Diálogos, **60** (1992) pp. 219–230.

Reseñas

JOHN BIGELOW and ROBERT PARGETTER, *Science and Necessity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. x + 410 pp.

Bigelow and Pargetter's book is in many ways a remarkable one, though not one I can feel comfortable with. In the course of reading it I enjoyed time and again the aptness of some of their insights and the forcefulness of some of their arguments, but I was never able to overcome the impression that theirs was a very strange way of thinking. While I would expect philosophical discourse to draw its sustenance from ordinary common-sense usage and to work its way *through historical recollection* to the more precise—but also more brittle—scholarly meanings of words, Bigelow and Pargetter devote their attention mainly to so-called "technical" terms and senses of recent origin and doubtful legitimacy, which are set in an intellectual landscape from which most memories of the history of concepts have been bulldozed.

Take, for instance, the word 'realism'. In Chapter 1 the authors serve us notice that they are scientific, metaphysical and modal realists.[1] They warn us, in passing, that Hilary Putnam's pragmatic realism "is not realism at all" (p. 29, n. 18). Now, this is "a view that takes our familiar commonsense scheme, as well as our scientific and artistic and other schemes, at face value, without helping itself to the notion of the thing 'in itself'."[2] It is, I dare say, the only kind of *realism* that will do justice to the original meaning of the word (← *real* ← Lat. *res* = Gk. πράγμα). By excluding it by *fiat* from *their* acceptation of the term, Bigelow and Pargetter deprive themselves of the ability to understand the amazement that is often caused by some contemporary philosophical uses of 'realism' and 'real'. They discuss this at some length in Section 4.4. They deal there with David Lewis' brand of modal realism, which they do not approve, but treat with the utmost respect. The gist of Lewis' doctrine can be stated thus: There are many worlds, which are causally, spatially and temporally disconnected from one another and from the world we ourselves belong to, but are not a whit less real than it. Our world is indeed the only *actual* world, but that merely shows that the adjective 'actual' is an indexical—a word whose denotation depends on the context in which it is being used—just like the pronoun 'we' or the adverb 'now': the actual world is the world that happens to

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[1] By this they mean that they attribute reality to the so-called theoretical entities of science, to universals and to multiple worlds, respectively.

[2] Putnam, *The Many Faces of Realism*. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1987, p. 17.

contain the speaker. The primary aim of modal realism is to explicate possibility and necessity in terms of sheer existence. Lewis' explication goes, very roughly, as follows: An event is possible in this world if a matching event occurs in another world sufficiently similar to this world; an event is necessary if matching events occur in every world (Lewis tries, of course, to give precise characterizations of what I am calling 'matching events' and 'sufficiently similar' worlds). Now, according to Lewis, when he explains this doctrine to someone he often encounters a blank stare. No wonder, I should say. By countenancing "realities" that are disengaged in every real sense from our environment, our life projects, our *praxis*, Lewis recklessly disregards the standard meaning of words, and can hardly expect to be understood. On the other hand, Bigelow and Pargetter, who do seem to understand him and to feel at ease with his talk of many worlds, are unable to see the point of the blank stare. They think it is meant to convey the assignment of a very low—perhaps zero—initial probability to Lewis' doctrine, and argue that such an assignment is not rational, given that the doctrine has not been proved inconsistent and that Lewis is an expert who has thought longer and harder about the matter than we have.[3] Such an argument is needlessly laborious: if Lewis' thesis made any sense at all, its initial probability would unquestionably be extremely high, for—as Leibniz might have said had he chosen to forget the difference between reality and mere possibility—*non apparet ratio cur tot possibilibus mundis noster solus praeferatur*.[4] The blank stare encountered by Lewis indicates only that his English, like Humpty-Dumpty's, is somehow out of touch with the spoken language and therefore sounds baffling.

Bigelow and Pargetter's insensitivity to conceptual change in history is particularly obvious when they refer to philosophies of the past. Consider this passage:

> The causal relation [...] is a specific sort of physical relation in the world —in fact, a structural universal the constituents of which are forces ultimately supervening on the fundamental forces of nature. This is what Aristotle calls an *efficient cause*.
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> (p. 296)

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[3] "Why should Lewis's testimony give a nearly zero probability to his theory? Was it rational, in an analogous case, to give the theory of relativity zero or nearly zero epistemic weight when it was proposed by Einstein?" (p. 188).

[4] Cf. Leibniz' letter to des Bosses of 19 August 1715 (GP, II, 502).

I do not know[5] that Aristotle ever called *anything* an "efficient cause" (what is the Greek for that? αἰτία ποιητική, perhaps?), but his medieval commentators coined *causa efficiens* as a term of art for what he describes more carefully as ὅθεν πρῶτον ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἡ μεταβολή, "that from which the movement and the change naturally first begin" (*Metaph*. 1013a8, cf. 983a30, 1013a30). However, Aristotle makes it quite clear that the referent of this description never is a relation, let alone a "structural universal", but either one or several individual substances (e.g., a sculptor is that which from the transformation of a piece of marble into a statue first begins, father and mother is that from which fetal development begins) or a concrete event or state of affairs (thus, at 1013a9, abusive language, λοιδωρία, is mentioned as the source of a fight, μάχη).

But may be I am just nitpicking. If Bigelow and Pargetter's *Science and Necessity* does succeed in clarifying the notion—or notions—of necessity employed in contemporary science we certainly ought not to grudge them their idiosyncratic use of familiar words and their wanton reading of classical texts. That task is undertaken in Chapters 3–6 (pp. 93–294). The authors' main aim is to explicate the concepts of physical necessity and physical possibility. They reject the idea that necessity and possibility are primitive terms that speak by themselves and cannot be defined in terms of existence alone. They give two grounds for this rejection: (i) they profess a correspondence theory of truth, which, they say, cannot be reconciled with the admission of modal primitives (p. 173), and (ii) they hold "that modal properties must be supervenient on nonmodal properties", a thesis they say "is allied to the view that all dispositional properties [...] must rest on a categorical basis—some conglomerate of nondispositional, nonmodal properties in virtue of which a thing possesses the relevant disposition" (pp. 174f.). They are therefore committed to producing an explication of 'must' and 'can' in terms of 'is'. They turn for that to the familiar Kripke semantics of modality. This utilizes the idea that there *are* many worlds, apart from the one that we happen to live in, and explicates possibility and necessity in terms of a binary relation of *accessibility* between worlds. Thus Bigelow and Pargetter would say that a state of affairs *p* is physically possible in this our world if and only if *p* obtains in a world accessible from our world, and that *p* is physically necessary in our world if and only if *p* obtains in every world that is accessible from ours. They invoke *degrees* of accessibility to explicate counterfactuals, and would conjure up a *measure* on the set of accessible worlds to explicate probabilities. They do not share, however, Lewis' view of worlds as individual systems of individual objects. According to them there ex-

[5] But then, indeed, I am not acquainted with Aristotle's treatise "On the Four Causes" cited by Bigelow and Pargetter, and I have been unable to locate it in vol. 8 of the 1928 Oxford translation of his writings, to which they refer in their citation.

ists only one such system, viz. the actual world. Other worlds—so-called possible worlds—are merely "other ways the world could have been" (p. 203). Such other ways of being a world are therefore uninstantiated properties, universals. (Their modal realism thus turns out to be only a corollary of their metaphysical realism.) By conceiving worlds primarily as *properties*, not as *individuals*, our authors will surely avoid the blank stare encountered by Lewis: after all, we do understand the meaning of 'could', at least when it is used as it is here, in all innocence, as a self-explanatory word.[6] But the price they are ready to pay for it Lewis would surely judge too high:

> A reductive theory of modality aims to derive a *must* from an *is*. This is hard to do. Indeed, it may be impossible, as long as we fail to recognize an ambiguity in the 'is'. We cannot derive a 'must' from only a first-order 'is'. But we can derive a 'must' from a combination of a first-order and a second-order 'is'. A way things are is a way things must be when *there is no* alternative somehow for things to be.
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> (p. 212)[7]

The ways the world could be if it were not the way it is are, in Bigelow and Pargetter's terminology, the "worlds" *accessible* from our world. But, from their standpoint accessibility cannot be understood, as other authors have proposed, in terms of natural laws or of counterfactuals, because laws and counterfactuals are to be explicated in terms of accessibility (p. 263). Thus, as our authors acknowledge, they are bound to find a novel analysis of accessibility, or, if they cannot find one, they must justify their taking this concept as an unanalyzed primitive (p. 231). I am afraid that if they have to opt for the latter alternative they will be in the unenviable position of someone who explains the obvious ('can', 'must') by the wholly mysterious ('is accessible'). Unfortunately, however, as far as I can see, the closest they come to giving an analysis is the following:

> We have urged a supervenience thesis for accessibility. The degree of accessibility between two worlds should be determined by the intrinsic natures of those worlds. We recommend that some sort of combinatorial world-property theory offers the best chance of providing a satisfactory theory both of the worlds and of the degree of accessibility between them. Each world arises from a recombination of individuals in the actual world with the various quantitative

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[6] A similar consideration applies to the counterfactual that immediately follows the above quotation from p. 203: "If the world had been one of those ways, it would have instantiated different properties than the ones it does instantiate".

[7] On the other hand, Lewis' philosophical project—like Parmenides'—rests squarely on the idea that 'to be' has one and only one sense. As Lewis says: "I have not the slightest idea what a difference in manner of existing is supposed to be" (*On the Plurality of Worlds*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, p. 2).

properties and relations in the actual world, such as mass, charge, relative velocity, and force. More specifically, each world is a structural universal, standing in a host of internal relations to its own constituent universals and to other possible worlds. The degree of accessibility between worlds will be a function of the proportions holding between the different quantities assigned to the same individuals in these different worlds. [...] Thus, accessibility will be a quantity, a determinable, and each determinate degree of accessibility will be a structural universal standing in a host of internal relations to the worlds it relates and to various other universals.

(p. 263)

I confess I do not find it easy to understand how the many worlds, which have been said to be *properties*, can arise from a recombination of *individuals*. Even if we grant, for the sake of the argument, that this manner of speaking makes sense, we shall be left wondering how the *same* individual can partake of *different* quantities in *several* such worlds. For, as Bigelow and Pargetter say, somewhat quaintly yet sensibly enough, "*two* things which are *numerically identical* must have *all* their properties and relations in common" (p. 242, my italics). This principle of the indiscernibility of identicals cannot be reconciled with the notion of recombining the *same* individual with *different* quantities, unless *every* quantity with which the individual is combined in some world counts as one of the properties or relations which that individual must have in common with itself in order to be the same. But then the fusion of all existing individuals will sport at once each one of the properties we have agreed to call an accessible world, and such worlds will not be just the many ways that fusion *could be*, if it were not the way it *is*, but rather the many, ostensibly incompatible, facets of its being. So much for derivations of *possibility* from *existence*!

On their way to the explication sketched in the passage from p. 263 quoted above, Bigelow and Pargetter discuss some features of accessibility in the light not of experience—which is, of course, unavailable for this purpose—or of scientific practice, but of what they themselves judge desirable. Let λ be a first-order generalization that is true in every world accessible from a world $\mathcal{W}$. λ is then *nomically necessary*—a *law of nature*—in $\mathcal{W}$. Let $\mathcal{H}_\lambda$ be a world accessible from $\mathcal{W}$ in which λ, though true, is not nomically necessary. $\mathcal{H}_\lambda$ is said to be a *Hume world* with respect to the law λ. A world which is a Hume world with respect to every law in $\mathcal{W}$ is called simply *the* Hume world for $\mathcal{W}$. Bigelow and Pargetter "claim that there is a Hume world for each law-abiding world" (p. 243). This implies that accessibility is not a transitive relation and that it does not supervene on first-order properties and relations. Since "there are compelling reasons for believing that accessibility does supervene on the contents of worlds" it follows that worlds—at any rate those that are law-abiding—"must contain more than just first-order properties and relations of individuals. [...]

Combinatorialism must countenance higher-order universals. [...] These higher-order universals must hold the key to the nature of natural laws" (p. 245).

In Chapter 6—from the second paragraph of which I took the long quotation on accessibility—Bigelow and Pargetter explore such higher-order universals in the guise of *causation* and *force*. I cannot review here the details of this interesting chapter, but the following string of quotations gives the drift of its argument.

> Causation must be construed as a basic relation, a universal (p. 264). As far as semantics is concerned, this causal relation is primitive. Native speakers cannot pick it out by description—certainly not as "the relation which holds if and only if such and such probabilities hold". The best they can do is to recognize causal relations fairly reliably when they are confronted by them. Our task now is to develop a theory about what we *are* confronted with in such cases—not to analyse the meanings of causal statements: our task is metaphysical, not semantic (pp. 278f.}. Causation is a second-order relation between events (p. 280). Causation is, roughly speaking, a two-place relation, not an indefinitely-many-place relation (p. 271). A cause need be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an effect (p. 265). Causation is a *local* feature of a cause-effect pair. What makes one thing a cause of another is entirely a matter of the nature of the cause, of the effect, and of what transaction occurs between them (p. 271). We urge a strong thesis: that all causation is reducible to the action of forces or to some complex process involving the action of forces. Basic causation is a *structural universal* the constituents of which are forces. And forces, in turn, are *vectors* (p. 264). The Hume world is, first and foremost, a world without forces. The Hume world differs from ours only in higher-order properties and relations. [...] These two ideas can be seen as sides of the same coin: at the most fundamental level causation is the action of forces; and forces are higher-order relations (pp. 281f.).
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> There are two ways in which causation gives rise to modalities. [...] We will distinguish between "thick" and "thin" causes [...]. The thin cause is just the complex of particulars, properties, and relations which stand in the causal relation to the effect in question. The thick cause is the thin cause together with its external relational properties, *including* all the force relationships it stands in. [...] It is a relatively trivial matter that thick causes are necessarily followed by their effects. [...] Given the *whole* of the causal interaction *except* for the effect, the effect must follow. The second way in which causation gives rise to modalities is one which rests on thin rather than thick causes. [...] In situations in which there is no significant degree of indeterminacy, and there are no fail-safe back-up arrangements, then the nearest or most similar worlds with the [thin] cause are worlds with the effect, and those without the cause are ones without the effect. [...] The reason [for this] is as follows. Nearness or similarity of worlds is determined by the individuals, properties, and relations they share. The more they share, the closer they are. This applies not only to first-order

properties and relations, but to higher-order ones as well—including the causal relation. In fact, it is plausible that sharing of higher-order properties and relations should be given greater weight than first-order ones when determining the nearness, or similarity, or degree of accessibility for a world. Hence, the closest worlds with the thin cause will generally be ones in which it stands in the same relationships. Given the thin cause and its relationships (the thick cause, in fact) the effect must be present too.

(pp. 290f.)

Thus, Bigelow and Pargetter's philosophy of science and necessity turns ultimately on their idea of force. They are not very explicit about it. Indeed, they tell us that forces are vectors (p. 264), and as such a part "of the physical reality which underlies the mathematical machinations of vector spaces" (p. 63); but they warn us that they use the word *vector* "in a different sense than in abstract mathematics" (p. 81). However, they are reluctant to say precisely what is that sense. Presumably, they want to leave it up to physics. Now, physicists obviously enjoy talking of *forces* when they are in their more chatty moods—thus P. C. W. Davies in his deservedly successful *Forces of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) and H. C. Ohanian in the "interludes" interspersed in his excellent freshman/sophomore *Physics* (New York: Norton, 1985). But as soon as they get down to the business of doing physics, of thinking in current physico-mathematical terms about natural phenomena, the word 'force' fades out of their language. I have carefully gone through the indexes and tables of contents of two graduate textbooks I have at hand and I have not been able to find that word.[8] The reason is not far to seek: though concepts of force—such as the derivative of the energy-momentum 4-vector of a particle with respect to its proper time—still occur in modern physical theories, they no longer play the chief role, as the derivative of momentum with respect to absolute time did in classical physics.[9]

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[8] Cohen-Tannoudji, Dupont-Roc and Grynberg, *Photons and Atoms: Introduction to Quantum Electrodynamics*, New York: Wiley, 1989; Green, Schwartz and Witten, *Superstring Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Nor is there an entry for 'Force' in Lerner and Trigg's *Encyclopedia of Physics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1981), though their index refers, indeed, *s.v.* 'Force', to Newton's Second Law, to the definition of generalized forces in the Lagrangian formulation of Classical Mechanics and to the so-called force constants (of molecular bonds) in spectroscopy.

[9] There are several indications that Bigelow and Pargetter, while paying lip service to relativity (p. 191) and quantum mechanics (pp. 285f., 362), feel more at ease in pre-20th-century physics. The only example of a physical vector that they explain in some detail is classical velocity, which they describe as "a vector at a time" (p. 65), endowed with "both magnitude and direction" (p. 79). The forces they have in mind form *parallelograms* (p. 287), presumably in Euclidian space. More revealingly perhaps, they criticize David Fair's definition of causation in terms of energy flow because "there are in-

By paying closer attention to history one may perhaps succeed in placing the idea of force once again at the root—even if not at the core—of the idea of necessity in physics. The primary concept of *force* is that by which we still grasp the agents of directly experienced (*erlebte*), brutal necessity. It was thus natural that in its earnest attempt to *understand* such necessity—as it is manifested, e.g., in the fall of heavy bodies—classical physics should have taken over the term 'force' and employed it to designate certain vectors (in the plain, mathematical sense) which are a key ingredient in its explanations. But in classical physics—at any rate, in its mature 19th-century formulations—the necessity of events is not grounded on forces as *agents*—let alone on them as *second-order relations*—but on the mathematical structure in which the force vectors are incorporated. The natural processes for which classical mechanics and electrodynamics provide an explanation cannot, under the circumstances, evolve otherwise than they do because they are governed by differential equations which admit one and only one solution for each appropriate set of initial or boundary conditions. This manner of explanation is still pursued successfully in physics, although the force vectors of the older theories have been degraded to shadows.

I must now wind up this hypertrophic review without going into Chapter 7, "Explanation", which contains some able though familiar remarks about causal and nomological explanation and a novel and attractive theory of functional explanation. Nor can I dwell on the brilliant Chapter 8, "Mathematics in Science", which has compensated me for much of the discomfort I felt reading Chapters 1–6. I must therefore refrain from commenting on Bigelow and Pargetter's views on set theory, which I am not sure I would subscribe to, but I think are very much worth pondering.[10] On the other hand, I must say I sym-

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stances of causation not involving energy transfer, but involving only momentum transfer". Therefore, since Fair "must say that causation is the transfer of either energy or momentum [...], he must be able to determine that the momentum possessed by the effect is the very same momentum that was lost by the cause. [...] Also, in cases where both energy and momentum transfer take place, with which is causation to be identified? As they are distinct, the causal interaction cannot be identified with both" (p. 289). Let me add that, extraordinary as this tirade must seem in a book issued in 1990 by the same enlightened publisher that offered us Eddington's *Mathematical Theory of Relativity* as early as 1923 (and Dixon's beautiful *Special Relativity* in 1978—see there the definition of relativistic *momentum* on p. 101), it did not take me completely by surprise. After all, Pargetter is the co-author of a notorious attempt to define absolute simultaneity-at-a-distance by means of two *rigid bodies* in *inertial motion* relative to one another (*Phi. Sci.* **44**: 464–474 (1977)), and, as far as I know, he has never apologized for it.

[10] I should however, mention the following intriguing fact: The authors argue from their view of sets as universals on behalf of the plausibility of the Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) axioms. Yet they give pride of place to Zermelo's 1908 Axiom of Separation—

pathize with their "strategy...to deny that mathematical entities are idle" (p. 380) and I gleefully endorse their recognition that "mathematics is just further description of the physical properties and relations of things in the world" (p. 383), that, while "the mathematical 'must' is something that has to be reckoned with" (ibid.), mathematics also "generates a space of possibilities within which we locate the world as we know it and within which we can choose among possible futures for our world" (p. 384), so that mathematics both "sets limits to possibilities" and "opens up undreamed of possibilities" and thereby "lies at the core of modalities in science" (p. 384).

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ARISTOTELES, *Politik*. Teil I: Buch I, Über die Hausverwaltung und die Herrschaft des Herrn über die Sklaven. Übersetzt und erläutert von E. Schütrumpf. 390 S. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991.

ARISTOTELES, *Politik*. Teil II: Buch II, Über Verfassungen, die in einigen Staaten in Kraft sind, und andere Verfassungen, die von gewissen Männern entworfen wurden und als vorbildlich gelten; Buch III, Über die Verfassung. Übersetzt und erläutert von E. Schütrumpf. 590 S. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991.

Más o menos un siglo después de la prestigiosa traducción comentada (al inglés) de W. L Newman (4 vols.), aparece ahora otra traducción comentada (al alemán), pautada para cuatro volúmenes, de la *Política* de Aristóteles; se trata de los volúmenes 9,1 y 9,2 de la edición *Aristoteles Werke in deutscher Übersetzung* iniciada por P. Grumach y continuada por H. Flashar. Ya que de las casi mil paginas de ésta publicación, solamente una decima parte corresponde al texto de Aristóteles mismo, tenemos que ver con un monstruo de erudición: las Notas (*Anmerkungen*) cubren de hecho unas seiscientas páginas (pp. 171–384 del primer volumen; pp. 149–380 y 381–583 del segundo volumen); a ello se agregan, como *Erläuterungen* , la Introducción General (pp. 37–119) y tres introducciones particulares a cada uno de los tres primeros libros de la *Política* (pp. 120-134 en vol. 9,1; pp. 89-108 y 108-118 en vol. 9,2); y finalmente 65 páginas de bibliografía (pp. 135-170 en el vol. 9,1; pp. 119-148 en el vol. 9,2; esta segunda bibliografía es, salvo unas pocas omisiones y adiciones, casi idéntica con la primera; hay, además, varias bibliografías parciales/temáticas, insertadas en las Notas). El mismo traductor y comentarista —Ernst Schütrumpf, actualmente profesor en Boulder/Colorado— editará los

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which can be proved as a theorem in ZF set theory—and do not even mention the Axiom of Replacement.

restantes dos volúmenes, que comprenderán los libros IV–VI y VI–VIII, respectivamente. Para una justificación ulterior de sus interpretaciones, Schütrumpf suele remitir a su monografía *Die Analyse der Polis durch Aristoteles* (Amsterdam 1980).

La Introducción General trata específica y polémicamente dos temas: la estructura de la *Politica* y su ubicación dentro de la filosofía aristotélica. Muy temprano se había reconocido la falta de unidad temática en la secuencia trasmitida de los ocho libros de la *Política*, optándose por una recolocación de los mismos (la edición española de J. Marías y M. Araujo sigue aún este patrón). Pero ya en el siglo pasado, U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (*Aristoteles und Athen,* Berlin 1893) había protestado contra estas manipulaciones, alegando que teníamos que ver con dos tratados independientes. En esta linea siguieron luego las grandes investigaciones genéticas de W. Jaeger (*Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles,* Berlin 1912) quien, determinando las diferentes fechas de origen de los ocho libros, abogaba por la existencia de seis "pragmatías" diferentes entre sí, lo que condenaba al fracaso todo intento de los "unitarios" de salvaguardar algún tipo de proyecto homogéneo. Luego el mismo Jaeger (*Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung,* Berlin 1923), en polémica continua con von Arnim, modificó sus propios resultados en el sentido de que después de una *Urpolitik* perdida tendríamos que ver con un proyecto platonizante del estado ideal (libros II, VII–VIII), y con otro de investigación empírica de constituciones históricas (libros III, IV–VI), sirviendo el libro I como prólogo tardío a ambos proyectos. Pero trabajos posteriores han mostrado, según Schütrumpf, primero, que el estado ideal proyectado en el libro II no tiene mucho en común con el diseñado en los libros VII–VIII; y segundo, que los llamados libros empíricos parten de concepciones no tan empíricas, platonizantes (oriundas del *Gorgias*), que no excluyen el estado ideal. Mientras tanto, la tesis unitaria encontró nuevos defensores (por ejemplo. en I. Düring, *Aristoteles*, Heidelberg 1966); pero Schütrumpf rechaza enérgicamente estos intentos de convertir a Aristóteles el *Problemdenker* en un *Systemdenker*, sosteniendo —y ésta es la tesis hermeneútica de partida (p. 62)— que hay que distinguir cuatro tratamientos distintos entre sí de la pregunta ¿cuáles son las partes de la *polis* y cómo se explican, a partir de ellas, las consituciones existentes? Tenemos entonces dos torsos (libros I y III) y dos bloques (libros IV–VI, y VII–VIII con la introducción histórica del II), ambos incompletos y con vestigios de revisiones posteriores. La única unidad que esta interpretación reconoce para la *Política* es el todo de una continua evolución que implica, de hecho, cambios en la concepción misma de la filosofía política (los que, a su vez, prohiben sacar, de estos textos heterogéneos, "eclécticamente" algo como "la" filosofía política de Aristóteles).

Como (primera) consecuencia, Schütrumpf niega que la teoría política anunciada en el libro final de la *Ética Nicomaquea* sea compatible con las

teorías expuestas en la *Política*: los principios de una ética individual no son trasladables a la comunidad política, por más que se insista en la analogía de estado e individuo; así el ideal de la vida filosófica (contemplativa) no es realizable bajo ninguna de las constituciones existentes, y su "analogía" más cercana en lo político, la renuncia de un estado dado a la anexión de territorrios extranjeros, muestra lo precario de una conexión forzada entre *Ética* y *Política* (moralidad y legalidad no coinciden, de hecho, y las virtudes no son garantizables por leyes). La política, por más que originalmente se le haya encargado la determinación del bien supremo, no puede hacer mejores a los hombres, sino tiene que limitarse a tratar de formar buenos ciudadanos, y "buenos" sólo en vista de cada una de las diferentes constituciones. El político "verdadero", el auténtico "legislador", sería un educador, pero no lograría sus propósitos dentro y por medio del estado; de ahí que una política científica deba renunciar a la pretensión de una educación ética, buscando únicamente las condiciones históricas de un orden público estable. He aquí un Aristóteles resignado (en cuanto a las últimas metas de la filosofía práctica), pero nada dispuesto a retirarse ante la realidad política, sino, al contrario, reacio a la absolutización de un estado ideal utópico. De ahí el resultado: el primer libro de la *Política* no es la continuación de *Ética Nicomaquea* X; tal continuación podría establecerse, quizás, con *Política* VII–VIII, como una (fragmentaria, abandonada) ciencia del hombre; pero lo propiamente político, es decir, *una* teoría política (empezada, nada más) se concentraría en la investigación empírica de las constituciones históricamente dadas, como condicionamientos del proyecto del "buen ciudadano".

Segunda consecuencia: Schütrumpf niega también toda conexión (recientemente alegada, por ejemplo, por M. Riedel en *Metaphysik und Metapolitik*, Frankfurt 1975) entre la *Política* y la *Metafísica* o *Física* (doctrina de las cuatro causas; caracter "natural" del estado). Tal fundamentación platonizante de la política ha sido expresamente excluida por Aristóteles, quien exigió para cada objeto específico de estudio su ciencia particular correspondiente (aquí la ciencia del bien realizable por la acción), con su método propio de investigación (aquí el ajustado a la inestabilidad característica del campo de la *praxis*). De ahí que las analogías biomórficas y tecnomórficas deban evitarse en la investigación política (una cierta teleología es naturalmente inherente al condicionamiento biológico de la especie humana, considerada desde el punto de vista antropológico, pero tal "naturalidad" originaria pertenece precisamente a la *pre*historia de la política, a saber a los "regímenes" de la casa y de la familia). Al reducirse, en asuntos políticos, las proposiciones universales (prescriptivos) a meros lugares comunes, todo dependerá de la descripción de los casos concretos, y esta descripción empírica logrará solamente una exactitud relativa (lo que, sin embargo, hace al experto ser superior al conocedor de principios universales). El resultado de este rechazo de la conexión ontología-ética es que

la ciencia política aristótelica *no* se ocupa del análisis "exacto" de principios metapolíticos (platónicamente hipostasiados), sino intenta, sacrificando el ideal de una exactitud teórica, una evaluación pragmática de sucesos históricos contingentes; imposible entonces, para Schütrumpf, el tener que tolerar ese hegeliano *auf den Begriff bringen* que está de moda en ciertos estudios de la *Política* aristotélica, estudios que siguen insistiendo en una separación de los libros "de interés filósofico" de aquellos "de mero interés histórico" (al contrario: al renunciar al fantasma de un *telos* universal *in politicis*, resulta que el único interés filosófico está en el *telos* cada vez específico de cada constitución específica, histórica).

Entretanto se habrá notado que en todo lo resumido hay un fuerte *parti pris* envuelto, lo que se evidencia ya en los subtítulos (tomados de Aristóteles mismo) que Schütrumpf propone para cada uno de los tres primeros libros de la *Política,* pero se confirma aún más en las continuas polémicas (de Schütrumpf) contra unos críticos recientes de su interpretación global (la bibliografia del segundo volumen, preparada un año más tarde que la del primero, da cuenta de que esa polémica sigue su curso). Es obvio que solamente un estudio comparativo de algun problema particular planteado en *Política* I–III (por ejemplo, el de la esclavitud "natural" de cierto tipo de hombre/propiedad) podría ayudar a decidir cuál de los dos bandos tiene (más) razón (por ejemplo, respecto de la circunstancia paradójica de que, en *Categorías* 7, Aristóteles sostenga, al mismo tiempo, la igualdad teórica de todas las primeras sustancias individuales y la desigualdad fáctica de amo y siervo; véase Schütrumpf, pp. 107s.); un estudio al cual esta reseña tiene que renunciar por ahora, máxime cuando todavía faltan los otros dos tomos previstos (tal estudio particular, por ejemplo, sobre la esclavitud, tendría que tomar en cuenta, entre otras, la reciente edición francesa del libro I (P. Pellegrin, *Aristote, La Politique, Livre I,* Paris 1983). De todos modos, no importa quien gane; por el momento hay que reconocer, y con franca admiración, el enorme trabajo realizado (ya) con tanto rigor por el traductor/comentarista. La única crítica que sí habría que hacerle es lo inexplicable de la (supuesta) no-existencia de una filología/filosofía clásica en lengua castellana; pero esta lamentable ausencia (frente a la presencia de estudios en alemán, inglés, francés y italiano) parece ser "tradición" en la *Klassische Altertumswissenchaft* que no se ha dado cuenta de que el innegable atraso anterior de España —y, en consecuencia, de Hispanoamérica— en ésta y otras disciplinas ha sido superado ya, por lo menos en el último decenio (y el que Schütrumpf probablemente no sepa español, no debería ser una excusa).

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