

# THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF NECESSARY REASONS IN ANSELM AND LLULL

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THE attempt to find necessary reasons, proofs, and demonstrative arguments for the substantiation of human knowledge did not begin in the Middle Ages.\* The Greeks had explored the problem long before the first mediaeval men raised these questions. Indeed, it was primarily in the texts of Aristotle and his Latin translators and commentators that Anselm, Llull, and other thinkers from the Middle Ages found their main source of inspiration.

Aristotle's explicit aim in writing the *Prior Analytics* was to lay down the conditions of scientific knowledge and for this purpose

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\* I must make clear at the outset that the present paper's aim is primarily to deal with the elements that go into the structure of rational necessity or, what is the same, the elements that constitute the structure of arguments whose conclusions are considered by Anselm and Llull as rationally necessary. Consequently, I have omitted reference to much of the contents of the notion of necessity, emphasizing organizational aspects and their respective functions. I have omitted as well, reference to the purely logical dimensions of the problem, using a more traditional approach. For a preliminary study of necessity in Anselm, see D. P. Henry, *The Logic of Saint Anselm* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), particularly pp. 172-80.

he undertook the formal study of the syllogism. A syllogism is, in his own words, "an argument in which, certain things having been assumed, something other than these follows of necessity from their truth, without needing any term from outside."<sup>1</sup>

The inclusion of the notion of necessity, meaning deductive or syllogistic necessity here, was to be very important for the future of dialectics in the ages to come.

Concepts such as this, expressed by Aristotle in Greek, were translated, commented upon, and passed on to the mediaevals by Roman writers and scholars such as Marius Victorinus, a rhetor of considerable fame, and Boethius, whose greatest ambition was to make Greek learning available to the Latins. In Boethius' translation of the *Prior Analytics*, for example, terms such as *propositio demonstrativa*, *necessaria*, *probabilis*, etc. are found without difficulty.<sup>2</sup> Marius Victorinus even uses the term "*in rationibus necessariis*" a number of times in his *Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam*.<sup>3</sup> Also important in this transmission of learning was the work of early Christian writers such as Cassiodorus. In the writings and collections of classical workers assembled by the latter in particular, mediaeval thinkers found an immediate and rich source for their speculations on demonstrative knowledge.<sup>4</sup>

This heritage left by the ancients to the mediaevals presented a number of characteristics which helped to shape the early mediaeval discussions of this problem. There is, in the first place, an implicit and at times explicit belief in the power of human reason to know scientifically and to construct arguments which are valid, true, and necessary in support of human knowledge.

Secondly, the certainty accompanying argumentation is mostly

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<sup>1</sup> *Anal. Pr.* 24b18-22 and *Top.* 100a25-27. Translation taken from W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London: Methuen and Co., 1932), p. 32. These are not the only texts in Aristotle which express notions of necessity. See also *Anal. Pr.* 25b32-35 and Ross, pp. 34 and 38.

<sup>2</sup> Ed. L. Minio-Paluello, *Analytica Priora. Translatio Boethii in Aristoteles Latinus* III, 1-4 (Bruges-Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1962), p. 137; 70a1 ff.

<sup>3</sup> I, ch. 29. Ed. Carolus Halm in *Rhetores Latini Minores* (Lipsiae in aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1863), p. 233.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, the section on dialectics found in *Cassiodori Senatoris Institutiones*, ed. R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937). I do not have to stress, of course, that 12th century thinkers were acquainted mainly with the *logica vetus*, while the 13th had the whole baggage of Aristotelian logic.

logical, and, in particular, deductive or syllogistic what in the Middle Ages formed the core of the dialectical art.

Thirdly, both Greeks and Romans had already developed a highly technical vocabulary and conceptual framework involving terms such as *rationes necessariae*, *propositio necessaria*, *demonstratio*, etc. more or less adequate for the discussion of the problem.

Fourthly, there is a concentration of treatises on logic or related subjects among the works that found their way into the early Middle Ages. For example, in the case of Aristotle, only some of the logical works were available in translation, most of them with long commentaries. (These formed the bulk of what is called the *logica vetus*). Writers who were less interested in logic such as Plato and Plotinus were not available at all except through the thought and references of Augustine, the pseudo-Dionysius, and a few other writers.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, there were numerous treatises on subjects of a grammatical or dialectical nature written by Romans themselves.

Finally, it was within the bosom of the Church and through men of great religious prestige such as Cassiodorus that the thought of the ancients was preserved, thus suggesting the tacit approval of the hierarchy.

The stage was set, then, at "the dawn of the Middle Ages" for the controversies to come. The sources were available and the issues were vital to a Christian community that claimed to have and know the truth. But, unfortunately, circumstantial factors prevented them from being taken up at this time. After Boethius, Gregory, and Isidore, with the exception of the Carolingian interlude, Europe was plunged into a dark night of illiteracy and ignorance which produced little in the area of philosophical speculation. However, there were a few sporadic lights in these centuries of darkness which preserved some of the texts and learning of previous ages, preparing the way for an early renaissance.

Already in the tenth century there is some intellectual activity related to the problem of reason and knowledge as is evidenced in the treatise by Gerbert of Aurillac, later Pope Sylvester II, en-

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<sup>5</sup> Perhaps the most important of these was Chalcidius' trans. and commentary on parts of the *Timaeus*. Boethius' *De consolatione philosophiae* was also to prove very influential in this process. For other works see E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 81 ff., 103 ff., and *passim*.

titled *De rationali et ratione uti*.<sup>6</sup> But not until the eleventh century did the pace of discussion speed up.

Thanks to the factors which were mentioned above, all writers of this monastic period of human history knew dialectics, although they disagreed as to its proper use and its relation to faith and revealed truth. As Prof. Gilson has stated, the controversy centered on two questions: "first, was it lawful for a monk, who had renounced the world, to pursue secular learning? Next, was it lawful for a Christian to submit the mysteries of faith to the rules of logical reasoning?"<sup>7</sup>

Those who gave affirmative answers without reservations to these two questions have been branded by posterity as "dialecticians" and those who offered negative answers as "anti-dialecticians."

One of the first and bolder supporters of the application of dialectics to the discussion of theological issues was Berengarius of Tours (d. 1086) who in his *De Sacra Coena adversus Lanfrancum* tried to explain the doctrine of the Eucharist in philosophical language.<sup>8</sup>

His main adversary, as the title of his treatise suggests, was Lanfranc (d. 1089) who objected primarily to the indiscriminate use of dialectics in the interpretation of the mysteries of faith, and favoured the authoritative citation of Scripture in all theological writing.<sup>9</sup>

However, the most violent opponent to the use of dialectics in theology was Peter Damian (d. 1072). He went so far as to reject not only dialectics, but also grammar, saying that the first grammarian was the devil, who first taught Adam to decline 'deus' in the plural. Further, anticipating some of the excesses of late scholasticism, he also stated that it is possible for God to bring about that a past event never happened.<sup>10</sup>

### *Anselm (1033-1109)*

In the middle of the controversy appears the towering figure of Anselm. A student of Lanfranc, monk, abbot of Bec, and Arch-

<sup>6</sup> See *PL* 139, 157 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 615, n. 41.

<sup>8</sup> See the ed. of W. H. Beckenkamp (Hagae Comitibus: Martinus Nijhoff, 1941).

<sup>9</sup> Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 615.

<sup>10</sup> *De divina omnipotentia* ch. 15; *PL* 145, 618.

bishop of Canterbury, Anselm was well aware of the issues involved in the controversies that preceded him and he did not hesitate to make his contribution in this regard. He had inherited from his predecessors both the problem and the language in which it was presented, but he made of these two factors much more than anyone else had done before him or would do after him for at least another century. His works, filled with a deep and complete, but simple, faith, together with a trust in the rational powers of the human mind, made them an instant success, creating for their author the reputation of wisdom which has accompanied his name ever since. The mediaeval Church made him a saint and students of philosophy and theology incorporated his thought into the heritage of the Western World.

Unfortunately, in spite of the great respect of posterity towards him, his thought has not always been understood. There have been unfounded accusations of rationalism as well as attempts to minimize unjustly his trust in the human capacity to know.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, the occasional reader of Anselm might be easily misled by a number of texts found among his writings and the apparently ambivalent attitude which they reveal. For example, on the one hand, Anselm states clearly and repeatedly that the mysteries of faith transcend the human intellect and that the purpose of his works is only to provide a meditation on the understanding of faith. Elsewhere, he points out as well that he does not propose to bring faith to the unfaithful through reasons, but to provide delight for the faithful through understanding and contemplation, since understanding without faith is impossible.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The number of studies on this problem is staggering. Most useful are the following: Karl Barth, *Anselm: Fides quaerens intellectum*, trans. I. W. Robertson (London: SCM Press, 1960); E. Beurlier, "Les rapports de la raison et de la foi dans la philosophie de saint Anselme," *Revue de Philosophie* 2 (1909) 692-723; M. Garrido, "El supuesto racionalismo de San Anselmo," *Verdad y Vida* 13 (1955) 469-481; E. Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), pp. 23-27; A. M. Jacquín, "Les 'rationes necessariae' de Saint Anselme," *Mélanges Mandonnet in Études d'Histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale du Moyen Age II* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), pp. 67-78; A. Koyré, *St. Anselme de Canterbury: Fides quaerens intellectum* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930); J. Mariás, *San Anselmo y el insensato y otros estudios de filosofía* (Madrid, 1944); C. Ottáviano, "Le 'rationes necessariae' in S. Anselmo," *Sophia* 1 (1933) 91-97; Gerald B. Phelan, *The Wisdom of Saint Anselm* (Latrobe, Pa.: The Archabbey Press, 1960).

<sup>12</sup> For all references to Anselm, I shall use the edition of F. S. Schmitt,

On the other hand, however, Anselm also states that the mysteries of faith, such as the Incarnation of Christ and Redemption of the human race, let alone the existence of God and other such truths, can be demonstrated through necessary reasons and without the help of Scriptural authority to unbelievers. Moreover, this understanding and demonstration of faith is not to be pursued by the believer solely for the sake of bringing the unbeliever to the fold, but for his own edification as well.<sup>13</sup>

The solution to these apparently paradoxical statements lies in what Phelan has called "the wisdom of Anselm," referring to the doctrinal content of the two *formulae*: "*Fides quaerens intellectum*" and "*Credo ut intelligam*."<sup>14</sup> Basically, they express the same epistemological doctrine, which I shall explore briefly at present.

Although there may be disagreement among scholars with respect to a number of Anselmian doctrines, no one has seriously questioned so far that for him the starting point of all theological speculation is faith. He repeatedly and unambiguously insisted on this point.

"Let no man therefore rashly engage in the discussion of divine questions unless he first be firmly established in the solidity of faith and have acquired due gravity of wisdom and morals lest, while he wanders with incautious levity among sophistic divagations, he be caught in the trap of some tenacious fallacy."<sup>15</sup>

Faith is the starting point of *homo viator* on his path towards an understanding of the truth which he has already found in Christ. Moreover, faith is also a guide, leading him in the right direction and helping him to avoid the dangers of error which lure his nature

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S. *Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, 6 vols. (Secovii, 1938 ff.). In support of this paragraph see *Monologion*, Prol. and ch. 64 (Sch. I, pp. 7.2 and 74.30); *Cur deus homo* I, chs. 1 and 25 (Sch. II, pp. 47.5 and 9.6); *Proslogion* ch. 1 (Sch. I, p. 97); *Epistola de incarnatione verbi* ch. 1 (Sch. II, pp. 3.7-4).

<sup>13</sup> *Monologion*, Prol. and ch. 1 (Sch. I, pp. 7.9 and 13.10); *Epistola de incarnatione verbi* ch. 6 (Sch. II, p. 20.18); The term 'necessary' was dear to the period. Abelard will discuss it in detail later on in his famous *Glosses on Porphyry*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* 21 (1919-33), p. 3 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Phelan, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>15</sup> *Epistola de incarnatione verbi* ch. 1 (Sch. II, p. 9.16). I use Phelan's translation of this passage, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

corrupted by sin.<sup>16</sup> Through this divine gift man can gain once more the moral perspective lost under the tree of paradise, allowing him to decide between right and wrong. Hence, faith restores the image of God debased by his sin, and provides a rectitude and standard of judgement without which the attainment of truth is indeed a most difficult enterprise.<sup>17</sup> It is, if I may use a scientific analogy to describe it, the catalyst which speeds and yet secures the noetic reaction ending in truth.

Faith in the unquestionable truth of Christian doctrine is the sure, although negative, criterion of certainty, the standard of truth which measures the acceptability of any conclusion reached in the process of acquiring knowledge.<sup>18</sup> No conclusion which contradicts the principles laid down in the Scriptures and elaborated by the Fathers is to be considered sound, since departure from the established doctrinal content of revealed truths leads man to sophistical argumentation and ultimately to error.<sup>19</sup> Only when the conclusions reached in the process of understanding and demonstration confirm or at least do not oppose what the Christian already believes to be true, only then has he reached understanding.<sup>20</sup>

Faith is indispensable, then, for the attainment of truth since all true knowledge must begin and keep in close contact with it. Its absence leaves man without a standard to follow and against which he may measure the adequacy of his findings, since as a result of sin he has lost the criterion for truth of his pristine state in paradise. He only regains it in the moral quality and intellectual content provided by faith.<sup>21</sup>

However, according to Anselm, faith must be alive and pro-

<sup>16</sup> *Epistolae de incarnatione verbi prior recensio* §4 (Sch. I, p. 283.26).

<sup>17</sup> *Proslogion* ch. 2 (Sch. I, p. 101.3). The exact meaning of *fides* for Anselm is not altogether clear. At this point he seems to refer to it as an acquired characteristic of the soul given to it by God, a state of mind which awakens it to truth, what later scholastics would call a "quality" or "habit."

<sup>18</sup> *Cur deus homo* I, ch. 10 (Sch. II, p. 67.1); *Epistola de incarnatione verbi* ch. 10 (Sch. II, p. 28.4). If as a starting point and constant guide faith seems to be for Anselm a characteristic of the soul, as a criterion of certainty it seems to refer to the objective content of revelation, i.e. belief in the doctrines of the Christian Church.

<sup>19</sup> *Monologion* Prol. (Sch. I, p. 8.8); *Cur deus homo* I, ch. 18 (Sch. II, p. 82.8); *De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae dei cum libero arbitrio* III, 6 (Sch. II, p. 271.26).

<sup>20</sup> *Epistola de incarnatione verbi* ch. 1 (Sch. II, p. 7.8).

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. 6, p. 20.1; See also PHELAN, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

ductive in order to be effective in this role. "An idle faith is as good as dead, because it lacks the life of love."<sup>22</sup> It must also be complete and open: "To believe only what has to be believed is not to believe at all."<sup>23</sup> "Indeed," he writes elsewhere, "it would be negligent (for the Christian believer) to refuse to embark upon the search for an understanding of faith."<sup>24</sup> Thus, "...he who seeks this understanding while being firmly established in faith is not to be condemned..." specially since "...Sacred Scripture itself invites us to enter this quest..."<sup>25</sup>

If at the end of this search we succeed in gaining some understanding, then we must thank God for it; but if we happen to fail, Anselm advises, let us not fall into despair but bend our heads and pray.<sup>26</sup> For, indeed, the purpose of this search is not to comprehend or completely exhaust the secrets of the divine mysteries which transcend the highest noetic activity of the human mind; nor is it to strengthen faith:

"I only desire to understand your truth in some degree, a truth which my heart believes and loves. Nor do I ask to understand that I may believe, but to believe that I may understand. Because, of this I am certain, that 'unless I believed I would not understand'."<sup>27</sup>

Once the seeker of understanding has found his standard of truth, he is able to engage in his search with the help of dialectics. If faith is the criterion for truth, the Aristotelian logic of the syllogism as known in the eleventh century is the method of demonstrating it. Dialectics provides the formal skeleton of the procedure, and although it cannot assure us that the conclusions reached through it are unquestionably true (only faith can do that), it does

<sup>22</sup> *Monologion* ch. 78 (Sch. I, p. 84.22).

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 85.8.

<sup>24</sup> *Cur deus homo* I, ch. 1 (Sch. II, p. 48.16).

<sup>25</sup> This text appears in the Preface of one of the several versions of the *Epistola de incarnatione verbi*; It has not been included in Schmitt's edition; Edited in *PL* 150, 260 ff. For the value of these other versions see Schmitt's article "Cinq recensions de l'Epistola de incarnatione verbi de s. Anselme de Cantorbery," *Revue Bénédictine* 51 (1939) 275-287.

<sup>26</sup> *Cur deus homo* II, ch. 16 (Sch. II, p. 117.3); *Monologion* ch. 64 (Sch. I, p. 74.30); *Epistolae de incarnatione verbi prior recensio* §4 (Sch. I, p. 283.24).

<sup>27</sup> *Proslogion* ch. 1 (Sch. I, p. 100.16).



provide some certainty as long as those conclusions do not contradict some other stronger dialectical reasons or faith.<sup>28</sup>

The interplay of these two factors, faith and dialectics, is best illustrated, perhaps, with an example taken from the *Proslogion*: the controversial argument for the existence of God.<sup>29</sup>

In spite of all its apparent intricacy, the substance of the argument seems to be contained in a simple statement: "There exists, both in the intellect and in reality, a being than which a greater cannot be thought."<sup>30</sup> The apparent strength of this formula lies primarily in the logical implications of its denial which involve a blatant self-contradiction. To understand the formula is, of course, to grant that a being than which a greater cannot be thought exists in the intellect, and, more important still, to grant that this being exists also in reality, since "what exists in reality is greater than what exists in the intellect alone."<sup>31</sup>

The real strength of the argument, however, lies elsewhere, as it is clear from the fact that beginning with Gaunilon many subsequent philosophers and logicians have found no difficulty in denying its conclusion. It is only in the context of faith as understood in the Anselmian framework that this formulation is claimed to be undeniable. Provided faith leads the way, rectifies our soul, and confirms the truth of our conclusions, the correct dialectical formulation of any argument can contain no error. This is certainty at the highest possible point for Anselm and the one that he asserted to have achieved in the *Proslogion's* proof.<sup>32</sup>

The truth contained in faith, elaborated by the correct procedure of dialectics, can end only in understanding. Faith provides the moral rectitude, the contents, and the standard of truth necessary

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<sup>28</sup> *Monologion* ch. 1 (Sch. I, p. 14.1); *Cur deus homo* I, chs. 10 and 18 (Sch. II, pp. 67.1 and 82.5 ff.).

<sup>29</sup> The amount of literature on this problem is very large. Some useful articles are found in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, ed. A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (London: MacMillan, 1963); *The Existence of God*, ed. J. Hick (New York: MacMillan, 1964); and *The Ontological Argument from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers*, ed. A. Plantinga (New York: 1965). The many publications of Hartshorne on the problem are generally enlightening, but from an historical point of view the best article is A. C. Pegis' "St. Anselm and the argument of the 'Proslogion'," *Mediaeval Studies* 28 (1966) 228-267.

<sup>30</sup> *Proslogion* 2 (Sch. I, p. 102.2).

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101.15.

<sup>32</sup> See Pegis, *art. cit.*, p. 266.

for understanding, while dialectics supplies a secure method of procedure. To use an Augustinian metaphor, faith is the lighthouse that guarantees a safe return to the port, while the rules and method of dialectics help in the efficient manouvering of the vessel. Faith alone cannot lead the vessel to the port of understanding, just as reason alone is lost in the storm of error without faith.

For the believer, the passage from faith to understanding is relatively safe since he is starting at the right end of the process, namely, in faith, although he has no assurance of achieving it, i.e. understanding. However, as long as he holds securely to the truths which he believes, he will not end in error as some dialecticians have done according to Anselm.<sup>33</sup>

For the unbeliever, on the other hand, the situation is quite different. Lacking faith, and thus a proper standard of truth, he may end in error unless he is helped by the Christian who has both, and who, much like Socrates, plays the role of the midwife in the delivery of knowledge.

In summary, the enigmatic "necessary reasons" of Anselm are no more than evidence correctly articulated in dialectical form for the substantiation and clarification of the beliefs proposed by the Christian Church. Their necessity for the believer lies in the fact that their conclusions are confirmed by faith and their logical articulation is correct. For the unbeliever, their necessity is their sufficiency in bringing him into the threshold of truth if he agrees to be a docile disciple of the Christian who would lead him through them to Christ.

However, it is not only because they bring the believer to a greater understanding of his faith or because they guarantee the acceptance of Christian doctrines by the willing unbeliever guided by the faithful that these dialectical arguments checked by Christian truth are called "necessary reasons" by Anselm. There is a deeper and perhaps more important reason for this. As Karl Barth has correctly interpreted: "The *necessitas* that is peculiar to knowledge of the object of faith is the impossibility of the object of faith not existing or of being otherwise than it is..." based, moreover, in "...the *necessitas* peculiar to the object of faith..." itself, which "...is the impossibility for thought to conceive the object of faith as not existing or as existing differently."<sup>34</sup> In other

<sup>33</sup> *Monologion* chs. 67 and 68 (Sch. I, p. 77.27); *Epistola de incarnatione verbi* I (Sch. II, p. 9.20).

<sup>34</sup> Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

words, noetic necessity is based on ontic reality. Indeed, the strength and truth of the Christian's quest springs not as much from the method of knowing as from the fact that his conclusions are founded on truth. Knowledge that is founded on *what is* cannot possibly be otherwise, not because *what is* cannot be differently from a necessity of nature (this is possible), but because truth is based on the knowledge of things as they are.<sup>35</sup>

To know this truth, the truth of Christian doctrine in relation to the truth of things and the truth of God, in a deeper perspective, to see more clearly how these truths are part of the creation and God's plan, and to approach them more closely on our way to the beatific vision is the profound meaning of "*fides quaerens intellectum*" and the Anselmian doctrine of necessary reasons,<sup>36</sup> based on a particular structure in which faith and logical procedure play a pre-determined role.

After Anselm, the controversies concerning the relationship between faith and reason continued to flourish in almost every subsequent generation of mediaeval thinkers. However, the Anselmian terminology of *rationes necessariae* partially fell into disuse. Only in the second half of the thirteenth century do we find another figure who vigorously tried to demonstrate the truths of the Christian Church through "necessary reasons." I am referring, of course, to Ramon Llull.

### Llull (1233?-1315?)

In a way, although Llull was significantly influenced by Anselm and has been often called a man from the twelfth century, they are very different thinkers.<sup>37</sup> Europe had changed enormously from the monastic age of Anselm to the scholastic climate of the thirteenth century. The cathedral and monastic schools had given way to universities. The literatures of the newly formed Romance

<sup>35</sup> Phelan, *op. cit.*, pp. 33 and 44. See also Jacquin, *art. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>36</sup> *Monologion* ch. 70 (Sch. I, p. 80.9); *Proslogion* ch. 26 (Sch. I, pp. 120 ff.); See also Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, p. 129.

<sup>37</sup> The echo of Anselmian *formulae* is often heard in Llull's works. See, for example, *Logica del Gatzel* ch. 35, lines 640-651, ed. S. Galmés in *Obres de Ramon Llull* vol. 19 (Palma de Mallorca: Amengual i Muntaner, 1936), p. 28: "Si tu vols entendre lo ver./ fe c'entendre tauran mester./ Ab fe comença a obrar/ en ço que volrà encercar./ affermant possibilitat;/ car la

languages were flourishing, and a new spirit of nationalism was setting in. But most important of all, the West had witnessed one of the most decisive developments that have occurred in the history of Europe, namely, the progressive discovery of Arabic and classical learning. Anselm had at his disposal a truly meager bounty of philosophical ideas contained in the few works from classical antiquity that had been preserved in a few cenobitical libraries. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, had seen the appearance of most of what we have today from Arabic, Latin, and Greek science and philosophy. The main location for this revolutionary development was Spain, where Jews, Moslems, and Christians laboured to translate works by Averroes, Avicenna, Aristotle, Avencebrol, and many other. Suddenly, Latin Christian Europe was faced with a treasure of sophisticated ideas that challenged not only its outward culture and learning, but more important still, its beliefs. The highly technical philosophical language and thought produced by Greek and Arabic pagans was bound to clash with the Christian world-view of the Middle Ages, producing a score of works that attempted the absorption and Christianization of some of these ideas, the refutation of others, or the apologetic justification of Christian beliefs which they threatened.<sup>38</sup>

Llull, born in Mallorca in the second quarter of the thirteenth century, just after the island had been reconquered by the Catalans from the Moors, was particularly exposed to the problems and advantages resulting from the wealth of learning recently acquired by the West. A poet, courtier, and educated man, he lost no time after a dramatic conversion in setting to work on the defense of the Christian faith. His greatest ambition as outlined in the *Vida coetania* was threefold: first, to dedicate and if necessary sacrifice his life in the service of God through the conversion of the infidels; second, to write books which would refute the erroneous theories of the unbelievers, convincing them of the truth of the Christian faith; and third, to establish language schools in which Arabic

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impossibilitat/ no afferms al començament,/ cor si ho fas, l, enteniment/  
 no porà mays avant anar/ encercar ço que vols trobar;/ car qui al començament  
 menyscrè/ ab enteniment no veu re." Elsewhere Llull refers specifically to Anselm, and Richard of St. Victor when elaborating on this point. See *Liber mirandarum demonstrationum* I, 14, ed. Salzinger, II, p. 183.

<sup>38</sup> Some of the most important works produced as a direct reaction to this phenomenon are the *Pugio fidei* of R. Martí and Thomas' *Contra gentiles*.

and other languages spoken by heathens would be taught to those who intended to convert them through preaching or disputation.<sup>39</sup>

With these aims in mind, Llull set to work. He travelled extensively throughout Europe and the then predominantly Muslim Mediterranean basin, preaching, disputing, and writing. His works, written in Arabic, Latin, and Catalan, form one of the most impressive literary productions in the history of thought as much for their sheer bulk as for their literary quality and philosophical depth.

These factors, however, together with the controversial and novel nature of his theories created around him an aurea of legend and suspicion even during his lifetime. In spite of his popularity, his influence in Church Councils, the special favour of kings and princes, and his untiring fight against heterodoxy, his writings suffered a number of condemnations by official members of the Church hierarchy. One of the most serious of these was brought against him by Nicholas Eymerich, Inquisitor General of Aragon, in his *Directorium Inquisitorum* where he listed one hundred errors found among Llull's doctrines. Items 96, 97, and 98 in the Condemnation are related to the problem of necessary reasons. Eymerich condemns, first, Llull's pretension to prove rationally the articles of faith; second, the alleged preference which he gives to reason over faith; and third, his exaltation of rational certitude over the certitude of faith.<sup>40</sup>

As in the case of Anselm, there are many passages in Llull's writings which tend to confirm or disprove Eymerich's contentions, and just as in the case of Anselm's doctrine of necessary reasons, there have been several interpretations proposed as solutions to the apparently paradoxical Lullian epistemology. None of them are completely satisfactory, however, in part because they largely ignore the relations and similarities of Llull's doctrine with Anselm's, the most important exponent of this doctrinal emphasis on necessary reasons in early mediaeval thought.<sup>41</sup> Owing to the term-

<sup>39</sup> *Vida coetània*, ed. M. Batllori (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1948), p. 49.

<sup>40</sup> Nicolau Eymerich, *Directorium Inquisitorum* (Barcelona, 1503), ff. 101-105 and 122. Cited by B. Xiberta, "El presumpte racionalisme de Ramon Llull," *Estudios Lulianos* 7 (1963) 154 ff.

<sup>41</sup> For some of these paradoxical texts see *Libre de demostracions*, ed. S. Galmés in *Obres de Ramon Llull*, vol. 15 (Palma de Mallorca: Amengual i Muntaner, 1930), pp. 7-8, and *Libre de maravelles*, I, ch. 4, ed. M. Batllori

inology used by Llull, his unquestioned attachment to Franciscan thought, and the Augustinian character of his life, it is only in comparison with Anselm's doctrine that we can understand fully his contribution in this area.<sup>42</sup>

Like Anselm, Llull believed that the articles of faith can be understood and demonstrated through necessary reasons. Naturally, these "articles" included not only the existence of God, but also purely theological doctrines such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Second Coming of Christ.<sup>43</sup> However, he warns that this should not be taken to mean that our intellect can comprehend these truths. We can only apprehend them.<sup>44</sup> To exhaust the knowledge of the nature of God or of the doctrines contained in the Christian faith in an act of total encompassing, of whole and complete understanding, is impossible for man. Indeed, even the secrets of nature are hidden from his knowledge.<sup>45</sup>

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in *Obras Literarias* (Madrid: B.A.C., 1948), pp. 617 ff. The amount of literature on this controversy is very large. Most interesting are the following discussions: F. S. Blanes, *Bases criteriológicas del pensamiento luliano* (Barcelona: Schola Libera Lullismi, 1935); T. and J. Carreras i Artau, *Historia de la filosofía española; Filosofía cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, I, ch. 10 (Madrid: C. Bermejo, 1939); L. Eijó, "Las 'razones necesarias' del Beato Ramón Llull, en el marco de su época," *Estudios Lulianos* 9 (1965) 23 ff.; S. Garcías Palou, "Las 'rationes necessariae' del Beato Ramón Llull, en los documentos presentados, por él mismo, a la Sede Romana," *Estudios Lulianos* 6 (1962) 311-325; E. Longpré, "Lulle, Raymond," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* 9 (1926) 1072-1141; B. Mendía, *En torno a las razones necesarias de la Apologética luliana* (Madrid, 1950), and the article "Posición adoptada por Raimundo Lulio en el problema de las relaciones entre la fe y la razón," *Verdad y Vida* 4 (1946) 30-62 and 221-259; J. TUSQUETS, *Ramón Llull, pedagogo de la cristiandad* (Madrid: C.S.I.C., 1954); and from Xiberta the cited article and also the following: "La doctrina del Doctor Iluminado Beato Ramón Llull sobre la demostración de los dogmas, juzgada a la luz de la Historia y de la Sagrada Teología," *Studia Monographica* 1 (1947) 5-33.

<sup>42</sup> This aspect has been brought up in the article of S. Garcías Palou, "San Anselmo de Canterbury y el Beato Ramón Llull," *Estudios Lulianos* 1 (1957) 63-89.

<sup>43</sup> *Libre de demostracions*, ed. cit., p. 4.

<sup>44</sup> *Declaratio Raymundi*, ed. O. Keicher in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* 7 (1909) 100. See also the *Disputatio fidei et intellectus* I, 4, ed. Ivo Salzinger in *Opera omnia* vol. 4 (Mainz, 1721), pp. 481-482. For other Lullian texts on this point see the Garcías Palou article, p. 78, n. 53.

<sup>45</sup> *Libre de contemplació de Déu* III, 29, ch. 171, ed. M. Obrador y Ben-

Moreover, as was the case with Anselm, faith is the starting point and constant guide of knowledge. Its beliefs must be presupposed if they are to be demonstrated through necessary reasons:

“The gentile philosophers did not presuppose on faith what they were not able to reach through the intellect. On the contrary, they were led through necessary reasons, and thus their intellects could not reach as high in the contemplation of God as that of Christian, Catholic philosophers and theologians, who start in faith, presupposing that God is one and three.”<sup>46</sup>

Faith is the necessary disposition and preparation for the Christian to know the great things of God. Hence, it is not against faith, but with faith that Christian doctrines can be demonstrated, since without faith it is impossible to achieve understanding of these things owing to the inferiority of our intellect. Faith is the light of the intellect which raises it in the understanding of what the gentiles did not see because they lacked the illumination of this torch. It is, moreover, a disposition, a *habitus*, a quality given to man's soul by God as a gift of love by which the human intellect is able to overcome the handicaps of his nature and sinful state.<sup>47</sup>

Furthermore, beginning in faith and presupposing the doctrinal truths which accompany it, the Christian can proceed through necessary reasons to the demonstration of these truths to the unbeliever.<sup>48</sup> However, beside the requirement of faith provided by the Christian believer engaging in the demonstration of his beliefs to the unbeliever, the intellect of both must be sufficiently sharp and prepared to understand the process of argumentation. With the man of dull intellect, incapable of understanding the subtlety of syllogistic reasoning, only arguments from authority and miracles are effective in

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nassar *et al.* in *Obres...* vol. 5, pp. 27-28. By “secrets of nature” Lull understands both the *quid sit* of things, i.e. their essential characteristics in relation to their Creator, as well as the way in which natural processes take place. See also Carreras i Artau, *op. cit.*, p. 467.

<sup>46</sup> *Libre de maravelles* I, ch. 4, *ed. cit.*, p. 625.

<sup>47</sup> *Disputatio fidei et intellectus* I, 2, *ed. cit.*, p. 480; *Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in obiecto* I, 4, *ed. Ivo Salzinger in Opera omnia* vol. 4, p. 572. Garcías Palou has collected many interesting texts which support what I have said. See his *art. cit.*, p. 76, n. 50.

<sup>48</sup> *De maiori agentia dei*, *ed. B. Xiberta in Estudis Franciscans* 46 (1934) 307, 315, and 319-20; Cited by Xiberta, “El presumpite...,” p. 156.

bringing him out of his error. On the other hand, with the subtle man, it is much better to use natural reasons to bring him to truth.<sup>49</sup>

For Anselm, the power of these reasons lay in their correct syllogistic formulation according to the laws of logic as known to the eleventh century, the agreement of the conclusions reached with the beliefs of faith, and their actual foundation in truth.

For Llull, this is largely true as well, except that the formulation of these necessary reasons was not founded in the logic of the eleventh century, but in an original procedure that involved both metaphysical and formal elements. The thirteenth century provided him with tools to develop a highly sophisticated logical method based on a metaphysical analysis of reality whose influence reached as far as Leibnitz. I am speaking, of course, of the famous "Art."

The understanding of the "Art of finding truth," as Llull refers to this most curious methodology, is difficult, yet indispensable for a correct interpretation of Llull's place and importance in the history of thought and still more for an understanding of his doctrine of necessary reasons.<sup>50</sup>

The Art was, according to Llull, the result of a revelation. After his conversion, he spent ten years of seclusion studying philosophy, theology, and languages under the tutelage of an Arab slave. During this time he also composed his major work, the *Libre de Contemplació de Déu*, and formulated most of the guidelines along which his thought would develop in later years. After these ten years and during a period of retreat at Mount Randa in Mallorca, he had a religious experience in which, he claimed, the principles of the Art were revealed to him.<sup>51</sup>

After this initial insight, Llull spent the rest of his life structuring, substantiating, refining and simplifying this epistemological method. In spite of its mystical beginning, the method itself does not include any mystical procedures. In fact, at times it becomes quite formal and even mechanical. Moreover, it must not be con-

<sup>49</sup> *Libre de contemplació de Déu* III, 29, ch. 87, *ed. cit.*, vol. 5, p. 172.

<sup>50</sup> I shall not attempt to provide here a thorough examination, not even an adequate discussion, of the Lullian Art. My aim is, rather, to present a simplified exposition of some of the basic methodological and substantial principles on which it rests. Consequently, I have eliminated many important aspects and details of it which tend to confuse the reader who comes in contact with it for the first time. For a comprehensive study of the Art, the best so far, see Carreras i Artau's discussion, *op. cit.*, chs. 11-14.

<sup>51</sup> *Vida coetània*, *ed. cit.*, p. 53.



fused with logic or dialectics. For Llull logic is purely instrumental to philosophy and not a part of it as some maintained. Its exclusion from philosophy is founded on its inherent deficiency since it deals only with second intentions.<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, the Art, like philosophy, deals with first intentions and thus with reality. Nevertheless, the Art includes logic within it as a part, although it is primarily concerned with reality and not with concepts.<sup>53</sup>

This means, of course, that the Llullian Art is highly metaphysical in character, and any interpretation which presents it as a purely formal methodology, or, alternatively, a solely didactic device for pedagogical purposes, must be discarded from the outset.

Its metaphysical character becomes evident upon an examination of its principles, which are eighteen in number. Of these there are nine absolute and nine relative in the final version of the Art. The nine absolute principles (*bonitas, magnitudo, duratio, potestas, sapientia, voluntas, virtus, veritas, and gloria*) are predicated essentially of God, not accidentally. They are divine attributes rooted in God's nature. The other nine principles concern relations rather than natures and thus cannot be considered absolute. They are: *differentia, concordantia, contrarietas, principium, medium, finis, majoritas, aequalitas, and minoritas*.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> A second intention, if we may recall from the general philosophical terminology of the times, is a concept that is not directly grounded on reality, that is, on items falling within the Aristotelian categories. For example, the notion of category itself is a second intention since no such thing can be pointed to in the real world. A first intention, on the other hand, is the concept which signifies something to which we can point, such as "red," "man," etc. Llull is credited with having introduced these logical terms into the West. For a recent discussion see Kwame Gyekye, "The terms 'prima intentio' and 'secunda intentio' in Arabic logic," *Speculum* 46 (1971) 37-38. In Llull see *Libre de contemplació de Déu* II, 11, ch. 45, ed. cit., vol. 2, pp. 227 ff; See also *Liber the prima et secunda intentione* 1, ed. Salzinger in *Opera omnia* vol. 6, p. 538.

<sup>53</sup> *Ars Compendiosa inveniendi veritatem seu Ars magna et maior* I, 1, ed. Salzinger in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, p. 443; *Logica del Gatzel* 43, lines 1045 ff., ed. cit., vol. 19, pp. 42-43; And most important, the texts from *Arbre de sciència*, "Del arbre humanal," V, 6, i, q, and r, ed. S. Galmés in *Obres* vol. 11, pp. 215-216 and 222-223. See also Carreras i Artau, op. cit., p. 457.

<sup>54</sup> The number of these absolute and relative principles vary considerably in the different versions of the Art. However, their function within it remains more or less the same. See the article by Robert D. F. Pring-Mill,

Not less essential or characteristic of the Art than its metaphysical basis is its formal structure, an attempt at creating a purely formal system of posing, solving, and answering philosophical questions through the avoidance of the traditional pitfalls associated with verbalization and syllogistic argumentation. This is the aspect of the Art that is attracting more attention in philosophical circles today and specially among historians of logic, although a few years back, when a more metaphysical approach to philosophical speculation was fashionable, it used to be dismissed as "a lot of rubbish."<sup>55</sup>

The basic elements which Lull uses for building the formal structure of the method are four primarily: the alphabet, the figures, the rules, and the tables.<sup>56</sup>

The alphabet has nine letters (B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and K), each of which may represent an absolute or relative principle, a general question, a subject, a virtue, or a vice. For example, the first letter, B, may signify goodness, difference, a question involving possibility (*utrum*), God, justice, or avarice. Similarly, the letter C may signify greatness, agreement, a question of nature (*quid*), angel, prudence, or gluttony; and so with the other letters. (See Table).<sup>57</sup>

The figures are the second formal element of the Art. In its final and simplified version, the Art has four basic figures.<sup>58</sup> The first, called A, is a circle divided into nine parts or compartments,

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"El número primitivo de las dignidades en el 'Arte General'," *Estudios Lullianos* 1 (1957) 309-334 and 2 (1958) 129-156.

<sup>55</sup> B. Hauréau, *et al.* "Raymond Lulle, Ermite," *Histoire Littéraire de la France* vol. 21 (Paris: I. Nationale, 1885), p. 3.

<sup>56</sup> In fact, Lull divides the final version of the Art, known as *Ars generalis ultima* or *Ars magna, generalis et ultima*, into thirteen parts which include the definitions of the general principles, the discussion of procedural matters, the pedagogical rules for teaching it, etc. Most of these are not strictly speaking formal elements themselves. I omit some of them in order to simplify the discussion. There have been many editions of this last Art (see Carreras i Artau's list of Lull's works No. 54, *op. cit.*, p. 298).

<sup>57</sup> Earlier versions of the alphabet appear in the *Tabula generalis* and the *Ars inventiva veritatis*, ed. Salzinger, pp. 222 and 13 respectively.

<sup>58</sup> For the figures see the *Ars generalis ultima* II pars princ., chs. 1 ff., ed. L. Zetzner (Strasbourg, 1609), pp. 222 ff.; see also *Ars inventiva veritatis* I, "De figuris," and *Tabula generalis*, "De figuris," *ed. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 3-13 and 222-225 respectively. The figures as they appear in the plate below are reproductions of those that precede the *Ars inventiva veritatis* in the Salzinger edition.

ALPHABETUM

	<i>Principia</i>	<i>Quaestiones</i>	<i>Subiecta</i>	<i>Virtutes</i>	<i>Vitia</i>
B	bonitas	utrum	deus	justitia	avaritia
C	magnitudo	quid	angelus	prudentia	gula
D	duratio	de quo	firmamentum	fortitudo	luxuria
E	potestas	quare	homo (anima in <i>Tabula</i> )	temperantia	superbia
F	sapientia	qua	imaginatio	fides	acedia
G	voluntas	quale	sensitiva	spes	invidia
H	virtus	quando	vegetativa	charitas	ira
I	veritas	ubi	elementativa	patientia	falsitas
K	gloria	quo modo and cum quo (quo- cumque in <i>Tabula</i> )	artificium	pietas	inconstantia

each of which contains a letters (ex. B), a noun (ex. *bonitas*), and an adjective (ex. *bonum*), referring to each of the nine absolute principles of the Art. (See Plate).

The second figure, called T, also a circle, covers the nine relative principles and it contains three triangles. Each of the ends of these points to a letter. The first triangle, covering the principles of *differentia*, *concordantia*, and *contrarietas*, points to the letters B, C, and D. The second covers the principles of *principium*, *medium*, and *finis*, and points to the letters E, F, and G, and so on. (See Plate).

The third figure has thirty-six rectangles containing the different paired combinations of the letters found in the first two figures. (See Plate).

The fourth and final figure consists of three concentric circles of different sizes placed one over the other. The larger circle is fixed, but the others rotate. Each of them contains all the letters of the alphabet. The purpose of this figure is to integrate the previous three, combining the respective values of their letters into groups. For example, the group BCD in which C (greatness) unites goodness (B), and duration (D). (See Plate).

Another basic element of the formal method is a list of ten rules.<sup>59</sup> The purpose of these is to regulate and channel the philosophical questions that need solution. For example, questions involving possibility may be concerned with the doubtful, the affirmative, or the negative; questions of causality can refer either to existence or agency; and so on.

The last basic element of formalization consists of the table which results from the operation and combination of the figures.<sup>60</sup> Through the rotation of the fourth figure and the consideration of whether the value of each letter belongs to the first or second figure, Llull is able to produce a total of 1,680 different letter combinations. For example, using the fourth figure we can produce the combination BCD which may have different values depending on whether all (BCD), two (BC), or just one (B), of the values of the letters are taken from figure A.


<sup>59</sup> *Ars generalis ultima* IV pars princ., chs. 1-10, *ed. cit.*, pp. 40 ff.; see also the *Ars inventiva* III, "De regulis," and the *Tabula generalis*, "De regulis," *ed. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 37-65 and 235-242 respectively.

<sup>60</sup> The table did not change at all from its first version in the *Tabula generalis* (*ed. cit.*, pp. 214-220 and 242) to the last in the *Ars generalis ultima* V pars princ., ch. 1, *ed. cit.*, p. 258 ff.


# PRIMA FIGURA.




# SECUNDA FIGURA.



# TERTIA FIGURA



# QUARTA FIGURA



Four Basic Figures of the Art

An example will clarify the procedure involved. Suppose that we are in the middle of a disputation and we want to find out whether "goodness" that includes "contraries" is to be considered "great." The procedure in order to find an answer is relatively simple. First, if we have memorized the alphabet as Lull tells us that students of the Art should do, we know that absolute goodness is represented by B in the first figure. We also know that greatness, or its alternative form in the adjective 'great,' also belongs to figure A under letter C, and that D represents contraries (*contrarietas* and thus contrary things) in the second figure which deals with relative principles. Secondly, through the operation of the fourth figure we find that there is in fact a combination in the tables which puts together these three principles. Thus we can conclude that goodness is great even if it contains contraries.<sup>61</sup>

Although the number of ready answers to philosophical questions that the Lullian Art provides is limited by the combinations available in the tables, Lull believes that every philosophical question whatsoever can be fitted into one of these larger problems and thus answered correctly.<sup>62</sup> To determine whether this claim is true is beyond my task at the moment, although it is one of the most important aspects of the Art, requiring special attention.

As in the case of Anselm's doctrine, the strength of this method of finding truth lies in the unique structural combination of its formal and substantial elements. Formal strength is given to it by the certainty which a logico-algebraic method and its mechanical devices provide, avoiding the common errors made in traditional logic. The substantial strength comes from a metaphysical analysis of reality based on the truths of faith. The reduction of the absolute principles of the Art to the nine divine attributes through which all questions concerning reality can be solved shows how heavily Lull is relying on the Christian doctrine of creation for the construction and operational efficiency of his method. Without the presupposition that the created universe reflects in some way the essence of its Creator, the Art becomes nothing less than a confusing bundle of letters and figures. But supported by it, if we are to believe Lull, it will bring us to truth.

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<sup>61</sup> Lull gives many examples similar to the simplified one given in our text, some of which are rather confusing. See the cited edition of the *Ars inv. ver.* IV, p. I and the *Tabula generalis* V, *ed. cit.*, pp. 67-69 and 246-247.

<sup>62</sup> *Ars generalis ultima* V pars princ., ch. 2, *ed. cit.*, p. 267. Cited by Carreras i Artau, *op. cit.*, p. 444, n. 50.

The certainty that it provides, however, is not uniform. In the *Libre de demostracions*, Llull explains that there are three different degrees of necessary demonstrations and thus of certainty: the first is the sensual demonstration of a finite thing, as when it is shown that the body is bigger than the hand; a second degree, implying more necessity than the first, is the intellectual demonstration of a finite thing, for instance, that the soul is greater than its powers; and third, providing complete necessity and certainty, is the intellectual demonstration of the infinite. A case in point is the demonstration of the sovereign God.<sup>63</sup>

Moreover, the Art is not to be understood as an attempt to demonstrate the truths of faith through their causes since God has no cause. The strength of the necessary reasons which it provides lies, as in the case of Anselm, in two rather negative functions, namely, that the intellect cannot rationally negate these reasons and that it can solve any objections brought against them. Llull adds, significantly, ". . . whether this is to be called a proof, demonstration, persuasion, or any other appellative, is not important, because the fact that we accept or reject them changes nothing."<sup>64</sup>

It is not, then, within the limits of pure reason that Llull is trapped. His aim as that of Anselm is wider and deeper. In the *Libre de Contemplació de Déu* he writes:

"Whosoever wants to extend his thought and widen his frontiers, let him contemplate, Lord, according to the way and Art of this book; because using and trying the way and Art of this book, he will fall in love with You, and through this love he will extend his wisdom and his knowledge and his subtlety and his grace and his blessing."<sup>65</sup>

### *General Conclusions*

Looking back at what we have said, it is possible, perhaps, to draw some general conclusions concerning the thought of Anselm and Llull on the problem of necessary reasons. First of all we must note the similar Augustinian character which permeates the writings

<sup>63</sup> *Libre de demostracions* II, ch. 13, *ed. cit.*, vol. 15, pp. 92-97.

<sup>64</sup> *Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in obiecto* I, 4, *ed. cit.*, vol. 4, p. 572; See also *De maiori agentia dei*, *ed. cit.*, p. 319.

<sup>65</sup> *Libre de contemplació de Déu* III, 28, ch. 168, *ed. cit.*, vol. 4, p. 415.

of these two men. Anselm explicitly stated his intention not to depart from the guidelines set by Augustine, and although such a clear statement is not found in Llull, his indebtedness to the Augustinian tradition is unquestionable. Even their literary styles when we compare their prayers and continued outbursts of praise for God, the *genre* which they preferred, and the quality of their language, remind us of the *Confessions* and the *Cassiciacum Dialogues*.

Moreover, both Anselm and Llull give a predominant role to faith in cognition as the starting point and constant guide in the human quest for truth, although they reject the use of authority as argumentatively valid when trying to understand faith. The thought of Llull, however, is, as should be expected from the time when he lived, more scholastic. The original suggestion of Anselm as to the constant guidance of faith in the process of understanding has been substantiated by Llull with the Aristotelian terminology current in the thirteenth century: faith is explained as a *habitus* and a quality of the soul, as we saw above.

Finally, although both of these men help faith along in its quest for understanding with a logical *apparatus*, the simple dialectic of Anselm has become the highly technical and original methodology of the *Art* in Llull.

We must accept, in short, the similarity of approach in these two thinkers and the basic structural elements of their method, although the latter differ in details and emphases. In the stream of mediaeval thought which moved from a concern with *necessitas* in the age of the dialecticians to a concern with *probabilitas* in the fourteenth century, these two men find a place among those thinkers who trusted reason tempered by faith.

Only if we keep this in mind we shall be able to understand as historians of ideas the arguments proposed by Anselm and Llull in support of their beliefs. Also as historians of philosophical thought, I hope that we have seen the context in which the heritage of Anselm entered the thirteenth century and the respective places of Llull and Anselm in the controversy concerning the problem of faith and reason. Prof. Gilson has stated that "...Anselm did with the philosophical technique at hand in the eleventh century, what Saint Thomas was to do over again in the thirteenth century after the discovery of the entire works of Aristotle."<sup>66</sup> In terms of our discussion, I would like to qualify this statement by saying that although

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<sup>66</sup> *History of Christian Philosophy*, p. 130.



it may be the case that Thomas intended to do or in fact did in the thirteenth century what Anselm had done in the eleventh, it was Llull rather than Thomas who approached more closely the spirit and content of Anselm's work.

Furthermore, I hope that our discussion has illustrated clearly two other points: First, that the so-called "Anselmian and Lullian rationalisms" dissolve into what are, perhaps, two of the most eminent and genuine theological methodologies in the history of Western thought. All the most important characteristics of theology are present in them: an unquestionable faith, a search for the understanding of religious beliefs but always within the limits of revealed truth, and a tempered trust in the power of human reason.

Secondly, as a consequence of the previous point, it seems clear that both Anselm's and Llull's arguments have little demonstrative value in a strict philosophical sense. To the philosopher whose trust is not in faith and who is not preoccupied by an apologetic substantiation of religious truths, there is only occasional, and mainly formal interest in the writings of these mediaeval thinkers as the history of subsequent philosophical inquiry has proved so well.

In spite of these two rather negative conclusions, however, I believe that as philosophers we can find in the works of Anselm and Llull some valuable inspiration towards building an adequate philosophical methodology. In particular, their attempt to find a place and function in their speculations for man's beliefs and religious presuppositions is very important as well as their emphasis on the total human being as a cognitive unit. This is especially significant for the philosopher since to lose sight of man as a whole in a one-sided approach to knowledge which divorces his reason from the rest of his cognitive powers and other elements involved in his noetic activities is disastrous. Whether our task as philosophers is to describe or to discover, in both cases to forget some aspects of that with which we are dealing leads to failure. I hope that we are sufficiently wise to appreciate what Anselm and Llull achieved in this regard, while learning from their successes as well as their errors.

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