

CONSCIOUS WRITING*

(Derrida on Consciousness versus Unconsciousness)

Celui qui a laissé des traces en effaçant
ses traces n'a rien voulu dire ni faire
par les traces qu'il laisse. Il a
dérangé l'ordre d'une façon irréparable.
Il a absolument passé. Etre en tant
que laisser une trace, c'est passer,
partir, s'absoudre.

Emmanuel Levinas, *La Trace de l'Autre*

I'm all these words, all these strangers, this dust of
words, with no ground for their settling, no sky for
their dispersing, coming together to say, that I am
they, all of them, those that merge, those that part,
those that never meet, and nothing else, yes,
something else, that I'm something quite different, a
quite different thing, a worldless thing in an empty
place.

Samuel Beckett, *The Unnamable*

... dieses Stück Papier, worauf ich dies schreibe oder
vielmehr geschrieben habe...

G.W.F. Hege, *Phänomenologie Des Geistes*

0. Self-referential discourse, if read out of its context of utterance, is a performative "double bind" of pragmatic contradictions. For instance, categories such as personal pronouns, deictic adverbs of time and place, and the illocutionary force of performative verbs, if taken out of their context of situation, have to be compensated by the vicarious conventions of reading during a speech-performance simulacrum. Such is the case of this paper which was purposely written in order to prove this point. That is, the oral delivery of a previously accomplished act of writing was intended to be trapped into the self-referential paradox of a performative "double-bind". Consciousness itself was intended to be caught empty-handed in the blind alley of a double exposure. In fact, the claim to consciousness that is usually taken for granted by both writers and readers was intended to be nullified during the vocalized *reading* of my own act of *writing*.

However, when I received a letter by the Midwest Modern Language Association organizers which stated that papers were not to be read aloud but

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that they were to be distributed for a panel discussion, the appropriateness of my "double-bind" purport became even more felicitous. Indeed, the self-referential antinonies of the *act* of writing *vis a vis* the *act* of reading aloud could become more obvious during silent reading. Paradox and awkwardness could, then, become self-evident and unbearably farcical.¹ (On the other hand, the originally intended oral delivery might have compensated the loss of a discourse which was purposely misplaced.) The awkward dislodgement which the silent reader (or displaced listener) might himself experience (as will be obvious in the following sections), might prove even better "*la double séance, science,, scène*" of the paper's topic on its own self-referential deconstruction.

1. Since by now almost every renowned literary critic in this country has taken a pot shot at Jacques Derrida (Jack The Ripper, as I am told that he is nicknamed at Cambridge), then it should make no Derridean "différance" that a completely unknown traveler from Puerto Rico, like myself, should come to Minneapolis to add to the Frenchman's celebrity.² Hence, I will "defer", in "deference" to those critics, a systematic review of Derrida's main arguments which have been carefully worked over and placed accordingly; that is, as we say in Spanish: "puestos en su lugar", which means: that these arguments have been put where they belong (for example, on a shelf, in a waste basket) or else, that they have been made to fit into one's theory. Since this is not my attitude, I must avow that I will not "deconstruct" in order to put myself together again, for there is nothing to collate in order to "reconstruct",³ except my own consciousness which I take, in agreement with Derrida, as displaced and dislodged somewhere in my utterance right now while I read, just as it was sometime ago, while I thought, and while I wrote this paper, struggling with my English and my bilingualism: in the "double scene" of the "split writing" of my Puerto Rican interface culture of "double register" and of "double face"⁴. In fact, this "undecidable" doubling is what Derridan "deconstruction" is all about and it is the activity in which I am caught while I read what I am writing at this very moment; that is, while I am caught in the opposition between speech and writing.

However, Derrida expresses that "to deconstruct the opposition is first, at a given moment- to overthrow the hierarchy; ...its first implication is a new concept of writing which *both* provokes an inversion of the hierarchy speech/writing along with the whole system which adjoins it, *and* allows for

¹ I borrowed this insight from Paul Watzlawick and his development of Gregory Bateson's paradox of the "double bind".

² For instance, there are significant contributions and mentions, by M.H. Abrams, Charles Altieri, Jonathan Culler, Paul de Man, Eugenio Donato, Edward Said, Murray Krieger, Stanley Fish, Geoffrey Hartman, etc., etc.

³ Compare with Murray Krieger, "Poetics Reconstructed: The Presence vs. the Absence of the World", *New Literary History* 7 (1976), 347-375, and Denis Donoghue, "Deconstructing Deconstruction", *The New York Review of Books*, June 12, 1980, pp. 37-41.

⁴ See Jacques Derrida, "La Double Séance", in *La Dissémination* (Paris: Seuil, 1972, pp. 199-317). For further references on this notion see Jacques Derrida, "Positions", *Diacritics* 2 (1972), pp. 35-36.

the dissonant emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the received order and invading the whole sphere of speech.⁵ Derrida's point is that the activity of deconstructing the dominance of speech over writing doesn't have to lead to a dialectics of uplifting (*aufheben*) nor to a neutralization of opposites according to the standard mathematical and linguistic operations. Rather, deconstruction is not "the cure nor the poison, neither good nor evil, neither the inside nor the outside, neither speech nor writing". It is the doubling of "two texts, two hands, two books, two listenings".^{5a}

So now I am trying to get a hold of my double Puerto Rican self and of my bilingual culture while reading my own writing with "two texts", "two listenings"; doubling my activity and myself in English at a loss of both my writing and my reading and of myself; zeroing in on an activity whereby I am presently unaware of my very doubling. Obviously, this is not metaknowledge, metaconscience, metatheater not metaphysics. There is no "beyond" nor "above" anything, but stark performance irreducible in itself.⁶ Such *consciousness* of writing, and of reading my own writing corners me into the awareness or doing something *unconsciously* while retrieving these words that I now utter in some kind of regress.

The well known philosophical distinction of analytical philosophers between "knowing *that*" and "knowing *how*" comes to the fore of consciousness.⁷ All that my self-awareness can claim while knowing *something* (know *that*) is that *somehow* (know *how*) I am doing it. This type of knowledge fits well into the classical definition of the "performative" in the sense that the "knowing how" is also self-referential in its very activity. For example, a speech act's illocutionary force maintains a performative rhythm with its utterance in a manner similar to the "know how" of what I am doing while doing it. It really doesn't matter if the performative purport of speech wears out in writing and if the act of reading falls "under the doctrine of the etiolations of language"⁸ as John Austin contended against the "parasitic" use of utterances taken out of their context of situation. The kind of *knowing* that I am referring to concerns any kind of *doing*, while Austin's performative *doing*, narrows down to the *saying* of an act of utterance.

⁵ Derrida, "Positions", p. 36.

^{5a} Derrida, "Positions", p. 36, note 4.

⁶ I borrow the notion of "conscious writing" from Jean-Luc Nancy, "*Dum scribo*", *The Oxford Literary Review* 3(1978), 6-21. Nancy deconstructs Descartes *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* (1628). For instance: "I write while not writing in the instantaneity of the movement, describing each time different movements subordinated to the same instantaneity" (p. 9). Likewise: "My fundamental property resides in the immobility of my movement, in the death of each, instant which suspends and gathers my gesture of writing" (p. 20). Paul de Man, *Blindness and Insight* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 75) has expressed: "The ambivalence of writing is such that it can be considered both an act and an interpretative process that follows after an act with which it cannot coincide. As such, it affirms and denies its own nature or specificity".

⁷ For instance, see Jaako Hintikka, *The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975) pp. 1-25.

⁸ John Austin, *How to do Things with Words* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 22.

A notion like Husserl's "meaning-fulfilling-act" (*Bedeutungerfüllende Akt*) could be useful here if we restrict its fulfilling activity to the bridging of "act" and "meaning" in consciousness without letting the crossing over of the bridge grasp itself in its very activity: all of which, as is well known, is taken up by Husserl's "transcendental subjectivity". It is also well known that this is one of Derrida's favourite targets for the deconstruction of the "metaphysics of presence"; that is, the self-transparent encounter of the subject of discourse with himself; the self-fulfilling meaning of an expression (*Ausdruck*) that "intends" (*vouloir-dire*, *be-deuten* according to Derrida) what it says while realizing it in consciousness.⁹

2. You must also forgive my English pronunciation, which is essential for the understanding of the title and of the topic of this paper. I am trying to make a phonetic pun while spelling /o/ /n/ (/on/ consciousness), that is, Derrida on the topic of consciousness versus /v/ /n/ /un/ consciousness, that is, Derrida's *unconsciousness on consciousness*. I am sorry. One gets ludicrous after reading too much Derrida. His phonetic puns on a choice echelon of philosophers, linguists and writers makes clown of us all. In the meantime, Derrida is consciously (that is, unconsciously) making a fool of himself. Indeed, the very *unconsciousness* that displaces any utterances from a centered context of meaning is a play on Heidegger's play with etimologies. Deconstruction allows for this kind of tricks. For example, if the rapport between the *Presence* of Being (with capital letters, of course) and the *present* moment (*Anwesen/Anwesend*) is made possible by its very difference, the ontological essence (*Wesen*), however, remains hidden and forgotten. There is a fundamental deletion here whereby the composure of the *present* moment is salvaged by the very forgetfulness of its provenance (*Herkunft*) from a higher *Presence*. Contrary to Hegelian dialectics, it is not in the reflection of the past (*gewesen*) where the elusive essence (*Wesen*) of Being should be sought, but in the openness to an all encompassing presentness (*Anwesenheit*) that allows Being's essence to come forward; that is, to be elusively present at the present moment (*Anwesenlassen*) while letting it be: hidden and forgotten.¹⁰ Although there are theological undertones here, I am convinced by now that Derrida's absorption with the game on the phonemic paradigm of *praesentia in absentia* (*present* while *absent*) borrowed from structural linguistics¹¹ is a compound made up with Heidegger's project of "thinking" the ontological difference *as such*; that is, the difference between Being and Nothingness which turns out to be Nothingness, while the Being Nothing is the very ontological difference with

⁹ Although Husserl is often the target of Derrida's deconstructive aim, *Le Vox et le Phénomène. Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* (Paris: PUF, 1967), is still his most comprehensive treatment.

¹⁰ Derrida's deconstruction of Heidegger is pervasive. I take it as the fundamental Heideggerian "grounding" (*Grund*) for deconstruction which is also the "abyss" (*Abgrund*) that Derrida follows in his discourse. For Derrida's most comprehensive treatment of Heidegger, see *Marges de la Philosophie* (Paris: Minuit, 1972).

¹¹ Derrida's deconstruction of Saussure is also pervasive. His most comprehensive treatment is *De la Grammatologie* (Paris: Minuit, 1967).

which "thinking" (*Denken*) must come to grips as Heidegger suggested early in *Was ist Metaphysik* (1930). (*Identität und Differenz*, 1957, dwelled on the problem, although it was later given up. This is, perhaps, Heidegger's most disturbingly unfinished program that was taken up by Sartre and is now being exploited by Derrida). In fact, here lies Derrida's success with the play on "difference" (spelled /a/ /n/, phonemically /b/) which phonetically sound alike to the correct spelling of Saussure's "différence" (spelled /e/ /n/, phonemically /d/). It is, then, a phonetical play of utterance that is phonemically deleted. As such, it is a "trace"; the new structure of the "non-present" that is "deferred" in phonemic writing. This is very clever, indeed, and not madness; it is a play on "sound and fury" that cannot be taken as "signifying nothing". Derrida is not a "poor player" nor a telling "idiot" at all.

In short, Derrida's often repeated statement that the presence of consciousness to itself at the privileged moment of the presentness of speech is not self-transparent to a subject of discourse rebounds to a performative aporia at the edge of Nothingness; that is, at the marginal "trace" of a "différence" that is being thought read or written, according to the Heideggerian usage which is "appropriated" by Derrida as I mentioned before. (The very propositional act of such statement turns back to itself. It (self) has to be performed as a statement, whether it be *written* as the "trace" of the "non-present" subject of writing, or else *spoken* in the context of situation of a metaphysics of presence). While Heidegger's late thought accommodated the ontological difference (Being/being) into the *Ereignis* event of "appropriateness" taken as a privileged and reassuring instance of Being, Derrida's forceful rejection of any such instance kept him bound to the unsolved question of a *Presence* (the Being-question) that is somehow sustained by *Absence* (Nothingness).

The analogy with structural linguistics proved to be successful here. Its reversal provided the deconstructive model. For instance, Derrida has often repeated that either the phonemic or the graphemic mark deconstructs with its correlative unmarked differential trait, and that it yields to *neither*; nor even into itself. The binary riddle is not intended to yield either to the Freudian Unconscious or to Cartesian Consciousness.¹⁷ The result is the dereliction of an "undecidable" aporia that is not going to be recovered by the metalanguage of a descriptive solance that is couched in explanatory comforts. Self-evidence and absurdity go hand in hand.

3. Indeed, Derrida plays the wise fool (two wise for most of us) and ties together in a Gordian knot the threads of a metaphysical discourse whose ends are their beginning. He lets himself get strategically caught in the very discourse that he meticulously unties in vicious circles; in the self-referential tangles of Hegel's dialectics for the Selfhood of the Concept which posits itself-

¹⁷ See Jacques Derrida, "Freud et la Scène de L'écriture", *L'écriture et la différence* (Paris: Seuil, 1967) pp. 293-340.

as-other while turning back to itself in consciousness; in Heidegger's privileged *Ereignis* which recovers in a moment (in a true "happening") the very Being that it forgets while letting Being be in speech; and in Husserl's meaning (*Bedeutung*) of an expression (*Asudruck*) intended by a subject endowed with a transcendental constitution that binds self to the world and *vice versa* within a consciousness limbo of self-absortions and reductions. We might indeed get caught in this kind of self-referential metaphysical loops of meaning. But not Derrida, who only lets himself get caught as a strategical move for deconstruction. Reference doesn't turn back to a self-transparent subject of apodictic discourse but "effaces" through a "double face" that "faces" itself through the looking-glass of discourse and disperses itself through the loopholes of the threads of a network in which we are caught; that is, in the written text of Hegel, Heidegger, Husserl, Freud, Levinas, Saussure, Rousseau, Mallarmé, Artaud, Bataille, Abraham, Nietzsche, Genet, Sollers, Austin, Searle... If Derrida lets himself get caught strategically while deconstructing these texts with their own language- it follows that this very text that I am writing on a sunny Caribbean afternoon in Puerto Rico (but not reading in the cold Fall of Minneapolis / thus I wrote while I now read this very "read" that I write; wrote; read now, but is "written" as a "trace" to be retrieved / thus I write / "to be retrieved" / I wrote / / I write / / I read now that it "is written" /, indeed, written)... Derrida is right about "écriture", and the thread of my discourse would catch up with the reasoning that reads: "it follows that this very text" that I am self-referentially writing-reading has no reference but its own written "trace" of writing that I read / thus it is self-referentially written /, and it follows that this text is itself caught in Derrida's text on Hegel, Heidegger, ..., and so on we keep writing and rewriting Derrida's tricky text in self-referential regress to infinity. Such in Derrida's self-swallowing *unconsciousness*, and this is the way in which we are all caught in his writing while I now read my displaced act of *consciousness* in which I am myself at a loss. Moreover, if according to Derrida the "trace" of writing is a spacing out that is not there as such, but "defers" itself along with the ongoing rewriting movement of a "différence" that takes its own *time* in the space of the written text, ("*temporisation*", "*espacement*"), why not erase it altogether during performance? That is, why not deconstruct the written text by pivoting its performance back to an activity that doesn't have to "underwrite" a metaphysical assent to the primacy of a speech act (for instance: a naive speech act theory of literature) but that it simply acknowledges the act of writing and the act of reading as performances in their own right? For example, a performance-deletion of the "saying" that underlies every utterance has been suggested in linguistics.¹³ There is an elided noun phrase of the sort: "I am saying that", lurking beneath every statement wherein the connective "that" self-refers to the performance that follows. The presupposition (or the illocutionary force) of saying something to somebody is implied in every

¹³ J.R. Ross, "On Declarative Sentences", in *Readings in English Transformational Grammar*, R.A. Jacobs and P.S. Rosenbaum, eds. (Waltham: Ginn, 1970) pp. 222-272.

utterance even if it is not openly performed during speech. Consequently, it might as well be erased during the performance of writing or of reading while it is *somehow* there anyway. This might prove right Kant's assumption that the verb "to be" may be taken as the antithesis that is conversely "posited" in negations. For instance, a denial expressed implicitly the verb "to be" as the "position" that is being "opposed" and denied in such expression. In other words, any given verb in a natural language can be denied by virtue of the fact that all such verbs themselves contain the verb "to be".¹⁴ Likewise, a distinction was made some time ago by analytical philosophers between the *act-object* ambiguity in statements and utterances, so that any utterance-as-act precludes itself as *object* during the act of performance.¹⁵ This, however, is not a logocentric vantage point of reference for speech, meaning or truth. On the other hand, there is no foreclosure of writing here for the deferment of an "écriture" that spaces itself out in written postponement of meaning. For example, Husserl's so called fulfillment of a "meaning realizing *act* in consciousness" might cash in full for an *object* of the world that is fulfilled in consciousness. However, consciousness cannot recover itself back both as the *act* and the *object* of performance. It obviously doesn't pay. A simple formal distinction must be made for any *object*-statement, either written or spoken, since I cannot speak about my *act* of speaking while I am speaking unless I distinguished the often been made in philosophical discourse in order to one grips with a *conceptual* self-as-other; for instance, Sartre's reflexive *pour soi* as distinguished from an objectively numb and dumb *en soi*. It is interesting, however, that a self *as such* (*sui, soi*) is always posited as reference.

In short, the performance of a speech *act*, of an *act* of writing and of an *act* of reading rebounds on the pivot of its own reference and passes out. It can, however, pass along as an object of a reflection that is itself a performance in its own right. Reflection can recursively be reflected upon during another performance; and so we can perform on in unlimited circularity. Obviously, Heideggerian Hermeneutics are not allowed to drift into these spirals of performative dispersion. The Hermeneutic Circle is centered on a Oneness that gathers itself back in a *lógos* of "recollection" (*lógos-légein*) according to Heidegger's etimologies, while, on the other hand, there is no "speech event" here that takes back its belongings in escrow meaning: there is nothing to remember or to commemorate (Erinnerung) during a speech liturgy that celebrates my belonging to a tradition of meaning and interpretation (Gadamer's metaphor or speech-belonging-to-a-tradition-of-hearing: *Zugehörigkeit - Gehoren*). Rather, the ongoing Diasporra of performance is

¹⁴ See Herma Frank, "La critique analytique de l'ontologie", in *Essays in Semiotics*, J. Kristeva, J. Rey-Devote and D.J. Umiker, eds. (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), p. 29. For a deconstruction based on Aristotle and Benveniste see: Derrida, "Le Supplément de copule", in *Marges de la philosophie*.

¹⁵ Richard Garner, "'Pressupposition' in Philosophy and Linguistics", in *Studies in Linguistic Semantics*, C.J. Fillmore and D.T. Langendoen, eds., (New York: Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, 1971) pp. 23-42.

very much alike to Derrida's own semantic "dissemination" and generative "multiplicity" of writing.¹⁶

4. Current interest in the act of reading, however, entices us back along centered detours that rewrite the premises of logocentrism. Indeed some might rejoice in the reinstatement of the "reader" undertaken by Jonathan Culler, Stanley Fish, Georges Poulet, Wolfgang Iser and Umberto Eco et al.¹⁷ which could put a stop sign to all this ongoing nonsense on *écriture* and *différance*. Seriousness might come back to Academe. It is time to turn back to "tradition" and to "conventions". (Indeed, I must add: to a philosophy that is grounded in the retrieval of "tradition", and to a linguistic semiotics that focuses primarily on "conventions"). We might even be able to *read* again. (Thus I quote myself in some sort of ventriloquizing indirect discourse of wishful thinking for, in fact, we all know that neither Culler, Iser or Eco are being proposed nowadays as paradigms of "reading" and one often wonders if some "reading" is being done at all by the disquieted tutors of seriousness). Rather, the so called Common Reader is still the prevalent and persistent paradigm.

"But let's be serious", and I quote Derrida who kept quoting himself back to seriousness in his recent polemic with John Searle which, as a matter of fact, focused on the phenomenon of *citation*, as brought up by Derrida's deconstruction of Austin. I quote: "Faced with the speech act ("let's be serious"), readers may perhaps feel authorized in believing that the presumed signator of this text is only now beginning to be serious".¹⁸ Indeed, if we are to take seriously the notions of "tradition" and of "convention", we have to rely on their potential for retrieval. Their very grounding is citational. Such grounding is shared by the often quoted "intertextually" of a text and of a culture which is no joking matter, but hinges on our being or not being cultured enough to be able to read and understand at all. The idea of "competence" has also been quoted in this connection. For instance, Jonathan Culler ventures its usage along with other labels of linguistic jargon; and so does Umberto Eco. Wolfgang Iser accommodates it to a so called "implied reader" of a text who is committed to a "transcendental receptivity" which binds Iser (together with his colleagues at the University of Constance) to the Husserlian legacy of an apperceptive "horizon" of expectations in reading. That is, the act of reading and of understanding what I read relies on the "conditions of possibility" which I share by my "belonging" to a language, to a culture, and to a tradition which is somehow performatively "quoted" as

¹⁶ For further treatment see Eduardo Forastieri-Braschi, "La base hermenéutica del conocimiento literario", *Dispositio* 3 (1978) 103-123.

¹⁷ Compare Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) pp. 153-159, and Umberto Eco, *The Role of the Reader* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979) pp. 3-43. Also: *Reader-Response Criticism*, Jane P. Tompkins, ed. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

¹⁸ Jacques Derrida, "Limited Inc.", in *Glyph 2*, Samuel Weber and Henry Sussman, eds. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977) p. 168.

“implicit knowledge” or “competence” in the very act of reading. Thus I belong to a tradition, and partake of the conventions that render my act of reading possible. Likewise, Iser’s adaptation of Roman Ingarden’s assumptions on the indeterminacy of the literary *objects* has led to the metaphor of the “blank” and of the open space of the text that is to be filled (*Leerstellen*) during reading. The *act* of reading brings about the “concretizing” of the text’s virtual coherence. Connexity is thus brought about by the retrieval and by the anticipation of the background knowledge which the reader reinstates with new discoveries. (Similar metaphors and assumptions are shared by Eco and by Culler).

5. And yet, my *act* belongs to me while I read the *object*: statement that I now perform; while I reflect on such “belonging”; while I do the “reading of my writing”; while I “become conscious”, as Iser has suggested following Nietzsche’s lead on this slippery state of affairs. And yet I cannot grasp this “belonging” nor this “becoming” as such. Indeed, this paper that I / now / write / read / is caught in the pragmatic paradox of a performative “double-bind”. While I / now / write, “conscious writing” pushes on forward and spaces itself out towards a “counter-factual reading” that I / now / perform. Briefly then, consciousness cannot cope with the consciousness that “belongs” to itself during an act of consciousness; not even with the consciousness of a Hermeneutic circularity that blends the consequence of a tradition with the horizon of my present awareness (Gadamer’s key concepts of “*Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*” and “*Horizontverschmelzung*”).¹⁹

Although the Heideggerian premises of “thinking” seem to hold with this kind of “belonging”, the process of “thinking” Being as such is self-swallowing as Derrida sharply pinned down. Heidegger’s assumptions on “being-there” (*Dasein*), that is, on being in a world such that I am mostly unaware of it, drives “thinking” into a blind alley at a loss of both itself and the world. (And yet, “my *act* belongs to me”, when I am myself at a loss). I cannot grasp this “belonging” unless I reflect on it and unless I take a Cartesian hold of myself and of the world. Furthermore, such “belonging” might take the same fold on the loop of self-reference that Hegel’s Absolute Consciousness took; indeed, it is the same kind of regress that Derrida tries to deconstruct in every speech act (or Heideggerian “speech event”). Yet, this “belonging” cannot be strategically cornered into a dead end deconstruction of opposites, because it is in itself and irreducible deixis for Nothingness. It is altogether the “undecidable” self-reference of a performative discourse that vanishes with an indexicality that is its sole vantage point of reference; a pragmatics of discourse that points and shifts back to itself when the *here* and *now* of discourse are already emptied of their referential content: at the edge of language, of myself and of the world, as Wittgenstein might have suggested. In fact, this very antinomical “reading of

¹⁹ See Forastieri-Braschi, “La base hermenéutica”, pp. 114-115.

my writing" still holds while I poorly perform again, and "strut and fret" my turn in this panel; in this "*double séance, science, scene*". It still holds together in the *present* participle of the "reading of my writing" at least now while I utter this very: "*then is heard no more*" / which, as matter of fact, was never uttered in *this* context of situation/.

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