

HEGEL AND THE PROSPECT OF PERPETUAL PEACE

ROBERT ARP

I. INTRODUCTION

For my own part, I put my trust in the theory of what the relationships between men and states *ought to be* according to the principle of right. It recommends to us earthly gods the maxim that we should proceed in our disputes in such a way that a universal federal state may be inaugurated, so that we should therefore assume that *it is possible (in praxi)*. I likewise rely (*in subsidium*) upon the very nature of things to force men to do what they do not willingly choose (*fata volentem ducunt, nolentum trahunt*). This involves human nature, which is still animated by respect for right and duty. I therefore cannot and will not see it as so deeply immersed in evil that practical moral reason will not triumph in the end, after many unsuccessful attempts, thereby showing that it is worthy of admiration after all. On the cosmopolitan level too, it thus remains true to say that whatever reason shows to be valid in theory, is also valid in practice.¹

So ends Kant's response to the pessimistic Mendelssohn in his work entitled, "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'". There Kant es-

¹ Immanuel Kant, "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'", in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 92. For a recent account of Kant's cosmopolitanism, see *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, ed. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997).

pouses the view that the welfare of the human race as a whole "is increasing within a series of developments extending into all future ages."² Even though we are constantly being "confronted by the sorry spectacle not only of those evils which befall mankind from natural causes, but also of those which men inflict upon one another," we should not give up hope, for "our spirits can be raised by the prospect of future improvements."³ These "future improvements" will *possibly* culminate at the cosmopolitan level in a perpetual peace. Reason sets up the seeking of this peace as an immediate duty⁴

² *Ibid.*, p. 63. Kant's historical/developmental account begins with the recognition that humanity is bifurcated—the natural competes with the moral. By the close of the eighteenth-century Kant felt that humanity had reached the point where the moral could, through applied reason and free choice, transcend all of what is entailed in the natural. The "telos" of moral freedom could be postulated and moral evil obliterated at the communal and cosmopolitan levels. See Mortimer Adler, *How to Think About WAR and PEACE* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995), pp. 175–6. Adler notes, however, that Kant's "optimism was seriously qualified. He looked upon lasting world peace as an unattainable ideal. It has practical significance only in the sense that it regulates the direction of our efforts. It remains a goal, in that progress is determined by motion toward it, but history is doomed to fall short of its realization." It may be true that, for Kant, the prospect of perpetual peace was a regulative ideal; however, the slack created by the failings of the will would be taken up by the workings of nature. See Kant's "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in *Kant: Political Writings*, pp. 113, 116. Kant sees the "mechanism of nature" working itself out and compelling the world powers toward peaceable relations despite the dictates of the moral law apprehended by reason. See F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 72–3. Echoing Kant, Hinsley notes:

Kant's philosophy... drew a distinction between the mechanical and the teleological processes in history. Nature, the world of phenomena, was a purely mechanical system; in order to understand its operation it was necessary to postulate an end, a purpose. The end could not be derived from the course of history, from empirical data, from nature itself, but only from the existence of reason and morality in man. As for the relationship between the two processes... they must converge. The end was not derivable from nature, which had its own mechanical design; but the design of nature, working in history, could work only to that end. On the other hand, it was not because men willingly used their reason to guide it there that it worked to that end. It did so because the very opposition which the mechanical process of nature set up to the dictates of the moral process forced irrational men to use their reason.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁴ "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," p. 104.

and, since "ought" always implies "can,"⁵ there exists the hope that one day there will be a world peace.

Kant is rebuffed by Hegel for his vision of a world in which a "federation of peoples" comprising the world powers guided by reason as the "highest legislative moral power" would "end all wars for good."⁶ Such a state of "perpetual peace" is envisioned by Hegel as not only impossible because it is "*only a philosophical Idea*," but also unhealthy for the various societies that comprise the world.⁷ Hegel has Plato, but also Kant in mind when he states in the Preface to his *Philosophy of Right* that philosophy is

exploration of the rational, it is for the very reason the *comprehension of the present and the actual*, not the setting up of a *world beyond* which exists God knows where —or rather, of which we can very well say that we know where it exists, namely in the errors of a one-sided and empty ratiocination.⁸

Hegel goes on a few lines later to make it clear that what he is attempting in that treatise

shall be nothing other than an attempt *to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity*. As a philosophical composition, it must distance itself as far as possible from the obligation to construct a *state as it ought to be*; such instruction as it may contain cannot be aimed at instructing the state on how it ought to be, but rather at showing how the state, as the ethical universe, should be recognized.⁹

The Kantian concern for the "ought" is abandoned in favor of a descriptive account of what "is." The consequence of this

⁵ Concerning the "ought implies can" doctrine, see *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1929), A808–B836, p. 637. See also *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (La Salle: The Open Court Pub. Co., 1934), Book II, Section 1, p. 55. And note in Kant's essay entitled, "Perpetual Peace" that the "man of practice" concedes that "we can do what we ought to do" pp. 116–117).

⁶ "Perpetual Peace," pp. 102–104.

⁷ G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), para. 324, pp. 361–362.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

is that Hegel makes it abundantly clear that Kant's endeavor to philosophically proffer a cosmopolitan view of perpetual peace, understood precisely as a postulate of practical reason, cannot be accomplished.

But, there is more to this rejection. Hegel not only states that a perpetual peace cannot take place, he further implies that a perpetual peace *should not* take place. In Hegel's mind, perpetual peace should not be accomplished because warring between or among nations is something that is not to be viewed as an "absolute evil."¹⁰ War is a good thing in that it brings the entire state together in a unique way. War shatters the radical independence of individual free wills and reminds members of the state that their freedom and thus, very spirit or vitality, are to be found within the state.¹¹ In *The Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel makes this claim regarding a particular state: "In order not to get them rooted and settled in this isolation and thus break up the whole into fragments and let the common spirit evaporate, government has from time to time to shake them to the very center by war."¹² Also, in *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel likens the state to a body whose particular characteristics would become increasingly "rigid and ossified" if it were not for war, as it were, making the "blood flow" (pun intended) throughout the various parts of the body. If these parts become "internally hard" then the health of the body is put into danger and the eventual result is death.¹³

¹⁰ Ibid., para. 324, p. 361.

¹¹ For Kant, the radical independence of individuals translates into the slavery of natural impulse. So, for different reasons than Hegel, Kant wants to make sure that such a consequence can be avoided. For Hegel, the lack of war signals the negative consequences of social isolationism and deficient nationalist "spirit." For Kant, the lack of war signals the positive consequence that the needs and inclinations of an individual or people (which lead to destructive consequences) has been overcome. See Duane L. Cady, *From Warrism to Pacifism* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), p. 136. There Cady maintains that, according to Kant, "Unless nations as well as individuals subject themselves to principles of order that respect the rights of their peers and give up claims to moral superiority, disorder will prevail and the arbitrary and awful condition of war will continue."

¹² G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*, in *The Philosophy of Hegel*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Modern Library, 1953), p. 422.

¹³ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 324, pp. 361–362.

Perpetual peace, then, is envisioned as inimical because it would be the thing that kills the body of the state. It would be the ultimate disunifier; the thief in the night coming to steal the very spirit of the particular society.

This introduction hints at the purpose of my paper. I intend to show that Hegel was wrong in his conclusions regarding perpetual peace. Hegel's mistake does not lie so much in his insistence upon the unrealizability of perpetual peace. That is to say, it is understandable, given his insistence upon the correct recognition of the state as an "ethical universe" unto itself, as well as his concern for the dialectic and philosophy of history, that he would maintain that perpetual peace could not be realized. Where Hegel goes wrong has to do with the claim that perpetual peace *should not* be realized. I will elucidate the problems with this point of view by noting the inconsistencies present in Hegel's system. Further than this, by drawing from Hegel's own theories regarding the dialectic, the philosophy of history and Absolute spirit, I will consider a way in which Hegel could have concluded to the absolute abolishment of war and the prospect of a cosmopolitan peace.¹⁴

II. THE "COULD NOT" THESIS

To understand the reasons why Hegel thinks that perpetual peace could not be realized, it is necessary to give an account of how Hegel views the state *vis-à-vis* his own philosophical standpoint. This will entail a brief description of spirit, the dialectical process and freedom in relation to Hegel's concept of the state.

Hegel uses the term "*Geist*" or spirit to refer to the embodiment of reason in the institutions of the various societies throughout the course of history. The spirit of the world "is action,"¹⁵ the action of reason. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel makes this claim:

¹⁴ I wish to thank James Bohman, Brian Cameron, Kevin Decker and an anonymous referee for *Diálogos* for offering me their helpful comments on this paper.

¹⁵ G. W. F. Hegel, *The History of Philosophy*, in *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 162.

Reason is spirit, when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to the level of truth, and reason is consciously aware of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself. The development of spirit was indicated in the immediately preceding movement of mind, where the object of consciousness, the category pure and simple, rose to be the notion of reason. When reason "observes" this pure unity of ego and existence, the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, of for-itself-ness and in-itself-ness this unity is immanent, has the character of implicitness or of being, and consciousness of reason finds itself.¹⁶

Besides the obvious intent to make explicit an idealism, the "dialectical" character of Hegel's logic can be viewed in this above quotation since Hegel speaks of the "unity" of opposing forces such as "ego and existence" and "subjectivity and objectivity." Spirit is an activity precisely because of the triadic motion it exhibits as it moves from thesis to antithesis to sublated unity. The activity of spirit is a "unity of absolutely separate aspects, and in fact comes into existence as the common ground, the mediating agency, just through the reality of these selfless extremes."¹⁷ In *The Philosophy of History* Hegel echoes what is stated in *The Phenomenology* when he tells us that spirit is "within itself opposed to itself; it has to overcome itself as the genuinely hostile obstacle of its end... What the spirit wants is to achieve its own conception."¹⁸

The fundamental principle underlying all of Hegel's ideas is that "the truth is the whole" and the dialectic shows this to be the case.¹⁹ This is to say that any subject matter lacking in wholeness is one-sided, incomplete and consequently, partially true. This kind of holistic thinking transfers over into the moral and political life as well. Each individual person embodies the activity of spirit, and it would be a mistake to think that spirit's activity could take place in isolation: "Spirit, so far

¹⁶ *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 410.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 456.

¹⁸ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, in *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 22.

¹⁹ See *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, pp. 456-57 and the section entitled, "Absolute Knowledge".

as it is the immediate truth, is the ethical life of a nation."²⁰ The individual stands in relation to family, civil society and the various other institutions that comprise a particular nation-state. The state is the epitome of wholeness and an individual's "highest duty" is to be a member of the state.²¹ We are told in *The Philosophy of Right* that the "universal must be activated, but subjectivity on the other hand must be developed as a living whole."²² And further that the state is a "primary whole"²³ and a "wholly spiritual entity."²⁴ The state is the immanency of *Anundfürsichsein*, "the ethical spirit as substantial will, *manifest* and clear to itself, which thinks and knows itself and implements what it knows in so far as it knows it."²⁵

An individual is most free when knowingly and hence, dutifully existing as a member of a state. In *The Philosophy of History* we are told that "objective freedom, the laws of real freedom, demand the subjugation of the mere contingent will..."²⁶ Hegel can thus claim in *The Philosophy of Right* that freedom "enters into its highest right"²⁷ in the state, and in *The Philosophy of History* that "freedom is merely to know and understand such general and substantial matters as law and right, to will them and to create a reality which suits them—the state."²⁸ The achievement of spirit's own conception, the ac-

²⁰ *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 413.

²¹ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 258, p. 275.

²² *Ibid.*, para. 260, p. 283.

²³ *Ibid.*, para. 332, p. 368.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 335, p. 369.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 257, p. 275. See Carl Joachim Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 69–70. Friedrich notes that Hegel's conception of the state has affinities to the Greek polis: "When Aristotle defines the *polis* as the highest community and hence organized for the highest good, he has in mind a political community built upon the principle of group solidarity, in matters not only of politics and economics, but of religion, art, and all the numerous manifestations of the ritual everyday life... Hegel's concept, while not identical with this view... is nevertheless akin to it, in that the state is all-engulfing, the totality of values being in a sense comprised by it. It is not primarily the government, as is traditionally assumed by Englishmen and Americans, but the organized nation in all its manifestations."

²⁶ *The Philosophy of History*, p. 157.

²⁷ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 258, p. 275.

²⁸ *The Philosophy of History*, p. 25.

knowledge of spirit's immanent *Anundfürsichsein*, is an activity which is made manifest in the "stages in the development of the principle whose meaning is the consciousness of freedom."²⁹ The conscious awareness of spirit's "self as its own world and of the world as itself" precisely comprises its free activity.

However, the only way in which individuals could freely come together and embody the spirit of a particular state is by virtue of a dialectical process whereby the individual "distinguishes himself from himself" and relates "himself to another person."³⁰ Hegel claims that the negation entailed in the dialectic is "an essential component of individuality."³¹ Persons in a social setting are set up in opposition to one another by virtue of their claims to freedom which are manifested in individual rights. Individuals eventually come to realize the "good" of the society in which their will aligns itself with the "concept" of the will. In such a situation, "abstract right, welfare, the subjectivity of knowing, and the contingency of external existence, as *self-sufficient for themselves*, are superseded."³² But, as with anything sublated in the dialectical process, Hegel tells us that these various attributes of the individual will, although superseded by the concept of will, "are at the same time *essentially contained and preserved* within it."³³

In the state, the individual stands in a relationship "to and with the other members of the state. Again, it is only within the context of such a relationship that the individual is wholly free:

The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But *concrete freedom* requires that personal individuality and its particular interests should reach their full *development* and gain *recognition of their right* for itself (within the system of the family and of civil society), and also that they should, on the one hand, *pass over* of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and on the other,

²⁹ Ibid., p. 23.

³⁰ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 40, p. 70.

³¹ Ibid., para. 324, p. 362.

³² Ibid., para. 129, p. 157.

³³ Ibid., para. 129, p. 157.

knowingly and willingly acknowledge this universal interest even as their own *substantial spirit*, and *actively pursue it* as their *ultimate end*.³⁴

This acknowledgment of a universal interest as an individual's ultimate end is what translates into patriotism for Hegel. Hegel defines patriotism as "that disposition which, in the normal conditions and circumstances of life, habitually knows that the community is the substantial basis and end."³⁵ To be patriotic is to not only have an appreciation for your role in the state, but to see your individual role as conducive to a bigger plan. In *The History of Philosophy* Hegel likens the many-facetedness of the state to a cathedral "which has many vaults, passages, columnades, halls and other subdivisions; it all has been created as one whole, with one purpose or end."³⁶ He goes on to speak about the "rich spirit of a people" with the "entire wealth of its many-sidedness" that makes up the "definite form" of a particular nation.³⁷

Having given some background concerning Hegel's ideas of the spirit, the dialectic and the state, we are now in a better position to see the reason why perpetual peace could not be endorsed by Hegel. As was pointed out already in the introduction to this paper,³⁸ philosophy, for Hegel, is the recognition of the actual. Nothing simply comes to be as it is in actuality. We have the capability of understanding this actuality precisely because we can understand the ways in which this actuality has unfolded in historical time. Thus, Hegel makes the claim in the Preface to *The Philosophy of Right* that philosophy is thought in the world and "appears only at a time when actuality has gone through its formative process and attained its completed state."³⁹ The mind not only grasps this actuality, but *is* this actuality. This is why Hegel makes the further claim that "what is rational is actuality" and vice

³⁴ Ibid., para. 260, p. 282.

³⁵ Ibid., para. 268, p. 289.

³⁶ *The History of Philosophy*, p. 166.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 166.

³⁸ See above, p. 3.

³⁹ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 23.

versa.⁴⁰ What is rational is actual precisely because the mind, in its most fully realized state, comprehends the unification of abstract, theoretical "form" and concrete, particular "content" in what Hegel terms the "Idea."⁴¹ This view translates into something like a "here-and-now" of comprehended reality. Each individual mind is a "*child of his time*" and philosophy is "*its own time comprehended in thoughts.*"⁴²

Problems arise when the unity of the Idea is distorted by the mind's abstracting the form from the content of this historical process. In fact, Hegel maintains that doing so is "foolish" and opinionated. Plato's *Republic* and Kant's "Cosmopolitan Ideal" are among the foolish abstractions in the annals of history. Hegel concludes with respect to an abstract philosophical position: "If his theory does indeed transcend his own time, if it builds itself a world *as it ought to be*, then it certainly has an existence, but only within his opinions — a pliant medium in which the imagination can construct anything it pleases."⁴³ What this means is that philosophy can only appropriately speak about the past and the present in a descriptive manner. Plato and Kant's double problem is that 1) they speak about future possibilities as if they were realities and 2) they do so in a prescriptive manner advocating unrealizable "oughts." In *The Philosophy of History* Hegel maintains that "the only thought philosophy brings along is the very simple thought of reason, namely that reason rules the world and that things have happened reasonably (according to reason) in world history."⁴⁴ When we investigate the annals of history we note first that there has never arisen a utopia or a perpetual peace. Secondly, we note that there is an accompanying *reason why* there has never arisen a utopia or a perpetual peace. If reason rules the course of history, and to this extent, everything happens for a reason, then we can see why

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 20.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 20.

⁴² Ibid., p. 21.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 23.

⁴⁴ *The Philosophy of History*, p. 4.

Hegel would maintain the position he does concerning these merely opinionated ideals.

In *The History of Philosophy* Hegel investigates the activity of spirit as it has made itself manifest in various nation-states throughout history. There Hegel maintains that spirit's "life is action." But he goes on to state that this action

presupposes some existing material to which it is directed and which it shapes and remolds... What we produce, presupposes something already there; what our philosophy is exists essentially only in such a context and has necessarily grown from it.⁴⁵

What is stated in this quotation re-confirms what Hegel has said regarding the Idea as being a unity of abstract form and concrete content. Tying the analysis of spirit to the idea of perpetual peace we note that the life of spirit has confirmed the fact that a perpetual peace could not be possible. It could not be possible from the standpoint of such a descriptive historical analysis. If it were the case that perpetual peace was more than a mere postulate or opinion, then surely the activity of spirit would have revealed this perpetual peace at some point in history. We would then be able to give recognition to such a conception. But there has been no such union of form and content, no such context in which such an ideal could be realized.⁴⁶ Of equal importance is the idea generated from this quotation that a particular philosophy exists within a concrete context. Hegel affirms the fact that philosophical contemplation is to begin in a historical context "where reasonableness enters into the world's existence ... where there is a state in which such reason manifests itself in consciousness, will and deed."⁴⁷

⁴⁵ *The History of Philosophy*, p. 162.

⁴⁶ See *Inevitable Peace*, pp. 68–9. Of Hegel's position, Friedrich maintains: "This sanctification of the role of the nation state in history as the carrier of the leading ideas, and thus as the preordained carrier-out of the destiny that is man's, culminated for Hegel in the famous dictum that world history is the world court (*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgerichte*). What this means is, of course, that the value of ideas, movements, states, nations is revealed by their success. It is another way of proclaiming that the actual is an embodiment of historical reason, and that 'whatever is, is right'".

⁴⁷ *The Philosophy of History*, p. 25.

We are told in *The Philosophy of Right* that the "nation state is the spirit in its substantial rationality and immediate actuality, and is therefore the absolute power on earth."⁴⁸ This is the thesis that leads Hegel to posit next that "each state is consequently a sovereign and independent entity in relation to others."⁴⁹ Since each state is an independent entity as an individual manifestation of spirit, there is no "praetor to adjudicate between states," but at most contingent "arbitrators and mediators" who subjectively determine what is right and wrong.⁵⁰ The consequence of this lack of a pretor is that disputes which arise over the violation of a state's rights must be settled by war. The image Hegel utilizes for the relationship that exists among states in *The Philosophy of Right* is the "state of nature"⁵¹ and in his comments pertaining to the German Constitution Hegel ratifies this Hobbesian schema:

Thus war, or the like, has now to decide, not which of the rights alleged by the two parties is the genuine right —since both parties have a genuine right but which of the two rights is to give way. War, or whatever it may be, has to decide this, precisely because both contradictory rights were equally genuine; thus a third thing, i.e., war, must make them unequal so that they can be unified, and this happens when one gives way to the other.⁵²

It does happen that peaceable relations take place between or among states, but this is due to a treaty, which is merely a contract that is binding as long as either party agrees to the conditions of the treaty. At any point, however, a state could violate the agreement of the treaty; thus, causing a violation of rights that may be settled only by war. This is why Hegel maintains in his comments on the German Constitution that:

even if the phrase 'perpetual peace' and 'perpetual friendship between the powers' is so turned, it must in the very nature of things be understood as carrying the proviso: until one party is

⁴⁸ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 331, p. 366.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 331, p. 366.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 333, p. 368.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, para. 333, p. 368.

⁵² G. W. F. Hegel, *The German Constitution*, in *Hegel's Political Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Pr., 1964), p. 210.

attacked or treated like an enemy. No state can bind itself to let itself be attacked or treated as an enemy and yet not to arm itself but to keep the peace.⁵³

Of key importance is the fact that Hegel sets up an analogy which shows the similarities and dissimilarities between the individual's relationship to the state and each individual state's relationship to each other. Hegel notes that the modern state has "enormous strength and depth" because of its ability to synthesize the personal particularity of the individual with the universal end of the state while maintaining the integrity of both.⁵⁴ This fact leads Hegel to state that "everything depends on the unity of the universal and the particular in the state."⁵⁵ The modern development of the constitutional monarchy is viewed by Hegel as the type of government that best fosters the unity of the universal and the particular in the state. It is significant that the monarch of a state is one person who reflects the nation's spirituality because Hegel sees such a monarchy, or any sovereignty, as the "individual aspect of the state as such, and it is in this respect alone that the state is *one*."⁵⁶

Further, Hegel maintains that spirit in a particular state manifests itself as an exclusive "being-for-itself" and in this sense acts as an individual in relation to other states. "The state is an individual, and negation is an essential component of individuality,"⁵⁷ Hegel tells us and we are led to believe the same things about the relationship among states as we do regarding the individual in his/her particular state. We are led to think that the state will set up the other as opponent, but will supersede that opposition in the pursuit of the good, i.e., "realized freedom, the absolute and ultimate end of the world"⁵⁸ in some higher, social, possibly cosmopolitan reality.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 208.

⁵⁴ *The Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 260, p. 282.

⁵⁵ Ibid., para. 261, p. 285.

⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 279, p. 317.

⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 324, p. 362.

⁵⁸ Ibid., para. 129, p. 157.

But Hegel also maintains that states are not "private persons but completely independent totalities in themselves, so that the relations between them are not the same as purely moral relations or relations of private right."⁵⁹ This emphasizes the radical independence and consequently, the "primary freedom and supreme dignity" of each nation.⁶⁰ This also expresses a dissimilarity in the analogy pertaining to individuals and states. The *individual* finds being-for-him/herself in the larger whole of the state. That is to say, the individual gives self over to and consequently, is dependent upon, the state. Things are different for the *individual state* as it finds its own "being-for-itself" precisely in an independence. In relation to other states, the individual state shows itself to be free and dignified, worthy of "genuine rights." There is no giving self over because there is no higher pretor; the state itself is the manifestation of its own spirit and hence, freedom. Thus, the elements that give rise to a civil warring within the state can be regulated by the positive elements of the national spirit which aid in the integration of the various individual freedoms. However, there is no spiritual force over and above the nation states that can perform this same process that occurs within each individual state. This is why consistent warring among states takes place and perpetual peace remains an empty ought.

III. THE "SHOULD NOT" THESIS

History shows the activity of the spirit moving within a particular context. This context is understood to have happened, as Hegel states, "reasonably, according to reason" in the history of the world. To this extent, the philosopher gives a descriptive account of the events in world history *as they have reasonably taken place*. There can be no "issuing instructions on how the world ought to be" because philosophy "comes too late to perform this function."⁶¹ It has been shown that warring is a necessary and reasonable component of the

⁵⁹ Ibid., para. 330, p. 366.

⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 322, p. 359.

⁶¹ Ibid., Preface, p. 23.

spirit's activity throughout history. With no common pretor to adjudicate, the relations between or among states are reduced to a "state of nature" whereby the rights of states become equalized. War is the necessary de-equalizer which, of its own accord, settles disputes and aids in the unification of a particular state. Essentially, these are the reasons why a perpetual peace, according to Hegel, could not become actualized.

In commenting on the German Constitution Hegel makes this claim:

States stand to one another in a relation of might; illusions on this matter have vanished; this relation has been universally revealed and made to prevail. The weaker states have been brought to realize that they cannot equalize themselves with the stronger.⁶²

But Hegel is making a stronger claim than simply recognizing that perpetual peace could not take place. He is saying that a state of perpetual peace *should not* be realized. As was stated in the introduction to this paper,⁶³ the reason for this is because Hegel views war as something that is good for the ethical life of the state. War instills self-sacrifice and sets up a universal duty to defend the state;⁶⁴ war causes the members of a particular state to be unified and "rally" together;⁶⁵ war causes the "ideality of the particular" to attain its "right;"⁶⁶ war reduces the "vanity of temporal things and temporal goods";⁶⁷ war adds life to the state which has become "rigid and ossified" or "stuck in its ways" due to an extended period of peace;⁶⁸ Hegel actually makes the claim that war causes "internal peace" as a result of external conflict.⁶⁹ All of these comprise the supposed benefits of war.

⁶² *The German Constitution*, p. 227.

⁶³ See above, p. 4.

⁶⁴ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 325, p. 363.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 326, p. 363.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 324, p. 361.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 324, p. 361.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 324, p. 362.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 324, p. 362.

Even though war results in all of these “goods,” it is still important to emphasize the fact that Hegel does not advocate war. This sounds paradoxical, and it is given Hegel’s position. Hegel actually advocates peace —just not perpetual peace. All of those supposed goods listed above would be non-existent if perpetual peace reigned. Concerning the issue of whether Hegel advocates war there has been much comment. D. P. Verene, in his article entitled, “Hegel’s Account of War” lists three interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy concerning war: 1) the radical view that Hegel regards war as a “fundamental and glorious” activity; 2) the moderate view that Hegel is merely pointing to the role that war plays in the ethical life of nations; 3) the view that Hegel’s project is not incompatible with the liberal constitutional model and the pursuit of peace.⁷⁰

The first view, that Hegel glorified war, is not accurate. Again, with what Hegel says concerning the various “goods” of war, it is understandable how one could draw this conclusion.⁷¹ However, in *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel does say that in wartime, “the determination of war is that of something which ought to come to an end.”⁷² This is not the Kantian postulate that *all wars* should be put to an end for *good*. What is being said here is that from time to time the “winds” of war should churn up the sea made stagnant by the lasting calm of

⁷⁰ D. P. Verene, “Hegel’s Account of War,” in *Hegel’s Political Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives* ed. Z. A. Pelczynski (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ., Pr., 1971), p. 168. See also Mark Tunic, “Hegel Against Fukuyama’s Hegel” in *Clio* (Summer 1993) vol. 22, pp. 383–389. There Tunic shows that Fukuyama’s interpretation and utilization of Hegel is attenuated.

⁷¹ See *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, pp. 108–9. Hinsley suggests that Hegel views war as a means to an end à la Marx since Marx “urged that the exploitation of one nation by another would be ended only when the exploitation of one individual by another within the state had been made impossible. ‘With the end of the conflict of classes within the nations the hostile attitude of nations against each other is removed.’ And if (Marx) glorified the class war as the necessary tool of social revolution, he also justified nationalism and international war as another means of bringing it about in his own country and as the means of spreading it to others... war was ‘a mere continuation of policy by other means’ and it seemed unquestionable that ‘nations are strengthened by war’”.

⁷² *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 338, p. 370.76.

peace;⁷³ we wouldn't want the winds to evaporate the sea altogether.

Further, Hegel does recognize a kind of international "*ius gentium*." He states in *The Philosophy of Right*:

International law applies to the *relations* between independent states... Now a relationship between states ought also to be inherently governed by right, but in worldly affairs, that which has been in itself ought to possess power. But since no power is present to decide what is right in itself in relation to the state and to actualize such decisions, this relation must always remain one of obligation.⁷⁴

There is a kind of international law that exists, but it is one to which states are not dutifully bound in the same way individuals are dutifully bound to the state. At this point it could be argued that Hegel does not in fact proffer an international law because this obligatory stance resonates with the postulates of Kantian morality and therefore does not apply to the relations among states. Hegel does advocate that treaties should be obeyed and that this is the only way of maintaining a kind of transitory peace. Further than this, Hegel does maintain a kind of Kantianism when he states that the "commandment" of right is "*be a person and respect others as persons*."⁷⁵ Just because Hegel envisions the relations of states in a Hobbesian fashion does not mean there are no obligations to treat others as persons and keep the peace among nations.

Z. A. Pelczynski, in his article entitled, "The Hegelian Conception of the State" notes that, by virtue of the fact that Hegel "frequently compares Germany, France and Britain, and criticizes their practices, laws and institutions, implies that he has an ethical yardstick which he believes can be applied to all of them."⁷⁶ Also, in his article entitled, "The Problem of War in

⁷³ Ibid., para. 324, p. 361. The prevention of stagnant water, which is envisioned as a bad thing, is one image Hegel uses to defend the good of war.

⁷⁴ Ibid., para. 330, p. 366.

⁷⁵ Ibid., para. 36, p. 69.

⁷⁶ Z. A. Pelczynski, "The Hegelian Conception of the State," in *Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives*, p. 28.

Hegel's Thought" Shlomo Avineri claims that the state is not unlimited in omnipotence and thus not an enclosed "monad" in relation to other states. Each state "needs for *its very existence* the coexistence of its fellow-states."⁷⁷ Avineri goes on to point out that Hegel's dialectic fosters "the need for the existence of international law," but that because this international law is rooted in the mutual recognition of states, such relations would be based in the "abstractions of things-as-they-ought-to-be."⁷⁸ Avineri's comments are confirmed by Hegel when he claims that the state "has a primary and absolute entitlement to be a sovereign and independent power *in the eyes of others*, i.e., *to be recognized* by them."⁷⁹

The second view, that Hegel is merely pointing to the ethical life of the nations when he discusses war, is correct and not correct at the same time. It is correct to say that Hegel points out war as the "necessary movement"⁸⁰ of spirit in history. But it is incorrect to say that Hegel is simply acknowledging the fact of war. War is a kind of "necessary evil" and Hegel has stated that we should not think of it as an *absolute* evil. War is an evil alright, in the sense that it does the damage it does. But this damage, this alienation, this contradiction, this opposition is precisely what is necessary for the life and movement of spirit. The dialectic demands this kind of activity.

With respect to particular states, Hegel tells us that there is a "ceaseless turmoil" within and without. All of the "passions, interests, ends," as well as the goods and bads of a state manifest the dialectic. And further, "it is through the dialectic that the *universal* spirit, *the spirit of the world*, produces itself in its freedom from all limits..."⁸¹ George Sabine, in his work entitled, *A History of Political Thought* makes the claim that Hegel's dialectic exists as a logical apparatus "capable of revealing the 'necessity' of history." This necessity is "the un-

⁷⁷ Shlomo Avineri, "The Problem of War in Hegel's Thought," in *Journal of the History of Ideas* (October-December 1961) vol. 22, p. 469.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 469.

⁷⁹ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 331, p. 367.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 324, p. 362.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 340, p. 371.

folding or the progressive realization and materialization of the World Spirit in time."⁸² War is one of these necessities the reality of which causes humanity much unhappiness and frustration. Sabine notes that, in the dialectic, Hegel offers humanity a kind of placating remedy for the painful realities such as war in the progress of history: "Its remedy comes with reconciliation, the realization that what is must be and the consciousness that what must be also ought to be."⁸³

The third view, that Hegel's political philosophy is essentially compatible with a liberal constitutional model and the pursuit of peace is incorrect by Hegel's own standards and theories—but it shouldn't be. Neither should Hegel's philosophy be incompatible with these models on a cosmopolitan level either. My point in this is that 1) Hegel is wrong about advocating the "should not" of perpetual peace in the way that he does and 2) although Hegel rejects Kant's notion of perpetual peace, there are ways in which Hegel could have argued, within the context of his own philosophy, toward a universal cosmopolitanism and perpetual peace instead of dismissing such ideas as "empty oughts" or fictions "which exist God knows where." Let me proceed to make these points evident.

In his own *A History of Western Philosophy*, Bertrand Russell makes this claim concerning Hegel:

Such is Hegel's doctrine of the state—a doctrine which, if accepted, justifies every internal tyranny and every external aggression that can possibly be imagined. The strength of his bias appears in the fact his theory is largely inconsistent with his own metaphysic, and that the inconsistencies are all such as tend to the justification of cruelty and international brigandage.⁸⁴

Russell continues to state that Hegel's logic is consistent with the idea put forth in the *Phenomenology* that the "truth is the whole" and consequently, this "justified him in preferring a

⁸² George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 1973), pp. 580–581.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 578.

⁸⁴ Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), p. 742.

State to an anarchic collection of individuals, but it should equally have led him to prefer a world State to an anarchic collection of States."⁸⁵ Russell links Hegel's doctrines to "every" tyranny and aggression that can "possibly be imagined." This point is obviously over-stated, even though the case can be made linking Hegel's theories to communist or even fascists ideologies. It is Russell's further point regarding the inconsistency in Hegel's system that has merit for this discussion. Why couldn't Hegel have carried his dialectical movement to the next level, at which individual states would be united into a community of nations?

Russell's criticisms stand firm because he points to the fact that Hegel ultimately envisions a Hobbesian state of nature that exists among states. Consider Hobbes's assessment of the *Law of Nations* in the *Leviathan*:

...the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Sovereign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body. And that same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard to one another, dictateth the same to Commonwealths, that is, to Consciences of Sovereign Princes, and Sovereign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but in Conscience only.⁸⁶

We have seen already that Hegel endorses such a relationship among states and that this state of nature is not present among the individuals comprising the make-up of individual states.⁸⁷ Ultimately, the objective spirit of a people, rooted in the ethical life of a state will be the reality that binds a particular nation together. Thus, Hegel maintains that the state is the unity of the objective freedom of the universal substantial will and the subjective freedom of the individual will in the

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 742.

⁸⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986), Pt. II, Ch. XXX, p. 394.

⁸⁷ Kant appreciates the wretched state of nature in which we are all immersed as much as Hegel. However, Kant's deontological philosophy finds a way to transcend this materialism and consequent hedonism at national and international levels.

pursuit of its particular ends.⁸⁸ But again, no such pretor exists at the state-to-state level. Or is there such a pretor?

In the section of *The Philosophy of Right* dealing with international law Hegel does state that the European nations "form a family with respect to the universal principle of their legislation, customs, and culture, so their conduct in terms of international law is modified accordingly in a situation which is otherwise dominated by the mutual infliction of evils."⁸⁹ Hegel continues and mentions a "higher praetor" which he calls the "universal spirit which has being in and for itself, i.e., the world spirit."⁹⁰ Earlier, when speaking about the independence of states, Hegel maintains that there must be a "third factor," the "spirit which gives itself actuality in world history and is the absolute judge of states." This spirit is also envisioned as the "universal and as the active genus in world history."⁹¹ In these passages mentioning a "higher praetor" and a "universal world spirit" we must ask this question: Is Hegel speaking here about the Absolute spirit of the world in contradistinction to the objective and subjective spirits of an individual state?

Objective spirit makes itself manifest in the politics, economics, customs and other institutions of the particular state where it is unified with subjective spirit, i.e., the sphere of the private and individual interests of the members of the state. Coexisting with and organically related to these kinds of spirit is Absolute spirit which makes itself manifest in the art, religion and philosophy of a particular state.⁹² Hegel's account of Absolute spirit in *The Philosophy of Right* is ambiguous because we are told, on one hand, that spirit exists as a kind of pretor judging states. But, on the other hand, we are told that

⁸⁸ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 258, p. 276.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 339, p. 371.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 339, p. 371.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 259, p. 282.

⁹² For an explanation of the relationship that exists among subjective, objective and Absolute spirit, see J. Glenn Gray, "Hegel's Understanding of Absolute Spirit" in G. W. F. Hegel, *On Art, Religion, Philosophy*, ed. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 1-21.

this seat of judgment binds the individual with mere contingent treatises and "shoulds." If, in fact, Absolute spirit is understood to be something that transcends the particular states and binds them together, then it is arguable that this is the thing that can be appealed to in the pursuit of peace at the cosmopolitan level. This, I think, is the criticism Russell was getting at. What exactly does this mean and further, how would such an appeal to Absolute spirit work itself out in the dialectic of world history?

Individual states are in a state of nature to one another always prepared for the reality of war. In speaking about the military estate of any state, Hegel notes that the "true valour of civilized nations is their readiness for sacrifice in the service of the state."⁹³ He also notes that during times of peace, "the seeds" of war "germinate once more."⁹⁴ Utilizing an idea from Karl Jaspers, D. P. Verene formulates that the warrior is a human type recognized by Hegel as an integral part of the society. Verene states that the warrior-type is "a specific way in which men relate to their own existence" and that if there is a route to perpetual peace, it will have to be found in the "redirecting" of warriors: "an end to war lies in the transformation of the warrior's existence."⁹⁵ Peace is frustrating for the warrior because it prevents the "drive to act out the freedom of his own being." Verene notes that Hegel's own concern for the progressive movement of the dialectic would allow for the superseding of the warrior-type. The grounds for this transformation lie in Hegel's placement of art, religion, and philosophy as forms of mind that exist "beyond the state."⁹⁶

This is insightful for our discussion for two reasons. First, Verene is giving credence to the activity of the dialectic as a progression through history which continues in a motion of thesis-antithesis-sublation. Verene is correct in noting this since we recall that Hegel envisions dialectical movement as a

⁹³ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 327, p. 364.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 324, p. 363.

⁹⁵ *Hegel's Account of War*, pp. 177-178.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

necessary and life-giving activity.⁹⁷ Secondly, Verene singles out Absolute spirit as a way of reconciling the issue of war. Here, the dialectic is envisioned as leaving open the possibility of this transformation or, to use Verene's term, redirection. Further, Absolute spirit could take on a primary role existing over and above objective spirit pointing to the direction this dialectic could take. If Absolute spirit is interpreted as a higher pretor, then the objective spirit of a particular state should somehow be subordinated to it. The activity of Absolute spirit can be envisioned as embodied in human-types (i.e., the artist, the person of faith, the philosopher), and as standing in opposition to the warrior-type. The way in which to prevent war might be to appeal to these higher types by redirecting the energies of the warrior in the direction of these higher types. Just what would be entailed in this redirection, Verene does not say other than to point out that the politicians "whose existence is tied to the form of the state" will not contribute in this process.⁹⁸ In the end, Verene concedes that Hegel's philosophy offers no specific solution to the issue of superseding the warrior-type or the problem of war.⁹⁹ Although he does

⁹⁷ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 340, p. 371.

⁹⁸ This is Friedrich's point in note 25 regarding the fact that the state is primarily *not* the "government" of the English or American nations.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 179–180. Hegel echoes the nineteenth-century nationalistic and imperialistic feeling prevalent throughout the industrialized modern world. Consonant with the feeling of national pride is the readiness to stand up and fight for the rights of your particular nation. Thus, Verene makes explicit the concept of the "warrior-type," the Hegelian patriot found in every state. See William Slone Coffin, "Religion and Alternative Security: A Prophetic Vision," in *Alternative Security: Living Without Nuclear Deterrence*, ed. Burns H. Weston (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 206–19. The suggestion made by Verene has to do with transforming or subverting the warrior *vis-à-vis* the artist, religious person or philosopher. Coffin claims that "true" patriots realize that we all "belong to one another." Patriots are "no more uncritical lovers of their country than loveless critics of it." Further, the "prophetic vision" of every patriot should be that "nature is not separated from nature's God, that it is filled with wonder and sanctity, and that all human beings are spiritually linked to every creature and leaf" (pp. 206–07). Maybe this is what Verene was getting at in terms of the warrior's transformation. Hegel sees war as beneficial in that it stirs up this patriotic spirit found within the "heart" of each individual loyal to a particular nation. See *A Peace Reader: Essential Readings on war, Justice, Non-Violence and World Order*, ed. Joseph J. Fahey and Richard Armstrong (New York: Paulist Press, 1992), p. 456. Note this poem scribbled by an anonymous G.I. on a latrine wall in England during World War II:

not speak specifically about human types, this idea of objective spirit being subordinated in some way to Absolute spirit is fostered by Hugh Reyburn in his work entitled, *The Political Theory of Hegel: A Study of The Philosophy of Right*. Reyburn notes that objective mind/spirit "passes into" absolute mind/spirit and, in this sense, Reyburn views a kind of objective moral order present in Hegel's doctrines.¹⁰⁰ Now Hegel does maintain that the idea of the "good" is "realized freedom, the absolute and ultimate end of the world" and that it "has a content whose import encompasses both right and welfare."¹⁰¹ Notice that rights *and* welfare exist as integral parts of the state itself.¹⁰² Yet, as has been noted in, for example, Hegel's comments pertaining to the German Constitution, when speaking of inter-state relations, welfare takes a back seat to right. Reyburn claims that Hegel does not sufficiently account for the fact that the good of the state is not something merely private to it. He states that Hegel "fails to make the higher common good a real end of self-conscious objective mind." The good of the whole system of states must be kept in mind and if a state

pushes its own direct and apparent interest at the expense of other states and without regard to the welfare of them all as a totality, it fights against itself, and however great be its apparent gain in territory, wealth, and even culture, it suffers a spiritual loss.¹⁰³

The import to be gleaned from Reyburn is the apparent contradiction he is pointing to in Hegel's doctrines. Hegel does have a sense of an international law as rooted in spirit and this can be textually verified. Reyburn's point is that Hegel does

Soldiers who wish to be a hero
 Are practically zero,
 But those who wish to be civilians,
 Jesus, they run into the millions

¹⁰⁰ Hugh A. Reyburn, *The Political Theory of Hegel: A Study of the Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Clarendon Pr., 1921), p. 259.

¹⁰¹ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 129, p. 157.

¹⁰² See *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 199, p. 233; para. 207, p. 239.

¹⁰³ *The Political Theory of Hegel: A Study of the Philosophy of Right*, p. 258.

not make this explicit in his account of right and war given spirit's guidance over the nations of the world.

In speaking about the relationship of governor to governed in the ethical life of the state, Hegel makes this statement:

In times *of peace*, the particular spheres and functions [within the state] pursue the course of satisfying themselves and their ends, and it is in part only a result of the unconscious *necessity* of the thing that their selfishness is *transformed* into a contribution to mutual preservation, and to the preservation of the whole. But it is also in part a *direct influence* from above which constantly brings them back to the end of the whole and limits them accordingly, and at the same time urges them to perform direct services for the preservation of the whole.¹⁰⁴

Here, there is recognition of the value of peace and how *it* transforms individuals and brings them back to the whole. But there is also a higher influence aiding in the realization of this whole. Hegel goes on to speak about the fact that in times of crisis, all the particular spheres rally around the one sovereign and place the salvation of the state into its hands. Why could this higher influence not be the motion of the Absolute spirit at the cosmopolitan level? Why could Hegel not have maintained that a federation of states would govern the relations among states so that in times of peace or in times of conflict, the spirit would guide the world toward the good, i.e., realized freedom, "the absolute end of the world?" When Hegel applies the notion of opposition at the level of state interaction, it seems that such an opposition would lend itself to a sublation. This sublation would then necessarily include each state as independent individual as well as each state's "enemy." This appropriation of the two, i.e., a state and its "enemy," into the whole makes room for the two. If it is true that individuality gives itself to the whole, then to this extent the parts of the whole, although opposed, harmonize in such a collective. If we follow Hegel's dialectic of the spirit, then the state, like the individual, is harmonized into a larger whole and this recognition and inclusion of each state is that which allows for perpetual peace.

¹⁰⁴ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, para. 278, p. 316.

IV. CONCLUSION

Hegel should have been led in his political doctrines to posit a Kantian federation of states, guided by Absolute spirit, which would regulate the activities of all states in order to make sure that the universal "good" was being upheld. Instead, this notion of Absolute spirit sits in the background relegated to a mere interaction with a particular state's objective spirit. The Goethes, Mohammeds and Kants are subordinated to the Caesars, Napoleons and Hitlers of the world. Perpetual Peace, guaranteed by a federation of states, is a false hope since any "agreement, whether based on moral, religious or other grounds and considerations, would always be dependent on particular sovereign wills."¹⁰⁵

In speaking about the relationship of morality to politics, Hegel makes a distinction between the welfare of the state and the welfare of the individual. Hegel rejects a Kantianism and makes the claim that the welfare of the individual in a particular state has concrete existence "...and only this concrete existence, rather than any of those many universal thoughts which are held to be moral commandments can be the principle of its (i.e., the individual state) action and behaviour."¹⁰⁶ The welfare of others in another state remains abstract as a "universal thought" and "moral commandment" lacking the concreteness to be found within a particular state. Yet, the fact of inter-cultural and inter-state relations remains a reality which presents itself to the particular members of each state on a regular basis. The reality of the "other" outside the bounds of our nation cannot be denied. Consider what Francisco Suárez says regarding the rights and responsibilities of a particular state:

Wherefore, although each perfect state, republic, or kingdom, in itself a complete community made up of its own members, nevertheless, each of them is also in some way, insofar as it belongs to the human race, a member of the universal community. For

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., para. 333, p. 368.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., para. 337, p. 370.

those communities individually are never so self-sufficient that they do not need any mutual help, society, and communication, sometimes for their better and greater advantage, but also sometimes on account of their moral need and want, as is clear from experience itself.¹⁰⁷

We really do exist as a global community.¹⁰⁸ To this extent, the welfare of the state moves out of the lofty realm of the "ought" and becomes a concrete reality. This is what Reyburn was getting at with his criticism of Hegel's lack of a cosmopolitan view. And maybe, this shift in our abstract thinking from "that other" individual in "that other" nation to this person, my fellow "citizen of the world," puts us one step closer to solving Verene's problem of redirecting the warrior-type.

In *The Philosophy of History* Hegel submits that in the field of the spirit the "novel" occurs. Within the life of the spirit, we are told, is "a capacity for genuine change for the better, the more perfect, a drive toward perfection."¹⁰⁹ There is a development in spirit and this "principle of development contains further the notion that an inner destiny or determination, some kind of presupposition is at base of it and is brought into existence."¹¹⁰ This development works within Hegel's logic and metaphysics; it ultimately remains impotent where politics is concerned.¹¹¹ In speaking about Absolute spirit's motion

¹⁰⁷ Francisco Suárez *De legibus*, trans. John P. Doyle. Book I, Ch. 19, p. 326. An Unrevised Translation generated from Professor Doyle's seminar at Saint Louis University, Spring 1998

¹⁰⁸ See Martha Nussbaum, "Kant and Cosmopolitanism," in *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, pp. 25–57. Nussbaum traces Kant's cosmopolitanism back through the Stoics to Diogenes the Cynic, who claimed when asked where he came from, "I am a citizen of the world" (p. 29). Nussbaum links this spirit of universal care and concern spawned in Greek antiquity to Kant.

¹⁰⁹ *The Philosophy of History*, p. 21.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹¹¹ See *How to Think About WAR and PEACE*, pp. 171–5. Adler notes that there are two ways of illustrating the movement of history which are both too simplistic: the cyclical and the linear. Adler offers the spiral conception of history's movement as a comfortable medium; history "goes around in the course of going upward." After claiming that Hegel's conception of history follows a kind of cyclical path, Adler rightly criticizes Hegel for missing the "going upward" or progressive part of history's spiral motion. "In the course of time," Adler tells us, "the achievements of progress do be-

throughout history as understood by philosophy, Hegel claims that the spirit is in process and that this process takes a long time to work itself out: "It has plenty of nations and individuals to expend."¹¹² This implies that there is the possibility that the spirit *will in fact* work things out, and could mean that at some point war will be overcome.

In the final section of *The Philosophy of Right* entitled, "World History" Hegel speaks about the fact that national spirits come and go, while "the spirit in and for itself prepares and works its way towards the transition to its next and higher stage."¹¹³ The highest manifestation of this spirit is reason which comprehends the very actualization of this universal spirit. In *The Phenomenology of Spirit* we are told that the Absolute is spirit which, when all is said and done, means simple this: "that ultimate reality is then at once known as spirit when it is seen and beheld as immediate self-consciousness."¹¹⁴ There is a tension evident here between what has occurred in the dialectic up to now, and what could possibly be the direction that the dialectic would take in the future.¹¹⁵ Hegel's statements regarding war and international law seem to preclude the possibility of perpetual peace. However, there are statements that Hegel makes regarding the dialectic and Absolute Spirit that seem to be open to this possibility.

come more stable and secure." However, Hegel has doomed humankind to a kind of constant "spin-out" concerning this historical motion whereby a fatalism is the only possible result. This fatalism can be seen in Hegel's position concerning war. Where is the progressive motion of "moving beyond" in this case? Where is the genuine sublation?

¹¹² *The History of Philosophy*, p. 170.

¹¹³ *Elements of the philosophy of Right*, para. 344, p. 373.

¹¹⁴ *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 514.

¹¹⁵ Francis Fukuyama, in his book entitled, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992) argues that Hegel's philosophy points in the direction of a cosmopolitan, capitalist, liberal-democratic state. He claims further that the world has not only achieved this recognition of such a state, but that this kind of political organization is "completely satisfying to human beings in their most essential characteristics" (p. 136). Mark Tunick, in his article entitled, "Hegel Against Fukuyama's Hegel" [in *Clio* (Summer 1993) vol. 22, pp. 383-389] argues against such a liberal interpretation of Hegel on the grounds that recognition is not rooted in "abstract persons or a reified concept "state" or "government," but in the "people who matter to us, people with whom we identify" in the particular state in which we live (p. 389).

In the end it is important to note the value and power that reason plays concerning ethical and political matters. Reason has the ability to recognize that there is an ideal which should be strived for in our relationships with one another, not only at the state level, but at the cosmopolitan level as well.¹¹⁶ Things are not perfect, and the setting up of an ideal is something that, if not realizable in the here-and-now, at least keeps us striving toward making this ideal actualized (to use Hegel's term). Reason wants to close the gap between "is" and "ought"; it not only wants to come to know the world, it wants to perfect it. The ideal of perpetual peace, even if it is an impossibility by Hegel's standards, still keeps the world communicating and hashing out opposing viewpoints concerning matters of right and freedom. In this sense, the concept of perpetual peace, understood as a empty and lofty by Hegel's standards, fosters the dialectic. Consider the words of Kant, who maintains that "our *spirits* (my italics) can be raised by the prospect of future improvements."¹¹⁷ When all is said and done, and the Owl of Minerva has taken flight, we must remain hopeful in the perpetual pursuit of the "ought." As Kant states in his reply to the pessimistic Mendelssohn:

And however uncertain I may be and may remain as to whether we can hope for anything better for mankind, this uncertainty cannot detract from the maxim I have adopted, or from the necessity of assuming for practical purposes that human progress is

¹¹⁶ It seems that Hegel has down-played or underestimated the broad scope of rationality which always includes the possible. Kant would include the possible in Hegel's statement that "what is rational is actual" and vice versa. See the essays that comprise the work entitled, *Alternative Methods for International Security*, ed. Carolyn M. Stephenson (New York: University Press of America, 1982). Specifically, in his article from this collection entitled, "Making the Abolition of War a Realistic Goal," pp. 127-40, Gene Sharp outlines a reasonably possible alternative to warfare with his concept of a "Civilian-Based Defense," a "defense policy which utilizes prepared civilian struggle—nonviolent action—to preserve the society's freedom, sovereignty, and constitutional system against internal usurpations and external invasions and occupations... The aim is to make the populace unruleable by the attackers and to deny them their objectives" (p. 133). Sharp's conception of Civilian-Based Defense/Transarmament is one of many possible alternatives to deterring or even preventing war which seem wholly reasonable and possible.

¹¹⁷ "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'" p. 89.

possible. This hope for better times to come, without which an earnest desire to do something useful for the common good would never have inspired the human heart, has always influenced the activities of right-thinking men.¹¹⁸

Saint Louis University

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 89.