

KANT'S PUTATIVE ANTINOMY OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT

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Introduction¹

One might understand the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment in the *Critique of Judgment* (*KdU*) in the following way: Kant is arguing for two main claims, the first of which is that there is no antinomy for determinative judgment and the second of which is that the apparent antinomy for reflective judgment is merely an apparent and, therefore also, not a real antinomy.² Kant believes that the truth of the first of these claims is immediately clear once one understands the nature of an antinomy and the nature of determinative judgment. The proof of the second claim is not so readily grasped, as it requires more distinctions to be understood, but is nevertheless available. In very brief summary, it goes like this: (1) The principles of reflective judgment which give rise to the puta-

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² In this paper, when I refer to determinative and reflective judgment I am referring to the two modes of the faculty of judgment and not to particular judgments made in either mode. A difficult interpretive question arises for the reader of *KdU* as to whether Kant held the reflective or determinative status of such particular judgments to be known upon mere inspection of the concepts employed therein or whether this status was known in virtue of knowing under which mode of the faculty of judgment the given judgment was issued. This issue will not be dealt with here. The arguments presented in this paper are not conditional upon a particular solution to this puzzle.

tive antinomy are regulative, as opposed to constitutive, principles for reflective judgment; (2) given the nature of antinomies and the fact that the principles for reflective judgment are regulative, the apparent antinomy for reflective judgment is nothing more than an illusion.

Werner Pluhar has recently argued against understanding Kant in this way³. He claims both that the apparent antinomy for reflective judgment is not resolved by treating the putatively conflicting principles as regulative and that Kant had no intentions of so arguing. In this paper, I argue that Pluhar is mistaken on both accounts. To this end I elaborate upon and justify accepting the position outlined above and then assess Pluhar's arguments for rejecting it.

Antinomies

From what Kant claims in sections 69 and 70 of *KdU*, we can conclude the following concerning antinomies:

(AN) There is an antinomy of some cognitive faculty X iff the principles necessary for X to function properly⁴ (a) have their bases given in X and (b) involve a contradiction.⁵

³ Pluhar presents his arguments in the Translator's Introduction to his recent and fine English translation of the *Critique of Judgment* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). All page references to the *Critique of Judgment* are to Pluhar's translation.

⁴ I use "proper function" here instead of the Kantian phrase "right employment" for stylistic, and not semantic, reasons (cf. A643/B671 ff. in *KdrV* for an example of what Kant means by "right employment"). I intend to mean by my phrase what Kant means by "right employment."

⁵ It might be suggested that clause (b) be changed to (b') involves a *prima facie* contradiction. There are two reasons for construing antinomies as involving merely *prima facie* contradictions: (1) All of Kant's antinomies involve merely apparent contradictions which are shown to be illusory upon correct analysis, (2) Kant sometimes argues as if reason could not be so constituted that its principles are inconsistent.

However, it seems clear to me that Kant does believe that a distinction can be made between real and apparent antinomies. A real antinomy would result from the fact that "the transcendental concept of the absolute unity of the series, as thought in a certain way, is always self-contradictory" (*KdrV*, B 398). For an example, in the case of the faculty of reflective judgment, as we shall see, the transcendental concept of the absolute unity of the series requires the synthesis of the principles of mechanist and

For example, pure reason posits two principles which are necessary for it to function properly and which are, at least apparently, contradictory: the law of free causes and the law of natural necessity (CPR B473). Both are necessary principles, Kant claims, for our reason to function properly. However, it would appear that the law of free causes and the law of natural necessity are inconsistent, i.e., to maintain both cosmological ideas involves a contradiction. Therefore, there is apparently an antinomy of pure reason with regard to these two principles.

"Principle" is used in various ways by Kant (cf. *KdrV* B 356ff. and compare with *KdrV* B 188ff.). Kant's weak characterization of a principle is that it is any universal proposition used to apprehend the particulars (*KdrV* B356ff.). For example, on this version of principles the zoological generalization that all whales are mammals satisfies the conditions for being a principle. Using this universal proposition we can apprehend a particular whale as a mammal. Kant's stronger characterization of a principle is that it contain the grounds for all other judgments and that it not be grounded in some higher, more general kind of knowledge (*KdrV* B 188). Examples of these from *KdrV* are all of the *a priori* transcendental principles of the understanding. An example from *KdU*, which we will investigate later in this paper, is Kant's *a priori* principle of the technic of nature (*KdU*, First Introduction, 215'). For the purposes of this paper, we will concern ourselves with Kant's stronger characterization of principles and will refer, thus, to principles of this sort in our discussion unless otherwise noted.

final causation, which when thought of as determinative, is always self-contradictory (*KdU*, sect. 70, 385ff.). If such a conflict with the cognitive faculty could not be resolved, then there would be a real antinomy, and not merely an apparent one.

Furthermore, the second reason for construing antinomies along the lines of (b') suggests that Kant held self-contradictory transcendental concepts to be impossible. But if this were true, then certainly his arguments justifying this conclusion would have been showcased. That all of the cases that Kant investigates turn out to be merely apparent antinomies does not rule out the possibility of an unresolvable antinomy, and Kant seems prepared for this eventuality when he suggests the procedure of dropping one of the contradictory principles to avoid inconsistency (e.g., cf. *KdU*, sect. 71, 387). Thus, I think that clause (b) is preferable to the proposed revision.

For Kant and not surprisingly, a principle is necessary for the proper function of a cognitive faculty when the cognitive faculty cannot perform its allotted tasks without it (*KdU* 385).

For example, an allotted task of our faculty of judgment is to subsume objects of experience under concepts. One principle that Kant claims is necessary for our judgment to fulfill this task is the reflective principle of the mechanism of nature M1:

M1: All production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanist nature (*KdU* 387).

For, as Kant claims, "...unless we presuppose it in our investigation [of nature] we can have no cognition of nature at all in the proper sense of the term," (where the proper sense of "cognizant nature" here is subsuming intuitions under concepts or what is sometimes called "thick experience" in distinction from the "thin experience" of mere intuitions) (*KdU* 387).

Kant distinguishes between a principle being used by a cognitive faculty and a principle having its basis in a cognitive faculty. A principle is used by a cognitive faculty when the cognitive faculty in question requires it in order to function properly. Thus echoing the example above, judgment uses the reflective principle of the mechanism of nature in judging the objects of experience. A principle has its basis in a cognitive faculty when the principle is in some sense posited by that faculty. For example, the law of free causes is an *a priori* law of practical reason. Practical reason posits the law of free causes as an *a priori* law necessary to explain the subject's ability to act in accordance with the categorical imperative.

The following is an example of how this distinction is important for Kant. Assume the law of free causes were to be used by judgment as a principle, say, for subsuming an object of experience. The basis of this principle would be in practical reason. For as we have noted, practical reason, and not judgment, is the cognitive faculty which posits the law of free causes. Assume further that judgment employs as principles only principles the bases of which were in cognitive faculties other than judgment. Then, given the analysis of an antinomy

(AN), there could be no antinomy of judgment. For, condition (a) of (AN) would not be satisfied for the cognitive faculty of judgment.

Modes of the Faculty of Judgment

Kant distinguishes between two modes of the faculty of judgment: determinative judgment and reflective judgment. Determinative judgment is the cognitive faculty of judgment when it subsumes objects of experience under laws the bases of which are principles of the understanding (*KdU* 385). Reflective judgment is the cognitive power of judgment when it subsumes under laws, the bases of which are principles of reflection, objects of experience for which the understanding does not provide adequate laws (*KdU* 385). Since these two modes of judgment are crucial for our discussion in this paper, it will be helpful to present them in terms of definitions:

“Determinative judgment” =df. the cognitive power of judgment when it subsumes objects of experience under laws the bases of which are principles of the understanding.

“Reflective judgment” =df. the cognitive power of judgment when it subsumes under laws, the bases of which are principles of reflection, objects of experience for which the understanding does not provide adequate principles.

For Kant, something is an object of experience *O* if, and only if, (a) *O* is given to us in intuition and (b) there is some law under which *O* can be subsumed by the cognitive faculty of judgment (*KdrV* B12). This is the two-fold nature of what Kant terms our “discursive understanding.” For Kant, unless there is both a manifold of appearances presented to us in intuition and some law under which we can subsume this manifold, human experience is empty.

A law, according to the first *Critique*, is an objective rule of the understanding (*KdrV* A 126). Furthermore, Kant uses the terms “rules” and “objective concepts” interchangeably (e.g., cf. *KdrV* A 126). Thus, a law can also be understood as an

objective concept of the understanding, for Kant. (Because of this, we shall use the term "law" throughout this paper with the understanding that the term "objective concept" would serve equally well.) "Hypotheses," in contrast, are concepts the possibility of whose objects has been established but which fail to have an objective status (*KdrVB* 797–8).

Given that Kant understands laws in this way, it is troubling that Kant uses the term "law" in the context of explicating the nature of reflective judgment. For as our definition makes clear, Kant wants reflective judgment to subsume under *laws* those objects of experience for which the understanding does not provide adequate and specific laws. However, Kant has asserted that laws are objective rules of the understanding. Since the "laws" discovered by reflective judgment are not provided by the understanding, the "laws" discovered by reflective judgment must not be rules given by understanding alone and, hence, not laws but hypotheses.

The answer to this puzzle lies in the fact that in the *Critique of Judgment* Kant makes a distinction between two types of laws: laws of the understanding and particular laws of nature. Laws of the understanding are the laws understood in terms of *KdrV*. Particular laws of nature are the laws of reflective judgment, which can be understood as having the status of hypotheses. Something is a law of the understanding, for Kant, if and only if it is known *a priori* to be a universal law concerning the possibility of the objects of material nature (*KdU* 386). Something is a particular law of nature if and only if it is known *a posteriori* upon reflection to be a law of particular appearances presented to us in intuition (*KdU* 386). Thus, laws of the understanding and particular laws of nature differ in their epistemological status. Laws of the understanding are known *a priori* and are necessary given the nature of our understanding, while particular laws of nature are known *a posteriori* and are contingent upon the appearances presented to us in intuition.

To reflect, for Kant, is "to hold given presentations up to, and compare them with, either other presentations or one's cognitive power [itself], in reference to a concept that this [comparison] makes possible" (*KdU*, First Introduction, 211').

Furthermore according to Kant, judgment always reflects in terms of a certain principle of reflection:

(LP) Nature, for the sake of the power of judgment, makes its universal laws specific [and] into empirical ones, according to the form of a logical system of genera and species (*KdU*, First Introduction, 216').

This principle is the *a priori* principle of the technic of nature which posits the logical purposiveness of nature as a whole. According to this principle, we must presuppose that the variety of nature's empirical presentations conform to our power of judgment in such a way that, upon comparison, judgment can classify these presentations in terms of one system of laws (*KdU*, First Introduction, 215'). Thus, in Kant's terminology, this principle asserts that nature in its empirical presentations as a whole logically purposive.

We must presuppose (LP) in order to have a science of nature, according to Kant, because the variety of nature's empirical presentations could be so diverse and heterogeneous that no systematic way of judging empirical nature could be found. If no such systematic way of judging empirical nature were possible, then judgment could not hope to classify the diversity of empirical nature in terms of laws, and unless judgment can achieve such a lawful classification of empirical nature, natural science is not possible (*KdU*, First Introduction, 215'). Since we assume that natural science is possible (and indeed actual), we assume that we can (and do) classify the diversity of nature's empirical presentations in terms of laws. Thus, we assume that a systematic way of judging empirical nature is possible for us. Kant goes on to claim that we must, therefore, presuppose the principle of the technic of nature which asserts the logical purposiveness of nature.

Since we must presuppose the principle of the technic of nature (LP), it remains to determine what status this principle maintains for our judgment. We cannot judge determinately, in Kant's technical sense, that nature is constituted in such a way that our judgment can classify the diverse empirical presentations of nature in terms of laws (*KdU*, First Introduction, 214'). For, there is no law of the understanding concerning the par-

ticular empirical presentations of nature (*KdU* 386). Thus, this principle is not a determinative principle for judgment. Nevertheless, judgment must be able to reflect upon the manifold of appearances and form laws under which to subsume these appearances in order to function properly, according to Kant (*KdU* 386). Therefore, Kant claims that this principle is a reflective principle for judgment.

Maxims, Regulative Principles and Reflective Principles

As Kant claims in Section 6 of the First Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, (LP) is a reflective principle of judgment which makes a claim about the overall form of nature —viz., that it is logically purposive (*KdU*, First Introduction, 217'). As such, according to Kant, (LP) does not provide judgment with a principle for cognizing the forms of natural products (*KdU*, First Introduction, 219'). It merely provides us "with a maxim on which to base the logical use of judgment in experience." (*KdU*, First Introduction, 219'). Therefore, (LP) does not provide us with a principle for judging objects which are presented to us in intuition and for which the understanding does not provide adequate principles. However, there may be cases when objects are presented to us in intuition and for which the understanding fails to provide adequate principles. In these cases, judgment will have to reflect upon the presentations and form a law under which to subsume them.

According to Kant, a type of objects which is presented to us in intuition and for which the understanding does not provide adequate principles is the type of objects termed "natural purposes." Natural purposes are objects of experience the inner structures of which are such that, upon reflection, we must judge them as possible in terms of final causation. Kant's paradigm example of a natural purpose in nature is an organism. Organisms are presented to us in our intuitions as organized and self-organizing beings (*KdU* 374).

As Kant argues in Section 65 of the "Analytic of Teleological Judgment" in *KdU*, the understanding provides us with universal laws concerning the possibility of objects of experience which are insufficient, according to Kant, to explain the

possibility of organisms (*KdU* 374). Natural purposes appear to us as possessing formative force, and the possibility of this can only be explained by us, upon reflection, in terms of the teleological principle of final causation (*KdU* 373). Since the understanding only provides us with the universal law of efficient causation, the principles provided to judgment by the understanding are inadequate to judge natural purposes. For again, although judgment can make determinate judgments about natural purposes considered merely as natural products (i.e., as products of efficient causation) (*KdU* 411), when judgment considers the formative force which natural purposes manifest in our intuitions of them, we require the teleological principle of final causation (which the understanding does not provide).

Kant claims that, for objects presented to us in intuition for which the understanding does not provide adequate principles, reflective judgment has maxims which function as regulative principles and which allow us to arrive at concepts which enable us to cognize such objects (*KdU* 386). A maxim, for Kant, is a subjective principle which is derived from the interest of reason with respect to a certain possible perfection of the knowledge of the object (*KdrV* B 694). Maxims are, thus, regulative principles in that they guide our cognitive faculties in their functioning (*KdU* 387). They are not constitutive principles concerning the objective possibility of objects, i.e., they are not determinative principles (*KdU* 387). Rather, they are principles for reflecting upon presentations given in our intuitions, or in other words, they are reflective principles.

A reflective principle, for Kant, does not provide an objectively adequate basis for cognizing objects of experience (*KdU* 385). For, what is objective is what concerns the possibility of the objects of experience, (*KdU* 388) and only the universal laws of the understanding concern the possibility of the objects of experience (*KdU* 386). Since reflective principles have their basis in reflective judgment (and not in the understanding), reflective principles cannot be objective. Therefore, they do not provide an objectively adequate basis for cognizing objects of experience. Rather, reflective principles provide a subjectively adequate basis for cognizing particular objects of

experience. According to Kant, what is subjective concerns how the subject, given its cognitive constitution, must cognize the particular objects of experience (*KdrV* B 186). For example, as was argued above, Kant claims that our cognitive constitution is such that we must cognize the presentations of empirical nature according to the reflective principle of the technic of nature (LP). Thus, (LP) is subjectively necessary for our cognition of the particular objects of experience.

Although reflective principles do not provide an objectively adequate basis for our cognition of the particular objects of experience, they do provide us with a subjectively adequate basis. By "a subjectively adequate basis" Kant means a basis which is (a) subjective and (b) necessary for the proper function of the cognitive faculty in question (*KdU*, First Introduction, 214'). (LP) is an example of a reflective principle which provides a subjectively adequate basis for our cognition of objects of experience.

Neither Species of Judgment Has an Antinomy

With the foregoing terminological distinctions in mind, we can now adequately assess Kant's arguments for why neither determinative judgment nor reflective judgment have antinomies. Determinative judgment cannot have an antinomy because the principles of determinative judgment have their bases in the faculty of understanding and not in the faculty of judgment. This follows directly from the definition of determinative judgment provided by Kant. For, there can be an antinomy of determinative judgment only if the principles of determinative judgment have their bases in determinative judgment. Since the principles of determinative judgment do not have their bases in determinative judgment, there can be no antinomy of determinative judgment.

The case of reflective judgment is more complex. For, reflective judgment does have principles the bases of which are in reflective judgment. Therefore, it is at least possible that there be an antinomy of reflective judgment. We will first present the general form that an antinomy of reflective judgment would take, according to Kant. Then we shall focus on the

purported antinomy of reflective judgment concerning natural purposes which is analyzed and rejected by Kant.

For the general case, assume that some presentation *P* is given to us in intuition. We know that reflective judgment must subsume *P* under some particular law of nature in order to fulfill its proper function. According to Kant, there will be some set of maxims *M* which allows reflective judgment to arrive at some particular law of nature *R* such that *P* can be subsumed under *R*. We know from the definition of an antinomy that if the set of maxims *M* contains some maxim *M1* and some maxim *M2* such that *M1* contradicts *M2*, then there is an antinomy of reflective judgment.

In the case of natural purposes, we assume that some natural purpose *NP* is presented to us in intuition. Reflective judgment must subsume *NP* under some particular law of nature in order to function properly. According to Kant, there is a set of maxims *M* of reflective judgment which has for its members the following two maxims:

M1: All production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanist nature.

M2: Some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanist nature. (Judging them requires a quite different causal law—viz., that of final causes (*KdU* 387)).

Kant claims that *M1* and *M2* are sufficient for reflective judgment to subsume *NP* under a particular law of nature. Assuming that this is so, it remains for Kant to determine two things in order to show that there is no antinomy of reflective judgment: (1) that *M1* and *M2* have their bases in reflective judgment and (2) that *M1* and *M2* do not contradict each other.

Given that a maxim, for Kant, is a subjective principle which is derived from the interest of reason with respect to a certain possible perfection of the knowledge of the object, it is clear that neither maxim *M1* nor maxim *M2* is a law of the understanding. For, laws of the understanding are objective laws about the possibility of objects of experience. As such, they

are constraints placed upon the possibility of objects of experience given the nature of our understanding. Maxims are subjective principles used to guide judgment in reflecting upon appearances given in intuition. They are, thus, regulative principles for reflecting upon appearances and not constraints upon the possibility of objects (*KdU* 387 & 388). Given this, we can conclude that M1 and M2 do not have their bases in the understanding. For, principles have their bases in the understanding only if they concern the possibility of objects of experience. Similarly, M1 and M2 do not have their bases in reason. For, reason is concerned with the unconditioned premises in our system of laws, while the principles of reflective judgment are concerned with the contingent appearances given in intuition. Thus, M1 and M2 must have their bases in reflective judgment.

M1 asserts that we must judge all production of material things and their forms as possible in terms of merely mechanist laws. M2 asserts that (a) we cannot judge some products of material nature as possible in terms of merely mechanist laws and (b) we must judge some products of material nature as possible in terms of final causes. In order for M2 to contradict M1, M2 must assert that it is not the case that we must judge all production of material things and their forms as possible in terms of merely mechanist nature.

It follows from M2 that we cannot judge all products of nature as possible in terms of merely mechanist laws. As such, M2 states a fact about the limits of our ability to judge the products of material nature in terms of merely mechanist laws. As Kant states, M2 "asserts only that human reason, if it obeys the first maxim (M1) and acts accordingly, will never be able to discover the slightest basis for what is specific in a natural purpose" (*KdU* 388).

M1 does not assert anything concerning the limits of our cognitive faculty of reflective judgment. Rather, M1 states how reflective judgment should judge the production of material things and their forms. As such, it is a prescriptive claim. As Kant puts it, M1 is "only pointing out that I ought always to reflect on these events and forms in terms of the mere mecha-

nism of nature, and hence ought to investigate this principle as far as I can" (*KdU* 387).

Since M2 describes the limits of reflective judgment and M1 prescribes a method for reflective judgment, the two cannot be in contradiction. For, it is possible for both to be true. If we present M1 and M2 in terms of classical logic, this will become more clear. M1 asserts: All production of material things and their forms are things which must be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanist laws. Abbreviating for the terms, we get: All A's are B's (where A stands for "production of material things and their forms" and B stands for "things which must be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanist laws"). M2 asserts: Some products of material nature are things which cannot be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanist laws. Assuming that "products of material nature" is synonymous with "production of material things and their forms", we get for an abbreviation of M2: Some A's are not C's (where C stands for "things which can be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanist laws").

B and C are not synonymous. Things which must be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanist laws are not equivalent with things which can be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanist laws. The modal difference between the two terms is obvious. Moreover, in the context of Kant's discussion, the modalities in the two terms refer to different things. In B, our judging things to be possible in terms of merely mechanist laws is necessary in the sense that otherwise reflective judgment goes beyond the concept of mechanist causality provided by the understanding. In other words, M1 is presenting a necessary condition for reflective judgment to reflect using only derivatives (via (LP)) of the universal law of mechanist causality provided by the understanding. In C the possibility being talked about concerning our judgments of the possibility of things in terms of merely mechanist laws is the possibility of our being able to adequately reflect upon certain things given the concept of mechanist causality provided by the understanding. In other words, M2 is presenting a necessary condition for reflective judgment to reflect upon products of nature for which derivatives (via (LP)) of the universal law

of mechanist causality provided by the understanding are inadequate. The following two propositions can both be true:

- (1) It is a necessary condition for reflective judgment to reflect according to derivatives (via (LP)) of the universal law of mechanist causation that reflective judgment judge all productions of material nature and their forms to be possible in terms of merely mechanist laws.
- (2) It is a necessary condition for reflective judgment to reflect upon a product of nature using a law of causation different from derivatives (via (LP)) of the universal law of mechanist causation that that product of nature cannot be subsumed under derivatives (via (LP)) of the universal law of mechanist causation.

(Putting this more simply, since B and C are not synonymous, the propositions "All A's are B's" and "Some A's are not C's" are not contradictory.) For, the fact that reflective judgment cannot always successfully judge in accordance with M1 has no bearing on the merit of what M1 directs reflective judgment to do. It may simply be the case that some production of material things and their forms cannot be judged by us as possible in terms of merely mechanist laws. Nevertheless, it may also be the case that we must judge those same productions and their forms as possible in terms of merely mechanist laws in order for reflective judgment to remain within the bounds set by the understanding. Thus, Kant has shown that there is no antinomy for reflective judgment by showing how M1 and M2, as merely regulative principles, do not conflict.

Pluhar's Position

Werner Pluhar, in the Translator's Introduction to his translation of the *Critique of Judgment*, presents an objection to the above approach to interpreting Kant. Pluhar claims that the conflict between M1 and M2 is not resolved by showing that they are regulative principles for reflective judgment and that Kant did not attempt to resolve the conflict in this way (*KdU*, Translator's Introduction, xc).

Pluhar presents three main arguments in support of his position. The first argument is the following:

P1: Kant has not revoked the doctrine according to which the universal laws of nature—in particular, the principle of necessary efficient (mechanist) causation—are determinative.

P2: Either Kant has revoked the doctrine according to which the universal laws of nature are determinative or Kant has not solved the antinomy by construing both mechanism and teleology as regulative principles.

C1: Kant has not solved the antinomy by construing both mechanism and teleology as regulative principles.

(*KdU*, Translator's Introduction, p. xc). We have argued above that C1 is false. It is also implicit in our discussion that Kant has retained the doctrine according to which the universal laws of nature are determinative. For, we have argued that Kant distinguishes between two species of judgment one of which is determinative; and it has been shown that, according to Kant, this determinate nature of judgment is due to the fact that the universal laws of nature posited by the understanding are determinative. Thus, we are in agreement with P1. However, the disjunction asserted in P2 is not exhaustive. For, we have argued above that the universal determinative laws of the understanding cannot be used by reflective judgment in subsuming the appearances presented in intuitions. Because of this, it was urged that Kant understood (LP) to provide a link between the universal determinative laws of the understanding and the regulative principles which serve as maxims for reflective judgment. Thus, Kant can retain his doctrine of the universal determinative laws of the understanding while nevertheless asserting that, with reference to the particular laws of nature and with the subjective warrant of (LP), the principle of mechanism is regulative for reflective judgment. Thus, we reject Pluhar's second premise in this argument as false.

Pluhar's second argument is the following:

- P3: The section that comes after the presentation of the antinomy offers a "preliminary" to its solution.
- P4: If the section that comes after the presentation of the antinomy offers a "preliminary" to its solution, then the solution to the antinomy has not yet been given in Sections 69 and 70.

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- C2: The solution to the antinomy has not yet been given in Sections 69 and 70 (*KdU*, Translator's Intro., xc).

We have argued above that the solution to the antinomy of reflective judgment has been given in Sections 69 and 70. We are thus at odds with C2. Furthermore, it is indubitable that Section 71 of the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment is entitled "Preliminary to the Solution of the Above Antinomy" and presents a preliminary to the solution of the antinomy. We thus agree with P3. However, it does not follow from P3 that the solution to the antinomy has not been given in Sections 69 and 70. For with regards to arguments, something may be preliminary in terms of its order of presentation, or something may be preliminary in terms of its logical priority. Pluhar reads Kant to be asserting that Section 71 is preliminary in terms of presenting the solution to the antinomy. However, in Section 71 Kant is concerned with presenting the presuppositions involved in making the claim that the principle of teleology is merely a regulative principle for reflective judgment. For neither in the "Analytic of Teleological Judgment" nor in Sections 69 and 70 of the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment does Kant explain the presuppositions involved in making the claim that the principle of teleology is a merely regulative principle. Yet, certainly this task is preliminary in terms of logical priority to the task of solving an antinomy which involves the claim that the principle of teleology is merely a regulative principle. And if we attend to the discussions and arguments presented by Kant in the remainder of the Dialectic, we note that Kant is primarily concerned with explicating the presuppositions involved in asserting (a) that we must judge some products of nature according to the teleological principle and (b) that this

principle is merely regulative for reflective judgment. Thus, it appears incorrect to conclude from Kant's use of the term "preliminary" that he has not presented his solution to the antinomy of reflective judgment in Sections 69 and 70.

Pluhar's third argument is the following:

P5: If we judge a natural purpose NP according to M1 and also according to M2, then we are judging as both necessary and contingent one and the same thing.

P6: To judge one and the same thing as both necessary and contingent is to contradict oneself.

P7: We judge natural purposes according to M1 and M2.

C3: Even understood as regulative principles, M1 and M2 lead to an antinomy of reflective judgment.

P7 is uncontroversial, given what Kant claims in the *Dialectic of Teleological Judgment*. Furthermore, P5 is true. Kant claims that "if we present the existence or form of a thing as possible (only) under the condition (that there is) purpose, then the concept of the thing is inseparably connected with the concept that the thing is contingent," (*KdU* 398) and from what Kant claims about the mechanist laws of nature it is clear that he understands them as involving necessity. Since applying M1 and M2 to the same thing would be to apply the laws of mechanist nature and the law of purposiveness (i.e., teleology), we would be judging the same thing as both necessary and contingent.

P6 asserts that to judge one and the same thing as necessary and contingent is to contradict oneself. Thus, P5 asserts that the following two propositions would be contradictions:

- (1) I judge this thing to be necessary in terms of mechanist laws.
- (2) I judge this thing to be contingent in terms of mechanist laws.

However, we have seen in our discussion of Kant's solution to the antinomy of reflective judgment that (1) and (2) are not contradictory statements for reflective judgment. (1) is only true insofar as reflective judgment must stay within the bounds prescribed by the universal laws of the understanding. (2) is true only if reflective judgment cannot stay within those same bounds. Thus, (1) and (2) are not contradictory propositions. We thus reject Pluhar's third and final argument against our interpretation of Kant's solution to the antinomy of reflective judgment.

A Final Consideration

It might be urged against our response to Pluhar that Kant claims, in Section 78 of the *Dialectic of Teleological Judgment*, that

the principle of the mechanism of nature and the principle of nature's causality in terms of purposes, as both are applied to one and the same natural product, must be linked in a single higher principle and flow from it together, since otherwise we could not consistently use both in considering nature (*KdU* 412).

In response we note that Kant says of M2 in Section 78 that it "carries with it the necessity of reconciling the two principles when we judge things as natural purposes, but not with the aim of putting one type of production, wholly or in part, in place of the other" (*KdU* 414). Thus, it is a necessary condition for the M2 to be a regulative principle of reflective judgment that reason be able to reconcile it with M1. However, this does not undermine the interpretation given above of Kant's resolution of the apparent antinomy of reflective judgment. Rather, it only shows that for Kant's solution to work some further condition must be satisfied. If we allow that this line of argument undermines our interpretation, then we also would have to allow the following line to undermine this interpretation: It is a necessary condition for M1 to be a regulative principle of reflective judgment that our understanding be constituted in the way that it is. But this is clearly not the central aspect of Kant's solution to the antinomy of reflective judgment. In the

same way, Pluhar's third argument misconstrues the central feature of Kant's solution.

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