

# NIETZSCHE AND THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH

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Ever since a recent interpretation of Nietzsche's thought put forward the claim that he criticized the correspondence theory of truth, it has more or less been accepted as an accurate characterization of a central aspect of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge. Moreover, it has been placidly accepted that this particular version of Nietzsche's criticism of this theory of truth is accurate. That Nietzsche does seek to undermine the validity of the theory that truth is a 'correspondence' between thought or judgment and states of affairs in the world is certainly correct. However, the various accounts given of this radical critique of correspondence are not completely accurate nor do they go to the heart of Nietzsche's epistemology.

Since the question of the relation between thought or judgment and the "world" or "facts" is an important one, and since Nietzsche's analyses of this issue have often been misstated, there is room for a detailed examination of what is, in point of fact, an implied critique of the correspondence theory of truth. It is implied because he does not formulate his position as a criticism of the notion that truth is expressed in a correspondence between statements and states of affairs in the world.

## *Versions of Nietzsche's Critique of Correspondence*

In Danto's *Nietzsche as Philosopher* a number of remarks are made concerning Nietzsche's implicit critique of the correspondence theory that raise interesting questions about what precisely he means by his criticism of traditional conceptions of truth. Before presenting some disputable versions of this critique, it should be said that Nietzsche himself does not explicitly claim to attack the theory of correspondence nor does he present a single, unambiguous analysis of this question in any one place. In order to see what he was driving at in his sustained assault on traditionally propounded ideas of truth, it

will be necessary to assemble random pieces of a puzzle in order to construct a reasonably clear picture of his thought. Since Nietzsche's critiques of previously accepted notions of knowledge and truth lie at the heart of his philosophical polemic and deal with difficult matters, we must proceed cautiously in order to avoid booby traps.

The account given of the attack on the correspondence theory of truth by Danto may be summarized in the following way: the world cannot be interpreted in terms of the concept of "truth" because "the character of existence is not true," is false, "and there is no basis for assuming a "true world" —hence, nihilism or the idea that "every holding-for-true" is *false* prevails and there is no *true world* at all." This is taken to be "a highly dramatized rejection of the Correspondence Theory of Truth."<sup>1</sup>

Granting that Nietzsche's compressed mode of expression virtually invites misunderstanding, the characterization of the remarks cited by Danto do not represent a rejection, not even a dramatic rejection, of the correspondence theory of truth. Let us look more carefully at what Nietzsche is saying in this context. The passage cited appears in the context of Nietzsche's explication of, and description of, the "advent of nihilism" in notes for his projected work, *Der Wille zur Macht*. The point that Nietzsche is making is that *one* reason for the emergence of nihilism is that philosophical categories that were previously accepted as applicable to the world may no longer be considered valid. If the world is no longer understood in terms of concepts such as "aim" or "purpose," "unity," "being" or "truth," then the world would "appear *valueless*" because these categories have been used to "project . . . value into the world." If, as Nietzsche intends, these categories are themselves "devalued," then, because of their inapplicability "to the universe," they no longer can be the basis "for devaluing the universe." Nietzsche avers that it is our "faith" in the (Kantian) "categories of reason" as metaphysical truths that has contributed to the rise of nihilism in philosophical terms. The conceptual error that has been made is that "the value of the world" has been measured in terms of categories that, Nietzsche maintains, represent a "*fictitious world*."<sup>2</sup> Nietzsche's point is that traditional philosophical categories that have practical and utilitarian value were taken to represent the 'true' structure of the world. Once scepticism about their applicability to the world emerges, then the world *appears senseless*. If the philosophical understanding of the world in terms of the specified categories is undermined by scepti-

<sup>1</sup> Arthur Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, New York, 1965, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> *The Will to Power*, Trans. R.J. Holingdale and W. Kaufmann, New York, 1968, p. 13.

cism, then, Nietzsche claims, the value of the world may be put in question. For Nietzsche himself, the inapplicability of such concepts to the world does not affect the value of existence or the world at all.

Danto's reference to the most extreme form of nihilism as the belief that there is no "true world" is quite misleading. For what Nietzsche means in this context is not that *he* holds that the denial of a "true world" leads to a form of nihilism, but that those committed to a previous standpoint may construe the rejection of a "true world" (constituted in terms of traditional categories) as nihilistic. What we call "the world" is, according to Nietzsche, a "*perspectival appearance*" the origin of which "lies in us." The acceptance of the "apparent character" of the world requires "strength" because, from the point of view of previous philosophy, the notion that actuality is appearance undermines the belief in a stable "true world", a belief that men, in general, seem to need. Although the complex question concerning Nietzsche's conception of a world characterized by perspectival appearances can only be touched upon here, it is clear that Danto's references to the correspondence theory of truth are not appropriate in the context in which he presents them. It is not so much that Nietzsche, in this particular passage, is denying that there is a correspondence between certain categorical determinations and the "world," as he is concerned to criticize the conceptual construction of a "true world" that is a consequence of a version of the correspondence theory of truth!

A commonsense belief that has been defended by a host of philosophers is that there is a "correspondence" between "a sentence and a fact" or between a judgment and a state of affairs in the world. Danto is correct when he points out that Nietzsche opposes this commonsense view. And it is also the case that Nietzsche maintains that the commonsense notion of the world is "true" in the peculiar sense that it is that kind of "error" that has created a world in terms of categories such as "unity," "being," "substance," "thing" or "causality" that is, indeed, "true for us."<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the commonsense world supported by traditional philosophical categories is not "true" in an ontological or metaphysical sense. In this regard, Danto claims that what Nietzsche means is "that there is no order in the world for things to correspond to, there is nothing, in terms of the Correspondence Theory of Truth, to which statements can stand in the required relationship in order to be true." This observation is substantially correct if we substitute the view that actuality is a complex of processes for the reference to the absence of "order." But

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 306.

<sup>4</sup> Danto, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

even this way of characterizing Nietzsche's position does not get to the heart of his standpoint.

The commonsense conception of the world supported by a correspondence theory of truth is, for Nietzsche, only *one* interpretation of the world, albeit a practically valuable one. We do not discover through experience and observation uninterpreted, "brute facts." Rather, there are only interpretations of phenomena that are conditioned by valuations or value-interpretations. For Nietzsche, what we call "the world" is conditioned by our senses, by categorical schema, our "psychological prejudices" and our "logic." There is no "world" apart from such determining factors. In terms of his own process theory of actuality, Nietzsche sees the actual world as a *Relations-Welt* or "relations-world" that is different at every point and at every moment. The commonsense world that has developed over a long period of time is a "fictional" one that has, nonetheless, proven to be exceptionally valuable for the survival of the human species. This notion of the "falsification" of actuality is considered as "tragic" by Nietzsche insofar as it deprives man of his belief in a "true world."<sup>5</sup> This reaction to what is called a "philosophy of dissolution" is a relatively early response to the loss of belief in a "metaphysical world" and the despair of attaining any absolute truth. Following in the wake of Kant's agnosticism in regard to "things-in-themselves," Nietzsche draws out the sceptical consequences. The world of phenomena that, in Kant's thought, we can "know" is not the "true" (or noumenal) world in itself, but is a world constituted by our senses, our intuitions of space and time and our categories of the understanding. Any creation of a "metaphysical world" must, in this context, be a duplication of the world of phenomena or, as Nietzsche puts it, the "true world" (in a metaphysical sense) is nothing but the "apparent world" once again.<sup>6</sup>

The claim that the 'true' world in metaphysical speculation is a duplication of the apparent world is not as paradoxical as it first sounds. In the wake of the Kantian restriction of knowledge to phenomena alone, Nietzsche maintains that we have no knowledge of a transphenomenal world or a metaphysical world. The Kantian notion of a realm of "things-in-themselves" or the Platonic conception of a world of forms or, for that matter, any idea of a transphenomenal "world" is considered unjustified. All transcendental worlds have been constructed out of the bricks of the phenomenal, "apparent" world insofar as such worlds are *conceivable* at all.

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and a 'true' world, Nietzsche is seeking a conception of the real as immanent in time and becoming. Insofar as actuality is in process and is apprehended only from a variety of perspectives, the world (or, in point of fact, worlds) comprised of perspectival appearances is the real world. There is no stable, immutable "world" at all. Rather, there have been a number of worlds conceived of by man throughout his development. For Nietzsche, the Kantian exposition of the structure of the phenomenal world is not a portrait of *the* world. It is, rather, a synthesis of categorical classifications that became crystallized in Kant's time and the scientific world-view supported by Newtonian physics. When Nietzsche refers in his notes to a realm of dynamic relations he appears to be relying upon a correspondence between his positive ontological assertions and an independent "reality." In this regard, Danto suggests that he speaks in an "idiom. . . congenial to the *Correspondence Theory of Truth*."<sup>7</sup> This is not the case because the correspondence theory claims a relationship between propositions or judgments and a specific, factual state of affairs, a relationship between a linguistic utterance or inscription and an actual, particular, extra-linguistic state of affairs in the world. Nietzsche's claims about the dynamic, relational character of actuality are not intended to represent any specific state of affairs. Rather, they are philosophical interpretations of a dynamic, physical theory. Nietzsche is quite aware that, in a strict sense, language cannot describe actuality.<sup>8</sup> The position that Nietzsche adopts in regard to the relational complex involving dialectical interactions of "centers of power" is provisional and hypothetical: it is a speculative process theory of actuality that is based upon the assumptions found in the world-interpretation of dynamic physical theories emerging in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Of course, it must be said that Nietzsche is attracted to the notion of a dynamic fluctuating process that amounts to a dialectical conception of actuality. It is "dialectical" in the sense that it assumes "action and reaction," a reciprocal, rhythmic process in which "centers of power" wax and wane, act upon and react to, one another. Such an experimental hypothesis is, however, no longer a blunt claim to apodictic knowledge. It is an elaborate postulation that is put forward as a philosophical response to the tendencies in physical theory. The path of Nietzsche's thinking was moving in the direction of something like A.N. Whitehead's *Process and Reality*, minus any metaphysical confidence or optimism. To see Nietzsche's last reflections in their proper light, we must see them not as an expression of

<sup>7</sup> Danto, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

<sup>8</sup> *The Will to Power*, p. 380.

the "last metaphysician" (as Heidegger calls him), but as the experimental thoughts of the first, post-metaphysical twentieth century thinker.

At one point in his discussion Danto claims that Nietzsche was not aware that he was undermining or trying "to overcome" the correspondence theory of truth.<sup>9</sup> This is not the case because, in terms of his analyses of language, conceptualization and the typical practical or functional nature of 'knowledge,' Nietzsche was certainly aware that he was putting in question commonsense realism, early positivism and any claims to a direct correspondence between propositional judgments and actuality. On the other hand, he does, in a sense, offer a backhanded justification of the correspondence theory insofar as he discloses its biological utility and its instrumental value. As we shall see, the implicit critique of correspondence ends with a critical version of a pragmatic conception of truth which finds a place for the instrumental value of the notion of correspondence.

Although Danto is sensitive to the importance of language in Nietzsche's thought and is cognizant of his belief that language is imbedded with metaphysical assumptions and presuppositions carried over from man's earlier "psychological" beliefs, he does not specifically apply this conception of language to the critique of the correspondence theory of truth. In natural languages, Nietzsche argues, there is a hidden "philosophical mythology" that is difficult to overcome. Through language man created another world of meaningful symbols by which he sought to become master of his environment. Language became the medium of a presumed "knowledge" of the world, a means of organizing and classifying phenomena for the sake of control and the creation of a human world in which man can function effectively. The tool of language has become so powerful that it is now, Nietzsche believes, an obstacle to understanding.<sup>10</sup>

Throughout its diachronic development, language has undergone a process of sedimentation and has been incorporated into philosophical thinking. Even though Danto accurately sees an anticipation of linguistic analysis in Nietzsche's thought, he does not emphasize a distinctive difference between Nietzsche's views and those of the philosophers who look upon "ordinary language" as a means of resolving philosophical knots. For, what Nietzsche says about the language of philosophy is *a fortiori* the case for ordinary language. Ordinary language cannot be a privileged guide in the clarification of thought because, according to Nietzsche, it is saturated with metaphors, anthropomorphisms and crypto-metaphysical assumptions.

Both traditional philosophical language and ordinary language are characterized by what Nietzsche calls a "falsification" of immediate experience or the actuality encountered in lived-experience. Natural languages do not and cannot "picture" the world because of their very nature and structure.

At one point in his discussion of Nietzsche's critique of the correspondence theory, Danto presents a tangled argument. He holds that Nietzsche is concerned about our beliefs *about* beliefs; for example, that they *should* correspond with factual states of affairs. The fact, he continues, that our beliefs are false in terms of the correspondence theory is "irrelevant as to whether we should hold these beliefs." Danto sees that even though our beliefs about the world are false, they by no means should be abandoned insofar as they are useful and have a life-preserving function. From this Danto falsely concludes that Nietzsche is not attacking the ordinary beliefs of ordinary men, but only "philosophical justifications of these beliefs."<sup>11</sup> This is an erroneous conclusion because, in the first place, Nietzsche holds that *before* the creation of logic, before man studied his languages and before any "philosophical justification" of beliefs, certain fundamental beliefs became entrenched in language that reflect primordial collective *beliefs*. Philosophers such as Kant are said to have given sanction to beliefs in "unity," "identity," "subject," "object" and "thing" long after they had become ensconced in ordinary language. As an illustration of his understanding of the development of language, we may turn to Nietzsche's evolutionary account of the idea of "identity" ("sameness" or "equality").

Nietzsche speculates that many beings who were unable to see the similar as "equal" perished over a period of time. The changing character of events or entities had to be overlooked in order for man to survive. Equality projected into the world of "similar cases" is a falsification, albeit a constructive one, that serves to give those who perceived it and conceived it an advantage over those who did not. This idea of "equality" or "sameness" is said to be the "basis of logic" and is the concept that shaped the fallacious notion of an underlying "substance."<sup>12</sup> Given this type of argument, it is clear that Nietzsche holds that the classifications and distinctions found, say, in the writings of Aristotle are philosophical justifications of such basic assumptions. Or they are formal presentations of beliefs that had long preceded such reflections. In this regard, Nietzsche seems to be presenting a notion similar to that of the structuralists, but with the addition of biological instrumentality. That is, that a

<sup>9</sup> Danto, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

<sup>10</sup> *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, 11. Cp. *Morgenröte*, 47.

<sup>11</sup> Danto, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

<sup>12</sup> *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 111.

kind of linguistic-conceptual *a priori* emerges out of the social experience of man that is eventually incorporated into the conceptual structure of a culture or preserved in a language group. Out of primordial beliefs or habitual "perceptions" certain patterns of thought are formed that are incorporated into grammar. There is an "unconscious domination and guidance through the same grammatical functions" that finds its way into modes of philosophizing that bear a "family resemblance" to one another.<sup>13</sup> Even though Danto refers to this insight of Nietzsche's, he does not seem to see that the "grammatical functions" that are referred to are rooted in pre-philosophical language and, hence, in the primordial language (and thought) of unphilosophical men. Therefore, the philosophical justification of basic beliefs only confers distinction upon notions that are imbedded in natural languages. In the language of the structuralists, Nietzsche is suggesting that there is an "unconscious *a priori*" that is carried over into philosophical discourse.

There is one final point in Danto's interpretation of Nietzsche that must be considered. He maintains that Nietzsche attacked the correspondence theory of truth out of an anti-metaphysical "bias"<sup>14</sup> and that he denied that any of our propositions are 'true.' In regard to the first point, it may be said that, in part, it is correct. Certainly, Nietzsche did attack any truth-claims about an absolute, permanent, immutable "reality" and did deny that we have any knowledge of a transphenomenal, "unconditioned" realm of being. However, Nietzsche does not undermine the correspondence theory solely in terms of any "bias" against claims made about a transcendental world of perfection. Rather, he denies that there is any authentic correspondence either between metaphysical assertions and a transcendental reality or propositions and a state of affairs in the world. There can be no strict correspondence between any linguistic-conceptual expression and any independent "reality" because of the nature of language and concept-formation.

According to Nietzsche, even the simplest statements (e.g., "The leaf is green.") are considered as "falsifications" of our dynamic, immediate experiences. Since I shall have occasion to refer to the central points in Nietzsche's analysis of words and propositions below, further discussion of this issue may be postponed for the moment.

In regard to Danto's second point—that Nietzsche denies that any propositions are 'true'—, it may be said that, from Nietzsche's most critical perspective, he is right. Given Nietzsche's critical analysis of

<sup>13</sup> *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, 20.

<sup>14</sup> Danto, *op. cit.*, pp. 192n, 193.

the origin, nature, function and structure of language, the truth-value of propositions is undermined. The "truths" that man has come to accept are construed, paradoxically, as a special set of "errors" without which man could not have survived. What Nietzsche seemed to be aiming at was a distinction between a strict theoretical or ontological sense of truth and a reduced form of practical truth. Linguistic-conceptual expressions cannot be said to represent any "truth" in an ontological sense or in the sense of apodictic certainty. When Nietzsche himself makes what appear to be "ontological" claims to truth, he is actually putting forward a provisional philosophical interpretation of some "world-interpretations" offered in the physical sciences. Even his cherished notion of a universal "will to power" acting through all beings is an "hypothesis," a postulation based upon a *human analogy*. The positive claims about a dynamic "relations-world" or a universal will to power are put forward as experimental, theoretical "interpretations" that have no more claim to "Truth" than any other plausible philosophical interpretations.

If, as Nietzsche avers, *all* language is metaphorical, so, too, is the language he uses in his positive assertions about the real. If, as he also argued, the language of physics in particular or the language of science in general (a language he admires for its greater precision) is a "semiotics" that is conditioned by our senses and our psychology,<sup>15</sup> then his own affirmations must be understood as signs (*Zeichen*) or symbols that point to or signify a reality that, in the final analysis, eludes linguistic or conceptual determination.

Insofar as Nietzsche's theory of "centers of force," "will-points" or a "will to power" is an interpretation expressed in the symbolic form of language, it is subject to the same strictures he imposes upon competing interpretations of the real. Only in accordance with his revised, experimental conception of truth could his theoretical claims be considered as "true." For Nietzsche, "'Truth' is not something that is there to be discovered—but something that must be created."<sup>16</sup> Having abrogated the notion of apodictic truth, he now construes 'truth' as an experimental "process," as a creative act, as *poiesis*. This radical, virtually aesthetic, conception of truth is sometimes characterized as "tragic" and sometimes related to the hypothetical, tentative, piecemeal approach to knowledge that Nietzsche admired in scientific method. "In place of fundamental truths," he once wrote, "I put fundamental probabilities—provisionally assumed *guides* by which one lives and thinks."<sup>17</sup> If one grants to Nietzsche his provi-

<sup>15</sup> *The Will to Power*, p. 306.

<sup>16</sup> *Nachlass. Werke*, Leipzig, 1901-1915, XVI, p. 56.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, XIII, p. 72.

sional, experimental and creative conception of 'truth,' then Danto's charge that Nietzsche is an epistemological nihilist is not justified.

The notorious statement—"There is no Truth."—does not mean that there is no mode of truth at all or that there is nothing that we may provisionally accept as true. Rather, it means that there is no eternal, immutable, transcendental or absolute "Truth," no "truth-in-itself." Nietzsche avers that it is man's fascination with such an idealized and etherealized 'Truth' that has been one of the causes of the advent of nihilism in Western civilization. This is the case because it represents "Truth" as perfect, absolute and complete (as in Platonism) and thereby condemns *this* world, the only world in which man has lived, thought, suffered and died, as "unreal," mere appearance, as radically imperfect, if not meaningless. And the loss of belief in such an absolute 'Truth' that follows in the wake of the rise of the scientific world-view and exposures of the psychological basis of the need for such a belief in absolute permanence renders *this* world, the "humanized world" in which man moves and has his being, valueless or meaningless. Thus, one mode of nihilism is considered as a consequence of an erroneous metaphysical apotheosis of 'Truth.'

Nietzsche believes that truth partakes of the uncertainty, ambiguity and adventure of human existence. The creation of truth is immanent in human destiny and is a means by which man creates a "human meaning" for the earth, for existence in time and becoming. The expression "*es gibt keine 'Wahrheit'*" conveys the idea that "there is no given 'Truth.'" This assertion does not preclude the making of 'truth' for the sake of the enhancement of human existence.

Another version of Nietzsche's critique of the correspondence theory of truth that initially relies on that of Danto has recently been presented. In Grimm's *Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge* it is said that Nietzsche's paradoxical assertions about truth are derived from the fact that he has to use a language that is freighted with the metaphysical and epistemic assumptions that supported the postulation of absolute truth in order to express his radical notion of truth as a creative process. This is a valid observation insofar as Nietzsche searches for a kind of meta-language in which to express his own positive assertions. In Grimm's account it is Nietzsche's "ontology of power" that is said to undermine the validity of a correspondence between judgments and actuality. Certainly, if actuality is characterized, as Nietzsche says it is in his notes and elsewhere, by interacting centers of force, by dynamic quanta of power acting upon and being acted upon by other such power-units, then propositions cannot be said to correspond to such a shifting, kaleidoscopic reality.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup>Ruediger Grimm, *Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge*, New York, 1977,

If reality is construed as a transitory, dynamic process, if it is a complex system of relations, then neither language nor conceptualization can be said to represent it. So far, this rationale for the rejection of correspondence in Nietzsche's thought has some validity. However, as we have seen, if neither language nor conceptual expression in language is adequate to describe such a world-process (an *adequation* that correspondence presupposes), then Nietzsche cannot consistently hold that *his* metempirical assertions about the structure of reality are objectively valid. If he claims that his statements about "power centers," "centers of force," "constellations of force" (*Machtkonstellationen*) or "will-points" are adequate or 'true' descriptions of an independent actuality, then he seems to have implicitly relied upon a form of correspondence between his propositions and an extra-linguistic, extra-conceptual "reality." But this is, of course, precisely what his critical analyses of language, knowledge and truth prohibit. Only if we assume that his philosophical speculations concerning the implications of a dynamic interpretation of nature are purely experimental and hypothetical can we rescue Nietzsche from an inconsistent reliance on a form of the correspondence notion of truth. As I've said, I believe that this assumption is warranted.

In his further exploration of Nietzsche's critique of the correspondence theory, Grimm argues that the correspondence theory presupposes a world of relatively stable objects and factual states of affairs about which we can make judgments that represent such entities or facts. It is not pointed out, however, that, for Nietzsche, facticity and objectivity are basically interpretations. Contrary to the nineteenth century positivists, he argues that there are no 'facts' in themselves. Rather, there are only value-interpretations of experienced event-sequences that we designate as "facts." An empirical statement, then, does not represent any purely objective, factual state of affairs in the world. In Grimm's account of Nietzsche's views, there is a precipitous move from this account of facts to Nietzsche's staccato assertions that "the character of the world of becoming is unformulable" and that there is a disrelationship between "knowledge and becoming."<sup>19</sup> Although these are accurate references, they obscure an important point in Nietzsche's analysis of "facts."

When it is denied that there are facts, Nietzsche means that there are no "given," uninterpreted facts. The identification of a specific event or state of affairs as a "fact" is a selective, perceptual and cognitive process. There are no "facts-in-themselves," he argues, because there is no "meaning-in-itself." In order to recognize mean-

pp. 26-42.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 47.

ing (*Sinn*) in something, "meaning must always be projected into [it]. . . before there can be "facts."<sup>20</sup> This notion is not far removed from Husserl's claim that consciousness is "meaning-giving" and that the "world of fact" is intentionally constituted as such. Without the "imposition of meaning," Nietzsche argues, there is no meaningful *Faktum*.

Nietzsche's related comments on this process of identifying facts are also relevant to the issue of correspondence. He remarks that all judgment is an expression of "belief." And our beliefs about entities are said to rest upon our perception of such entities as "identical cases." This means that we perceive entities *as* identical and then our belief assimilates this perception and is finally expressed in judgment. Before cognitive judgment, then, there must occur a more primitive "process of assimilation" that involves "an intellectual activity that does not enter consciousness."<sup>21</sup> Offering a typical genetic account of coming-to-know, Nietzsche traces the process of factual judgment from unconscious sensory processes of assimilation and selection to belief and thence to factual judgment. What is being emphasized here is that what we ordinarily take to be a relatively simple judgmental representation of a state of affairs is actually a rather elaborate process of *interpretation*. This is one of Nietzsche's reasons for denying a simple correspondence between judgmental assertion and an external state of affairs. For, while the process leading up to an empirical judgment is complex, the aim of this process is a radical *simplification* of our immediate experience.

What we ordinarily take to be an empirical datum is said to be already structured, selectively apprehended and synthesized. In effect, it is a kind of sensory construct. Judgments extend this process of distancing from the primitive experience and present their own form of "simplification" by means of the subsumption of sensory constructs under what Husserl will later call categorical "idealities." Factual knowledge, then, involves schematization, the imposition of order upon immediate impressions. The relatively rapid formation of judgments of fact was, Nietzsche believes, a human capacity formed under the aegis of "practical needs." Such practical needs include the need "to subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation."<sup>22</sup> This kind of hyperbolic Kantianism expresses the view that what comes to be accepted as "knowledge" of the world is a derivation from a more basic urge for control, mastery, convenient classification and designation for the sake of life, survival and effective action.

<sup>20</sup>*The Will to Power*, p. 301.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 289.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 278.

If, as Nietzsche argues in "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," language is a system of metaphorical signs, and if concepts are abstract, denuded metaphors, then there cannot be a correspondence between the schematizations and simplifications embodied in statements and actuality because actuality, as immediately experienced, has been transmogrified by virtue of sensory assimilation, rudimentary belief and conceptual judgment.<sup>23</sup> It should be noticed that this denial of correspondence also presupposes the dynamic, complex, fluctuating nature of a world-process that we are presumably aware of by means of a pre-judgmental, sensory intuition of "becoming" or a stream of impressions. If we grant Nietzsche these assumptions, and if we accept his accounts of sensory-cognitive simplification and schematization, then his claim that our reasoning (as preserved or expressed in judgment) *falsifies* actuality is not as implausible or as arbitrary as it is often taken to be.

Returning to Grimm's version of Nietzsche's attack upon correspondence, we may note that the acceptance of Nietzsche's "ontology of power", his assumption of dynamic relational processes underlying observed "effects" cannot safely be used to undermine a correspondence between thought (or judgment) and things, facts or events. This is so because this would presuppose the objective validity of Nietzsche's ostensible truth-claims *in re* his ontology on the basis of *some* kind of correspondence between his assertions and actuality (*Wirklichkeit*). To adopt Grimm's view, we would have to assume that the correspondence theory of truth is put in question by a theory of reality that itself can only be "true" if Nietzsche's propositions about it correspond to an independent reality. As we have seen, Nietzsche's ontological claims have to be seen as experimental suppositions that give a human meaning to the dynamic conception of nature in the rising orientation in the physical sciences in Nietzsche's day. If it can be shown that Nietzsche undermines a traditional version of correspondence without relying upon a metempirical theory of actuality, then the appeal to such a theory in his questioning of correspondence would be unnecessary.

A second tack adopted by Grimm in *Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge* is more promising. He indicates that Nietzsche argues that the intellect cannot transcend itself in order to determine the presumed relationship between its conceptual judgments and an independent actuality. Thus, the correspondence theory suggests that the knower has a vantage-point from which to compare the cognitive act and the object of cognition and is able to comment upon the adequacy of "their correspondence to one another."<sup>24</sup> Certainly,

<sup>23</sup>*Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's*, ed. D. Breazeale, Atlantic Highlands, 1979, pp. 82-83.

<sup>24</sup>Grimm, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

Nietzsche does suggest that the correspondence theory separates thought-symbols or conceptual judgment from an independent *Realität* and then claims that there is a relation of correspondence between two epistemologically distinct relata. In order to affirm such a correspondence relationship, we must go beyond the terms of the theory itself by claiming knowledge of a relationship between judgment and extra-judgmental phenomena that is unjustified in terms of the theory of correspondence itself. Furthermore, the assumption of the distinction between thought or judgment and "things" neglects to include the fact that the "things" or "states of affairs" referred to as independent phenomena are actually *already constituted* by sensory experience and rudimentary apprehension. Although such a line of argument is only suggested by Nietzsche,<sup>25</sup> it is consistent with his other comments on the structured "objects" that are the presumed referents of factual judgments. What is not emphasized in Grimm's elaboration on Nietzsche's critique of the correspondence theory is that, when formulated in a restricted way, the assumption of a correspondence is considered by Nietzsche as 'true' in a functional or pragmatic sense. Looked at from the standpoint of "utility" or survival value, the assumption of a correspondence between judgment and actuality has, in Nietzsche's considered view, a conventional value as a kind of highly useful theoretical fiction. That is, correspondence may be construed as a postulate of the empirical method or orientation that has proven to be exceedingly valuable for man's survival and his increasing mastery over natural processes.

### *The Pragmatic Value of Correspondence.*

Although it is often assumed that Nietzsche's pragmatic analysis of knowledge and truth is a late development in his thought, this is not actually the case. As early as 1872, he was exploring the meaning of the "knowledge-drive" and was raising questions in his notes about the *value* of knowledge and truth. Conceding that "life does require . . . belief in truth," he nonetheless held that "truths" are not logically demonstrated. All claims to truth have resulted from a *pathos* underlying the struggle to acquire a "holy conviction." It is this *pathos* that is said to generate the "illusions" that men eventually come to venerate as truths.<sup>26</sup>

In his unpublished essay, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," we find Nietzsche's bluntest remarks on knowledge and truth. He maintains that the human intellect is a sophisticated tool that is

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

<sup>26</sup>*Philosophy and Truth*, pp. 16-17.

similar to the physical mechanisms of defense that animals possess. The primary function of reason is "dissimulation." It is said that we trust our senses even though they selectively respond to stimuli the origin of which is unknown to us. Man agrees to accept the testimony of his senses and value truthfulness for their social value, for their conventional utility. In very early stages of his development man comes to recognize the "life-preserving consequences of truth."<sup>27</sup>

Unsatisfied with the "empty husks" of tautologies, man seeks to classify his sensory experiences by means of words. A word is used to designate a specific sensory experience. Words are signs or symbols that serve to designate "the relations of things to man" in a metaphorical way. A specific sensation is transferred into an "image" or what Nietzsche calls the first "metaphor." Then the image is imitated in a sound or a word. This second metaphor gives us an impression that we possess "knowledge." But we have only translated certain bodily sensory responses into metaphors that bear no (known) relationship to the original stimuli to which we responded.

Through a process of abstraction, we form concepts out of words, concepts that put aside the uniqueness and individuality of a particular experience, that classify similar phenomena as identical. We use the word "leaf," for example, to designate a bewildering variety of entities having unique forms, textures and colors.<sup>28</sup> This observation is the first expression of a notion that Nietzsche will repeatedly emphasize: that conceptualization has a simplifying function.

Nietzsche is led to the conclusion that the meaning of "truth" is rooted in language and in what he vaguely calls "human relations." Truth is understood as "A moving host of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms" that express "a sum of human relations." As time goes by, these "anthropomorphisms" become "canonical and binding." Truth, then, is comprised of worn out metaphors, linguistic sedimentations and "illusions" that have become socially sanctioned.<sup>29</sup> Years later Nietzsche repeats this observation in only a slightly different form. Asking, "What is truth?" he answers: "Inertia, that hypothesis which gives rise to contentment; smallest expenditure of spiritual force, etc."<sup>30</sup> The acceptance of the value of truth is, then, a settling of belief or conviction that serves the economy of social life, that serves to facilitate social relations and has primarily a utilitarian function.

One of the outcomes of this early sceptical analysis of truth is

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

<sup>30</sup>*The Will to Power*, p. 291.

that it is seen as ineluctably "anthropomorphic truth." In language or in our linguistic designation of our experiences we are engaged in a "metamorphosis of the world into man" or, as Nietzsche will later say, we seek a "humanization of the world." Our assertions or propositions do not refer to some absolutely independent actuality simply because our sense, our intellect, our language and our conceptual scheme transform immediate experience into intelligible, meaningful phenomena. Truth is a highly prized value that has proven enormously serviceable for human existence.

The idea that statements about external phenomena (or, as Nietzsche would prefer, statements about our experience of immediate processes) are "true" if they correspond to what we encounter in experience is naive and misleading. Having already selectively responded to (or perceived) only certain aspects of a dynamic process and having already transformed our sensory responses into conceptual-linguistic form, we cannot then claim, in any strict sense, that (to use Russell's early terminology) "atomic propositions" adequately represent or "picture" independent "atomic facts." The assumption of a propositional representation of cognitive data that have already been "constituted" (as Nietzsche says, after Kant) by our sensibility and our understanding<sup>31</sup> is, on the other hand, perfectly acceptable and may even be characterized as "true" in what Nietzsche calls a "restricted, anthropomorphic sense." From a purely utilitarian point of view, Nietzsche does accept a form of the correspondence theory of truth as long as one grants his particular account of the nature of the referent in empirical propositions.

It has not been sufficiently emphasized that Nietzsche's account of the "apparent" or "phenomenal world" and the means by which we come to claim knowledge of it are only sceptical variations on Kantian themes. The question that is raised concerning Kant's categories or "synthetic *a priori*" statements is, why do we believe that they are 'true'? Specifically in regard to synthetic *a priori* judgments, it is said that they "must be *believed* to be true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though they might . . . be *false* judgments for all that!" The acceptance of the truth of such judgments "is necessary" (though not, of course, in a logical sense) as a "foreground belief" that belongs "to the perspective optics of life."<sup>32</sup> This general attitude towards Kant's thought is quite typical. It is as if Nietzsche accepts the validity and meaningfulness of Kant's categories and synthetic *a priori* judgments purely in terms of their

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 308-309.

<sup>32</sup>*Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, 11.

functional value for human life while denying that they correspond to any independent feature of reality. He accepts Kant's classifications of knowledge and categorical determinations while insisting that they "falsify" actuality and are themselves "false." It may be noted that it is Kant's analysis of the limits of human knowledge and of the constructive nature of knowing that suggests the kind of agnosticism Nietzsche embraces. If all we know is constituted by our sensibility, our understanding and our *a priori* intuitions of space and time, then the phenomenal world is an elaborate construct. Since "things-in-themselves" transcend our knowledge, human knowledge is restricted to a constructed phenomenal world and is not an apprehension of the "true" order of things. The active, functional and constructive nature of knowing was clearly suggested to Nietzsche by Kant.

In his early essay on truth Nietzsche had not yet overcome Kant's distinction between a known phenomenal world and an unknown noumenal world. For, he remarks that the "conformity to law" that impresses us so much "coincides . . . with those properties we bring to things." We are said to have no access to a world except by means of our intuitions of "time and space" and our metaphorical, conceptual-linguistic representations. The world we know is entirely shaped by a "rigid and regular web of concepts;" it is a world *for us*. Creators of language and concepts are unconcerned with the unknowable "thing in itself" and language and concepts are neither "derived from the essence of things" nor capable of an adequate representation of what, for Kant or Nietzsche, cannot truly be represented or 'pictured.'<sup>33</sup>

Although Nietzsche will later reject the very notion of things in themselves, his conception of the intuition of actuality will retain something very similar to Kant's idea of the "manifold of sense impressions." At one point in his notes, he says that "The contrast to the phenomenal world is not the 'true world', but the formless, indefinable world or sensuous chaos. . . one which is not knowable to us."<sup>34</sup> In another place, he refers to an original "chaos of representations" that we encounter in immediate experience. For Nietzsche, as well as for Kant, knowing is an *activity* that imposes "form" or meaning on a chaotic stream of impressions. Knowledge is also, for both thinkers, concerned with constituted or constructed *phenomena* and not with a transitory stream of impressions that signify an encounter with an extra-conceptual, extra-linguistic actuality.

Nietzsche pushes Kant's agnosticism two steps back by first doubting that our categories or empirical judgments are 'true' in any

<sup>33</sup>*Philosophy and Truth*, pp. 82-83, 87-88.

<sup>34</sup>*Nachlass. Werke*, Leipzig, 1901-1915, XV, p. 68.

strict sense and then by arguing that what Kant calls knowledge is a simplification, organization and schematization that gives us a "false" representation of a transcategorical reality that is an elaborate, highly useful, fiction. In his wrestling match with the concept of knowledge, Nietzsche quite often seems to accept a kind of Kantian phenomenalism (without any allusion to noumena) with an instrumental or pragmatic twist. When he grudgingly allows such a knowledge of a "phenomenal world", he implicitly accepts the functional value of the assumption of the correspondence theory of truth. What has been shaped and formed by our senses, our "categories of reason" is phenomenal and does bear a correspondence relationship to our judgments precisely because such a *world* has been conditioned or constituted by our senses, our language and our categories.

Nietzsche repeatedly claims that the world-interpretations in philosophy and in the physical sciences as well are anthropomorphic interpretations built with the bricks of "conventional fictions" (e.g., "cause," "substance," "things," "number," etc.). Although inventive and useful, such interpretations or phenomenal representations do not bring us closer to the "truth" of things. What has come to be accepted as "true" in philosophy and science has been that which is in the service of life, the preservation of the species and the mastery of nature—that is, instrumental truth. Given his understanding of the nature of, and function of, language and conceptualization, it is clear that, for Nietzsche, knowledge involves a transformation of the "raw data" of experience into a semiotics that then is construed as the real world. However, he agrees with Kant that the world formed by our language and our concepts is strictly a "phenomenal world," a world for us, a humanized world.

As I've already indicated, there is a correspondence between appropriate empirical judgments and states of affairs in the "world" in the sense that what is interpreted as factual is already selected, meaningful, organized and constituted. The only "world" that man can comprehend or seek to describe in language is a constructed "phenomenal world." If we have no mysterious cognitive access to an unconditioned, transphenomenal "world-in-itself," then the "apparent world" is the "true world" or, as Nietzsche avers, there is no real distinction between the two. There is no "thing-in-itself," no "world-in-itself" and no "reality-in-itself." In regard to this standpoint, his analyses of logic and the "categories of reason" dovetail with his early interpretation of language as a metaphorical semiotics that simplifies and schematizes our complex, dynamic, immediate experiences or our pre-judgmental awareness of a fluctuating, fleeting multiplicity of unique processes and dynamic relations.

We have already seen that Nietzsche insisted that there are no strict "identities" in the ontological order. The projection of "identical cases" into the changing sequence of event-processes is, however, a very useful "error." One that has contributed to human survival. Now, it is precisely this ostensibly fallacious notion of "identity" that is said to lie at the basis of logic. Nietzsche is quite willing to grant that the basic principles or "laws" of thought accurately describe how we think when we think correctly. However, he does not simply assume that they are themselves universally valid *a priori* truths. Typically, he proffers a genetic analysis of primitive logical concepts. He sides with most thinkers in holding that logic does not have direct ontological reference—i.e., it is not 'true' of the world—even though he realizes that it has extensive application to the world. In fact, it is one of the basic tools by which a *phenomenal world* is constructed. To the claims that logic "pictures" the world or that logic may be effectively applied to the world, Nietzsche replies that "The world seems logical to us because we have made it logical."<sup>35</sup> And what lies at the foundation of the apparent logical structure of the world is the primitive assumption of what is variously called "equality" or "identity" or "identical cases."

Accepting as fact that man, in his evolutionary development, came to think of unique individuals in a complex, relational situation with other particulars as "equal" and "identical" or as subsumed under categories, Nietzsche speculates about the origin of this *belief* in identity and equality. First of all, he avers that "knowledge" is never an end in itself or an intrinsic good. Rather, it is strictly instrumental and "works as a tool of power". Knowledge is to be construed "in a strict and narrow anthropomorphic and biological sense." A species seeking to preserve and conserve itself, to augment its power, forms over a long period of time a conception of the world that is sufficient to "base a scheme of behavior on it." All of the instruments of knowledge serve the "utility of preservation" and extend only so far as the striving for mastery and control requires.<sup>36</sup>

Nietzsche contends that the "inclination to posit as equal" the diverse entities encountered in experience was motivated by "usefulness" for survival in, and mastery of, the environment. This process of schematic imposition on a fluctuating actuality is seen as similar to the process by which a primitive form of life (e.g., protoplasm) makes "what it appropriates equal to itself and fits it into its own

<sup>35</sup>*The Will to Power*, p. 283.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 267.

form and files." It is the coarseness of our senses that also incline us to see apparent equality or identity in actuality. But it is our "spiritual" activity that imposes equality and identity on processes in a way that is analogous to the assimilation of "inorganic matter."<sup>37</sup>

This biological model of knowing assumes that the appropriation and assimilation that takes place in apparently unconscious biological processes also continues in "spiritual" or cognitive processes such as coming-to-know. This biologism is taken quite seriously and is consistently maintained and ingeniously defended in a number of places. Sometimes Nietzsche metaphorically compares man's "web of concepts" to the spider's web that collects in its structure only what it can collect and what is of use to the organism. Our sensory habits are such that they "falsify" actuality for the sake of assimilation, appropriation and preservation. These habits underlie "our judgment and our knowledge" and preclude an apprehension of "the real world." "We are like spiders in our own webs," he writes, "and whatever we may catch in them, it will only be something that our web is capable of catching."<sup>38</sup> That "something" which, throughout man's diachronic development, has been caught in his web of concepts in the phenomenal world, a world that is constituted by our senses, logically primitive notions and fundamental categories.

Nietzsche's analysis of logically primitive notions is highly compressed, but it can be unpacked. Starting with Aristotle's formulation of the law of contradiction, he argues that this law of thought is based upon certain basic "presuppositions." If it is thought to say something about the ontological order, then it presupposes a knowledge that opposite attributes can not be ascribed to actuality. If the proposition,  $\sim(A \wedge \sim A)$  means that opposite attributes *should* not be ascribed to actuality, then such a principle is clearly an "imperative." It is an imperative or "command" "not to know the true" nature of actuality, "but to posit and arrange a world that should be called true by us."

Nietzsche wonders whether the "axioms of logic" are adequate to reality or whether they only serve as a means whereby we create a conception of reality for ourselves. If they are presumed to be adequate to reality, then this is based upon the assumption of a prior knowledge of "being." But this seems not to be the case and it is not a typical interpretation of logical axioms or principles. The proposition expressing the law of contradiction is not a "criterion of truth." Rather, it is an imperative pertaining to what *should* be accepted as "true."

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 276-277.

<sup>38</sup>*Morgenröte*, 117.

The law of identity assumes something self-identical. The "A" in "A=A" is a putative self-identical something that would only apply to a self-identical "A" (even if it is conceptual self-identity) if derived from the belief in self-identical particulars that is appropriate to what he considers an "apparent world." "A=A" is not a purely rational *a priori* truth because what we come to identify as *a priori* logical 'truths' are considered as the fruit of a long process of habitual modes of perception and habits of thinking that have proven serviceable to man. Long before the formulation of logical principles by Aristotle, it is assumed, language and thought already contained primitive assumptions about self-identical entities or "identical cases" (*identische Fälle*).

Seeking what the structuralists call "the unconscious *a priori*," Nietzsche hunts down the origin of logically primitive notions. He argues that our belief in identity is rooted in our belief in a fictional, self-identical "thing." In fact, it is said that our belief in "things" is the precondition for our belief in logic. The logical unit "A" in "A=A" is like an "atom" (one thinks immediately of "logical atomism") or a reconstructed, denuded "thing." On the basis of the primordial assumptions incorporated into logic, it came to pass that logic was conceived of as a "criterion of true being." This assumption, in turn, led to the hypostasization of a host of ideas that became the foundation for an artificially constructed "metaphysical world" or a "true world."

The ideas of substance, attribute, object, subject, etc., were spun out of the language of logic. When they were hypostasized, they served as the bricks of a Platonic image of a "real" world that is, as Nietzsche insists, only the "apparent world once more." What is meant here is that the notion of the logical structure of *this* world was appropriate only to an "apparent world" constructed out of basic logical fictions. By hypostasizing this logical picture of the world, some philosophers (notably Plato) created a "metaphysical" or "true" world that was then taken to be the realm of the "truly real." And, of course, *this* world—which, for Nietzsche, is the only world—is then relegated to the status of phenomenal appearances or an ultimately "unreal" world of phenomena.<sup>39</sup>

The apotheosis of logic, then, has proven to be the reverse of harmless. Logic is comprised of "fictitious entities" that the inventive mind of man has created. It is central to "the attempt to comprehend the actual world by means of a scheme of being posited by ourselves. . . To make it formulable and calculable for us."<sup>40</sup> The

<sup>39</sup>*The Will to Power*, p. 279.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 280.

unfortunate turn in our thinking, according to Nietzsche, was to have taken an ingenious tool for "facilitation" of understanding and economical "means of expression" as 'truth' or as a "criterion of truth." For the "world of being" or "Being-in-itself" was created out of a logic that was rooted in our psychic and sensory simplification of the world, a world peopled with static "beings" or "being."<sup>41</sup>

If the intellect is a tool that is "a consequence of existence," then we must not only need it for our preservation, but we probably need it precisely as it is.<sup>42</sup> The imposition of "being" on the multifarious diversity of our experiences is a function not only of logic *per se*, but is characteristic of all categorical determination. Again, the emphasis is on the functional, biological and convenience-value of categorization and logical principles. Conceptual simplifications and logical principles, categorical determinations and truth itself, are all *valuations* that serve a distinctive purpose: they are conditions of preservation and growth, control, mastery and power. Our faith in reason, categories and the value of logic is justified only in terms of the demonstrated utility of such ways of thinking or such cognitive instruments. This says nothing about the "truth" of categories of reason or about their relation to truth. As Nietzsche puts it,

The inventive force that invented categories labored in the service of our needs, namely of our need for security, for quick understanding on the basis of signs and sounds, for means of abbreviation.<sup>43</sup>

It was powerful and influential "artists in abstraction" who ostensibly created categories such as "substance," "object," "subject," "being," "cause," "effect," "unity," etc. To be sure, these creative thinkers did not do so *ex nihilo* insofar as accumulated human experiences and the diachronic evolution of natural languages laid the groundwork for the formulation of universal categories. However, it is only the utility of such evolved categories that constitutes their "truth." Categories of the understanding such as those described by Kant have value as "conditional truths" only.

Although there are no unified "things," the concept of a thing is posited as the substratum of attributes or properties or as that in which attributes cohere. The idea of "substance" is an externalization of our belief that we ourselves are unified subjects. A substance is considered as a transposed "subject." Since there are neither subject-substances nor unified substances, the concept of substance is a

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 291.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 273.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 277.

fiction based upon a "psychistic fiction". Even though there are no authentic "unities" in actuality, the idea of such unities is a convenient and practically valuable "fiction." That is,

We need "unities" in order to be able to reckon: that does not mean we must suppose that such unities exist. We have borrowed the concept of unity from our "ego" concept. . . . If we did not hold ourselves to be unities, we would never have formed the concept "thing."<sup>44</sup>

Causality, too, is formulated in terms of "psychistic fictions" and the belief in cause-effect relations is a "conventional fiction". All in all, the basic categories that are thought of as applicable to the world of actuality are fictions through and through. In spite of this, they are not only useful fictions, but they are probably "necessary" conceptual fictions. For, such categories shape and form the empirical or phenomenal world that is a world constituted by our senses, our "psychological prejudices," as well as by our "reason." In this sense, basic categorical forms condition the world we "know" and are thus "true" *for us*. In the broadest sense of the term, categories of reason are indisputable *pragmatic* truths. A "world" that has not been reduced to "our being, our logic and psychological prejudices" does not exist "as a world in itself," "*als Welt "an sich."*"<sup>45</sup> What may be called the "world of fact" is already constituted, a humanized world that is necessarily a "phenomenal world."

The world understood as a system of intelligible appearances "is an arranged and simplified world, at which our practical instincts have been at work." It is one that is "perfectly true for *us*; that is to say, we live, we are able to live in it: proof of its truth for *us*."<sup>46</sup> That he freely admits this *Wahrheit für uns* that is related to the world we have constructed in order to be able to function and live effectively (*wir haben eine Konzeption gemacht, um in einer Welt leben zu können*) indicates that, in a circuitous fashion, he accepts not only the positive value of pragmatic truth, but a form of the correspondence theory of truth.

If logic and the "categories of reason" serve "the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends," they cannot be considered as criteria of 'truth' or 'reality' in any metaphysical or ontological sense. However, the biological utility of the conceptual schema that has come to dominate man's world-picture cannot be cast off so easily and, in a sense, "one might indeed be permitted to speak here of 'truth.'" The

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 338.

<sup>45</sup>*Nachlass. Werke in Drei Bänden*, Munich, 1966, III, p. 769.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*

error that has been made, Nietzsche insists, is to have taken "an anthropomorphic idiosyncrasy as the *measure of things*, as the rule for determining "real" and "unreal": in short, to make absolute something conditioned."<sup>47</sup>

Granting the instrumental, conventional and "fictional" nature of logically primitive concepts and basic categories, the world that is known by means of them is a kind of conditionally "true" world. If actuality is in process, is in a constant state of "becoming," then there can be no authentically adequate conceptualization of, or linguistic determination of, such a dynamic actuality. However, the conception of the phenomenal or empirical world has such powerful practical value that we cannot readily do without it. Knowledge entails a process by which we "re-form the world. . . into "things," into what is self-identical."<sup>48</sup> The acceptance of the phenomenal world conditioned by our psychic, sensory and cognitive processes is determined by its immense psychological and pragmatic value. There would be no world apart from "interpretation and subjectivity," apart from the shaping and forming of a world by means of our senses, our psyche and our intellect. If humanization of the world is inevitable, then the only true world we could be said to *know* would be an apparent world that is constituted from the human perspective optics of life. There is no "Truth" or "Truth-in-itself" because there "are many kinds of truths," many perspectival, interpretive "truths."<sup>49</sup>

Phenomenal knowledge yields only a pragmatic mode of truth. By implication, then, the correspondence theory of truth is a *belief* that is warranted solely in terms of the practical justification of its value. The constituted phenomenal world may be said to represent a kind of Apollonian imposition of order upon a chaotic process of becoming that is intuited or suggested by immediate sensory experience. Becoming is the essential feature of actuality, an actuality that, by its very nature, eludes conceptual or linguistic determination. As a system of conditional truths, Nietzsche more or less accepts the "world-picture" that he characterizes, from a more sophisticated, sceptical standpoint, as a "systematic falsification" of actuality.

That our assertions about the phenomenal world may correspond to states of affairs in that world is necessary to the pragmatic truth-value of our conception of such a world. Since the conditioned "world" is known and is *true* for us, then propositions may be said to be 'true' if they correspond to states of affairs (or facts) in the

<sup>47</sup>*The Will to Power*, p. 315.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 309.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 291.

world insofar as it is conditioned by our senses, our logic, our categories and our psychological attitudes and needs. In this restricted sense, and only in this sense, Nietzsche does accept a version of the correspondence theory of truth. For, the assumption of correspondence is necessary to his elucidation of the dominant pragmatic value of truth. Ironically, then, even though he set out to undermine the theory of correspondence, he eventually finds a place for a correspondence notion of truth in terms of an inevitably pragmatic-humanistic interpretation of the "world" that his own thinking seeks to transcend by means of the idea of the creation of "new truths" that would presumably enhance human existence and pave the way for the "overmen" of the future. The notion of truth as *poiesis*, the projection of radical conceptions of the condition of man and the transvaluating ideals that were to serve cultural regeneration are far removed from the "restricted" anthropomorphic notion of "conditional truth." Nietzsche's "experimental truths" were designed precisely to carry man beyond narrow anthropocentrism and practical utility. Any hint of correspondence is left behind in the positive, yet "tragic" vision that comprised the acid test for the life-affirming capacities of the aesthetically conceived "overman."

When the dust clears, we see that Nietzsche was not so much concerned with negating the value or use of the notion of the correspondence theory of truth developed out of the evolution of the conception of the phenomenal world that has its roots in an elaborate humanization of the world for the sake of preservation and conservation and the enhancement of man's mastery of the natural environment. In an ironic and circuitous way, he provides a pragmatic justification of this traditional conception of truth that he believed was a subsidiary form of "anthropomorphic truth."

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