THE PRAGMATIC VALUE OF PRAGMATIC VALUES
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I. INTRODUCTION

In this paper I argue that Rorty's pragmatism fails to be a freestanding doctrine. Rorty's pragmatism is only tenable, I maintain, if it is offered against the background presumption of a substantive and unqualified realism. Our theories must be responsible to the world, in effect, in a manner typically affirmed by correspondence theories of truth. Hence, I argue against the adequacy of Rorty's pragmatism by arguing for the necessity of correspondence truth (heretofore, "CT"). And, more specifically, I argue against the adequacy of Rorty's pragmatism by arguing that the presumption of CT is a precondition for our possessing a coherent understanding of our own epistemic practices. By "epistemic practices" I here mean those practices through which we engage in epistemic valuation, judging some epistemic audiences to be "better-informed", "more reliable", or otherwise epistemically superior to others.

I concede from the outset that a full defense of CT theory would require more than an explanation of CT's usefulness. Such an account would also require an account of CT's nature. We would have to show, in other words, not only that CT is necessary, but that CT is possible, or intelligible. Here I am concerned only to do the first. Though bothered by this deficiency, I am comforted somewhat by the following rationalization: The need we have to render CT substantive is inversely proportional to the need we have to invoke CT in the first place. Like any theoretical concept, the more invaluable we can show CT to be, the less we need to explain and excuse it.

Before offering my argument, however, I would like to first spend some time rationalizing the counter-Rortian strategy that I have chosen
to employ. For, it is important, when dealing with an author like Rorty, to make it clear that one is fighting on ground he is obligated to defend.

II. “JUSTIFIED BUT NOT TRUE”

For specificity, let’s construe CT even more narrowly, specifically along the lines of Marian David’s “representationalist” account. Using this as a foil, we can conveniently describe Rorty’s most recurrent objections. On David’s account, “x is a true sentence of language y in context c = df. x is a sentence of language y, and there is a state of affairs z such that x represents z in y in c and z obtains.”¹ For critics of correspondence, this is a wonderfully self-incriminating formulation, highlighting all of the problems that Rorty and others have attributed to CT theories as a kind. On an ontological level, it highlights the need to characterize and individuate “states of affairs.” On an ideological level, it highlights the need to informatively describe the natures of the relation of “representation” and the property of “obtaining.”

So, what is the best strategy for arguing that the presumption of CT is a precondition for a coherent understanding of our own epistemic practices? Consider Rorty’s attempts to reconcile his rejection of CT with his advocacy of “progress.” One deflationary value of “truth”- talk he tells us, is its “cautionary” sense, its ability to keep us aware that “for any audience, one can imagine a better-informed audience and also a more imaginative one -- an audience that has thought up hitherto undreamed-of alternatives to the proposed belief.”² On this account, “truth” has nothing to do with “correspondence.” To say that a theory is “justified but not true” is only to speak of justification. It is merely to acknowledge that our current standards of justification might change, and that some superior audience might retrospectively judge the beliefs we currently hold to be unjustified. Having said this, however, our concern immediately becomes the following: “In virtue of what is this alternative imagined audience superior?” Rorty claims that it might be superior by virtue of being “better informed,” “more imaginative” or “more critical.”³ And

he wants to bestow these honorifics while unequivocally maintaining that
our cultural conversation is guided, not by "the natures of objects", but
by the conversational practices of our "fellow humans." However, is this
account fully intelligible? In particular, can we make sense of the idea
that one audience can be "better informed" than another without in-
voking some or other regulative inquiry-governing ideal along the lines
of CT?

Let's begin pursuing this question by considering an author who
thinks we can do no such thing, and then examine Rorty's first round of
response. W. H. Newton-Smith notes the following. If Rorty claims that
"something which it is reasonable to believe now is false just in case
someone may come up with a better idea" later, then he needs to tell us
"who is this someone, and in virtue of what would his or her idea be be-
ter?" Although Newton-Smith raises two questions here, his focus stays
on the first. This "someone," he notes, must be a hypothetical, rather
than an actual, person or community. Otherwise, the truth of our pres-
et beliefs could result from a mere lack of future inquirers, the result,
perhaps, of nuclear holocaust or forever-vigilant thought-police. Moreo-
ver, this creature would require "unlimited access to the evidence,"
thereby enjoying the use of "enhanced perceptual faculties" as it
"continues its inquiries indefinitely." It would be useful to ask, Newton-
Smith suggests, "whether we would recognize one of these creatures if it
were to come among us," given that it would seem to have much the
kind of "God's eye point of view" that Rorty so consistently disdains.

Rorty's response to such remarks is immediate. He alleges that such
remarks derive from a felt need to provide just the sort of definition or,
at least, criterion, of truth he recurrently eschews. The notion that one
community of inquirers might be "better informed" than another, he
insists, need not issue from a critical position of detachment from any
particular community, allowing one to inspect these communities "from
a more universal standpoint." In particular, Rorty insists, the notion of a
"better informed" investigative community here need not derive its con-

4 3. Rorty, Richard (1982): Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press), pp. 165-166.
6 Ibid., p. 27.
7 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
tent from any kind of limiting ideal. Given that Rorty’s chief ambition is to substitute the idea of “unforced agreement” for that of “objectivity,” he is obliged to eschew all “limit” notions for their efforts to direct us “towards a place which has been prepared for humanity in advance.” This is the heart of Rorty’s invitation to change the subject rather than talk about truth.

But, will this response do? Can the notion of one community’s being “better informed” than another be expatiated without reference to a “universal” standpoint. Or, more modestly, can we “non-universally” flesh out this notion of being better informed in a way that preserves the value we want to ascribe to it? Let’s build up. Starting with minimalist intuitions, let’s ask what we can take the notion of a community’s being “better informed” to consist in if we foreswear analysis in terms of the community’s beliefs better approximating some or other substantive relation of truth. C1 can hardly be more informed than C2 simply by virtue of having more beliefs. The character of its beliefs must be allowed to count. The difference at issue here must be significantly qualitative, not merely quantitative. Moreover, if it is to serve Rorty’s ultimate pragmatist ends, this difference must be both discernible and reliably related to the presence of features whose value we can plausibly defend.

Not that quantitative difference isn’t part of the story. Coherence, of course, is a recurrent court of appeal for Rorty, since it is, on his account, what we must largely pursue in our endeavors to “see how things, in the largest sense of the term, hang together, in the largest sense of the term.” And coherence, as Rorty invokes it, has both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. All things being equal, community C1 is better informed than community C2 if C1 has a larger store of coherent beliefs than does C2. Newtonian scientific culture was better informed than its Galilean/Keplerian forerunner largely because it hooked together systems of belief that the latter treated as disparate. This quantitative and qualitative dimension account of coherence thus satisfies the first criterion noted at the end of the last paragraph: It makes the difference at issue discernible. But, does it satisfy the second criterion? Does it show this difference to be reliably related to the presence of features whose value we can plausibly defend?

In this regard, Rorty is disinclined to treat coherence as of value in itself. Of more ultimate value for Rorty are other, more clearly pragmatic criteria such as predictive/technological efficacy and the exiguit of social conflict that "solidarity" promotes. The former, for Rorty, is a necessary feature of scientific progress. Once we recognize the declaration that science predicts by way of accurate representation for what it is, "an incantation rather than an explanation" (since our tests for the explanans and the explanandum are effectively identical), we are left to simply define scientific progress as an increased ability to make predictions. "We only call something a science," Rorty writes, "Insofar as it enables us to predict what will happen, and therefore to influence what will happen."¹⁰ "Solidarity," on Rorty's account, is the cosmopolitanism a culture acquires as it expands its sense of moral community by emphasizing the similarities and de-emphasizing the differences between groups of people. As such, it is as much a necessary feature of moral progress as predictive/technological efficacy is of scientific progress. "It seems enough," Rorty writes, "to define moral progress as becoming like ourselves at our best (people who are not racist, aggressive, intolerant, etc.)."¹¹ Thus, to claim value for coherence, on Rorty's account, we must pay ultimate deference to other, more transparently utilitarian values that beliefs can possess. But, here the connection is easy to make, since coherence is largely the very stuff from which "usefulness" is fashioned. Coherence helps create "usefulness" by enhancing the explanatory scope, and consequent predictive and technological power, of scientific theories. Hence, evolutionary biology is a good research program for its ability to wire up explanatory relevancies between fields as seemingly disparate from each other as virology and embryology are from geology.

For Rorty, this outlook has moral dimensions as well, since coherence promotes "solidarity" by requiring us to weave together the beliefs of as many folks as possible in the course of seeking, in lieu of objectivity, "intersubjective," unforced agreement among larger and larger groups of interlocutors.¹² Davidson casts a long shadow here. To achieve solidarity, or substantive agreement with others, is to make others more intelligible to oneself, thus enabling oneself to better appreciate the full range of both cognitive and moral community. In summary then, coher-

¹¹ Ibid.
ence, for Rorty, is to be recommended for its service to Baconian scientific and Deweyan political agendas, where this service is symptomatic of the fact/value collapse that Rorty recurrently presents as definitive of pragmatism itself. Thus, in addition to being clearly discernible, coherence is plausibly defensible, on Rorty’s account, to the extent that technology and solidarity are useful to human beings. C1 may be better informed than C2 by virtue of having a more coherent and comprehensive set of beliefs, but only if coherence manages to serve the ends of predictive usefulness and social solidarity, which are Rorty’s final courts of appeal.

So what about these two other more ultimate features, those of predictive/technological efficacy and social solidarity? Does Rorty have in these two features plausible alternatives to CT with which to make sense of the idea that C1 might be better informed than C2? Note from the outset that Rorty is more than likely to regard my phrasing of this question as completely wrong-headed. Referring to the criterial features suggested above, he is likely to regard attempts to explain superior informedness in terms of CT as having been a non-starter from the outset. CT isn’t discernible, he would tell us, because we can only claim to identify true theories through their usefulness and concomitant coherence. Moreover, CT isn’t reliably related to the presence of features whose value we can plausibly defend because it is only to the extent that theories are useful that they are of any possible defensible value.

In fact, we can say more about the connection between these two constraints: It is largely because CT lacks this first feature of discernibility that it lacks the second feature of intelligible relation to defensible values. Rorty describes this connection in several places, and he describes it in a way that renders it particularly germane to his perennial eschewal of limit concepts. Rorty denies that truth is of value as a limit concept. For, to construe it as such is to detach it so radically from our standards of justification that we are left with no way of ever knowing how close we have come to achieving it. Thus, for Rorty, the absoluteness of “truth” renders it unserviceable as such a goal. “A goal is something you can know that you are getting closer to, or farther away from. But there is no way to know our distance from truth, nor even whether

we are closer to it than our ancestors were.” To understand CT as a limiting goal of inquiry is to see it as something we could only recognize if we detached ourselves from any and all particular parochial investigative perspectives. But, this is impossible. “The only criterion we have for applying the word “true” is justification,” Rorty writes, “and justification is always relative to an audience.” Consequently, on Rorty’s account, to ask if our justificatory practices lead to truth is both unanswerable and unpragmatic. “It is unanswerable because there is no way to privilege our current purposes and interests. It is unpragmatic because the answer to it would make no difference whatever to our practice.” Undetectable relations cannot help us in our investigative procedures because, being undetectable, they can do nothing to guide our inquiries.

III. A STRATEGY

The simple observations in section II narrow down our inquiry considerably. For, by tracing the connections described above, we can now tell the following story. In lieu of CT, Rorty recommends coherence as a constraint on inquiry, but only to the extent that coherence serves the more basic pragmatic values of predictive efficacy and social solidarity. Part of what makes these criteria acceptable is that they meet the two above-discussed constraints: They are both discernible and reliably related (via simple identity) to the presence of features whose value we can plausibly defend. In the case of CT, moreover, we’ve been able to trace out a more precise connection: CT fails to be pragmatic largely because it fails to be discernible. Now, this delivers up some useful morals regarding the allowable forms that any defense of the necessity of CT must take if it is to be effective on Rorty’s own terms. In particular, we can now see that such a defense would have to be of one of two varieties. One of these is the following. We might argue that CT is, in fact, discernible. But, this would seem to be hopeless, at least on the sort of confrontational model of truth-discernment that Rorty offers, only to criticize, on which such confrontation would necessarily require a “god’s-eye view” or “cosmic skyhook” able to lift us out of any and every particular observational and descriptive perspective that we might occupy.

15 Ibid., p. 4.
Thus, it is important that there is a second form that our criticism might take. We might argue that CT is implicitly essential to any adequate understanding of how coherence, and its subsequent promotion of predictive utility and social solidarity, could ever constitute values for human beings. Note that this strategy is significantly different from a related strategy that Rorty addresses in appraising the claim that “science can predict insofar as it gets reality right” as “an incantation rather than an explanation.”16 I am not concerned to argue here that the inductive power of theories is only explicable on the assumption of correspondence. Rather I am concerned to argue that the pragmatic value of pragmatic values is only explicable on the assumption of correspondence.

Now, this strategy looks potentially promising. In fact, it looks as though it may be the only type of criticism we could ever offer of Rorty’s account that Rorty would be obliged to engage. As we have seen, there is a reason that Rorty is consistently unresponsive to his critics’ calls for CT. The pursuit of CT, as such, does not lead us, on Rorty’s account, to the ends of social solidarity and technological mastery that he feels are ultimately alone worth pursuing. Thus, to show that CT is necessary to an understanding of our own epistemic practices, we would have to show that CT implicitly stands in the background of any coherent story we might ever tell about what makes pragmatic features desirable. Rorty’s story about value must be shown to rely on discernible presuppositions about how the world really is. The value of CT must enter at the outset for Rorty or not at all. Otherwise, he will always be able to consistently avoid even discussing truth for his alternative strategy of changing the subject. We must show that realism lies at the very foundation of Rorty’s motivation for such avoidance.

IV. WHAT MAKES PRAGMATIC FEATURES PRAGMATIC?

The sort of criticism I have in mind here has been anticipated before, and more than once, in the literature. But, it has been typically anticipated in the service of other ends. Lawrence Calhoone, for instance, has this criticism in mind when he asks what Rorty could mean in invoking success or utility as motivating reasons for belief, in light of his

16 Ibid., p. 5.
own eschewal of transcendent and ahistorical stances. What, Calhoone asks, could constitute success or utility of beliefs for Rorty? "Success" implies that beliefs serve aims. But, Calhoone asks, what are these aims? It is not enough that Rorty simply identify these aims as those of harmony (promoted by social solidarity) and technological power (promoted by predictive success). For, if Rorty were to say this, we would then have to ask, "What are the criteria for success with respect to these aims?" And, in response to this question, it would, once again, not be enough to enumerate the criterial features we invoked earlier, namely those of discernibility and reliable relation to defensible values? For, even if we took "discernibility" to be unproblematic in this regard, we would still have to ask, "What is it that makes social solidarity and predictive power desirable features of belief?"

For the purposes of this paper, let's restrict our inquiry. Let's concede, for purposes of argument, that social solidarity is of self-evident usefulness for the halcyon harmony it promotes. Let's focus only on predictive efficacy. Calhoone's observation above, then, results for us in the following demand: Rorty must provide us with an account of the features of things that make predictive efficacy desirable. For, without such a story, "the curtain of silence [threatens to advance through [Rorty's] argument, [prohibiting] questions about whatever term functions as the norm of belief acceptance." I think that Calhoone's insistence here is both pointed and correct. Thus, the question that will preoccupy us for the rest of this paper is the following: "Why is predictive efficacy useful?"

Now, this question might, at first glance, seem completely unmotivated. That is, we might be inclined to think that the pragmatic value of predictive success is self-explanatory if anything is. But let's ask to what extent this is the case. Let's imagine how things might be otherwise, starting with the very general and advancing to the more specific. Certainly we must make some assumptions in the course of presupposing that predictive success, and the technological resourcefulness it affords, is of value to human beings, assumptions about both the nature of the world and human nature besides. Most broadly, we must assume that we are not the likes of angelic beings, enjoying effective autonomy from na-

18 Ibid., p. 310.
ture. We must suppose, on the contrary, that we suffer injuries and benefits, the subsequent maximization and minimization of which allows us to define for ourselves a non-arbitrary set of "interests." For another thing, we must assume that we are related to the world (or to at least some significant region of the world) in a way that allows conditioned expectation to provide us with an effective strategy for fruitful interaction with it. Future experiences of seemingly "causal" co-occurrences must, in effect, reasonably resemble past such experiences. For, only if such inductive regularities were in place could predictive success ever materialize as a value.

But, so what? As realistic assumptions go, these are certainly minimal. Are they enough to make us substantively responsible to the "something non-human" toward which Rorty expresses so much aversion? One might argue that these constraints constrain virtually nothing. Couldn’t we be methodological solipsists, for instance, assuming nothing about causal "regularities" anywhere outside our experience? It is important for our purposes that this isn’t an option for Rorty. Two reasons for this are self-evident: Rorty’s concern for social coherence is seemingly unacceptable to the solipsist, as is his abiding disdain for private epistemic intermediaries.

A third reason that we should take these realistic assumptions to be enough to make us substantively responsible to some "way the world is" requires a little finessing. Given Rorty’s history of disagreeing, not with the content of Davidson’s views, but with their relevance to pragmatism, I take him to follow Davidson wherever I can. I think this is sound procedure not only in the case of Davidsonian doctrines that Rorty explicitly endorses, but also in the case of Davidsonian doctrines that spell out the content of more general positions and conclusions that Rorty explicitly endorses. Consider, in this spirit, Rorty’s statement of preference for Davidson’s over Williams’ strategies for dealing with the challenge of external world skepticism. Rorty demurs from Williams’ interpretation of Davidson as attempting to refute the skeptic head on. Rather, Rorty suggests, Davidson seeks to "undermine the skeptic’s idea that we can know

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what our beliefs are without already having a lot of true beliefs about the causal relations between those beliefs and the world." Davidson argues this, Rorty tells us, on the basis of the crucial insight that "causality plays an indispensable part in determining the content of what we say and believe."  

This antiskeptical strategy with which Rorty expresses so much sympathy is a direct development of Davidson's efforts to construct an empirical theory of meaning, belief and behavior. Thus, it is relevant to us for two reasons. (A) Davidson's theory, as he develops it, ends up being part and parcel of precisely the sort of account that I have argued is required to rationalize the usefulness of such pragmatic values as predictive efficacy; (B) Davidson's theory is illustrative in that it carries in its wake so many presuppositions about how the world really is, especially given Davidson's predilection for semantic analysis in terms of distal, rather than proximal, stimuli.

The source of these presuppositions lies in Davidson's account of the basis of all thought and language. This is an account that presumes a picture of triangulating human agents comprising interactive communities in the midst of a single shared, prosaic environmental setting. Such an account falls directly out of Davidson's efforts to turn the traditional Cartesian picture of inference from inner to outer domains on its head. On Davidson's telling, the "objects or events" picked out by a speaker's one-word sentences (e.g., "Table," meaning "Lo, a table") originally become determinate only through acts of "triangulation." These are the essentially public and cooperative performances that are required for the references of one's utterances to become clear, even to oneself. As Davidson envisions such performances, two or more people react differentially to sensory stimuli pouring in from a specific direction. Davidson asks us to imagine lines projecting outward, their intersection converging on the common cause. If the people now note each other's (largely verbal) reactions, Davidson notes, each can correlate these observed reactions with his or her stimuli from the world." Without such triangulation, the story goes, a speaker must remain forever uncertain as to whether his table thoughts are about tables or some other sensory stimuli "at the sensory surfaces or somewhere further out, or further.

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22 Ibid., p. 159
in. 23 "We collaborate in locating the items to which we respond, in essence, by pooling our interests and similarity spacings, and then converging on those we have in common to identify a common point of reference. 24 Of course, this isn't merely a point about knowledge. It is a point about meaning, belief and thought also. "Until a base line has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point in saying that a person's... words have a determinate content." And in the absence of an answer to the question of where the source of our stimuli is, there is no answer to the question of what our beliefs are about," and thus no sense to our talk about belief-or thought in general. 25 The object or event at issue is only identified as an item in the external world when its identity is agreed upon in the course of communicative exchange. And it is only when this agreement occurs that one's relevant sentential utterances and associated thoughts and beliefs come to have specific propositional content.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Again, this account is relevant to us for the reasons cited at the beginning of the previous paragraph. (A) Davidson's theory, as he develops it, ends up being part and parcel of precisely the sort of account that I have argued is required to rationalize the pragmatic value of pragmatic values, such as predictive efficacy. For, the function of this account is, at least in part, to explain the value that inductive constancy and an invariant causal order have for creatures like us. These features of nature help make language possible by allowing communities of speakers to externalize objects of reference through processes of triangulation. (B) Davidson's theory is one on which a sizable portion of our ordinary and refined scientific story about human beings, the objective realm, and the relations there between, is necessarily in place from the very beginning of our talk about talk. The story in place regards the "world at large," the prosaic domain of common sense, and is presupposed in the wake of

23 Ibid.
Davidson’s admonition that we must adhere to “the basic intuition that in simple cases, words and thoughts refer to what causes them.”

It seems to me that this has immediate consequence for my purposes in this paper, especially on the assumption, for which I have argued, that Rorty is sympathetic to the sort of story that Davidson tells. Rorty, it would seem, assumes a great many things about human beings, the world at large, and the relations there between in the very course of understanding the worth that pragmatic values such as predictive efficacy have for creatures like us. On this account, the pragmatic valuation of the likes of predictive success presupposes a view of human beings as dependent components of a causal order which is occupied by the familiar public objects of prosaic discourse, in which agents cooperatively and self-consciously interact to make thought and language possible. I take this account to provide at least the outlines of an answer to our question. There would seem, indeed, to be quite a lot that we must assume if we are going to be able to tell a substantive story about the value that predictive efficacy has for creatures like us. A domain of prosaic objects, standing within a well-defined causal order, must be presupposed, on Rorty’s account, if we are to account for the pragmatic value of pragmatic values. This domain, standing in this patterned structure, defines a non-human way the world is to which our commonplace and scientific theories must be accountable.

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